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Abstract 
Earlier corporate governance studies have demonstrated the influence of dimensions 
of board structure on firm financial performance. However, the overwhelming 
majority of that research has been conducted within the context of advanced markets; 
little research relates to emerging markets, and particularly the Saudi Arabian market.  
 
This research extends the literature on corporate governance by conducting the first 
empirical investigation of the relationship between board structure and firm financial 
performance through bundling theory with contextual considerations for the emerging 
Saudi Arabian market. In fact, certain political, social, and administrative elements 
have significant influence in the Saudi market, where members of the ruling royal 
family, individuals from a privileged regional background, and government 
bureaucrats are the leading forces. In addition, the Saudi Arabian corporate 
governance environment is less developed – both in terms of regulation and 
enforcement of law – than in the countries in which most corporate governance 
studies have been undertaken. 
 
This research adopted a comprehensive theoretical approach provided by agency 
theory, resource dependence theory, hegemony theory, stewardship theory, and 
supplemented by other theoretical considerations related to an emerging markets 
context, to explain the effect of board structure on firm financial performance in the 
Saudi context. Since theoretical frameworks that examine this relationship in this 
context are absent, the research developed eight hypotheses to address this void. 
These hypotheses were that outside directors with royal status, outside directors 
originating from the region of Najd, inside directors with large equity ownership, 
 xiv 
inside non-Saudi directors, and Saudi Government Representative Directors (SGRDs) 
have a positive impact on the dependent variable of firm financial performance. 
Further, two moderation terms were introduced to reflect positive effects of SGRDs 
with outside directors with royal status, and SGRDs with inside non-Saudi directors, 
on the dependent variable. Outside directors with large equity ownership were posited 
to have a negative impact on firm financial performance. 
 
To test the proposed hypotheses, this research used a cross-sectional sample of all 131 
publicly listed companies on the Saudi Stock Exchange for the years 2009 to 2013, 
making the total sample size 655 companies. The data was collected from secondary 
sources and publicly available firm annual reports over 2014–2015. Quantitative 
analysis included descriptive statistics, bivariate correlations, hierarchical multiple 
and moderated ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. Several steps were 
taken to validate compliance with the OLS assumptions of multicollinearity, 
normality, autocorrelation, and heteroskedasticity, as well to assess the risk of 
endogeneity bias. 
 
The findings of this research indicate that directors connected to influential political, 
social, and administrative institutions – namely royals, individuals from the region of 
Najd, and government officials – enhance the financial performance of the listed 
companies in Saudi Arabia. In the absence of such directors, Saudi firms can witness 
economic and communication conflicts, particularly if directors with large equity 
ownership dominate the board. However, the alignment of large equity ownership and 
executive management would overcome these conflicts. 
 
 xv 
The findings imply that integration of theory and context provides a more accurate 
assessment of board phenomena in Saudi Arabia than in previous research. 
Optimising the recognition of board members by utilising powerful informal 
institutions identify the key players in the boardrooms who influence corporate 
financial performance. A contextually embedded configuration of board members in 
the emerging Saudi market yields better financial outcomes for firms and investors. 
Such an approach has significant implications for corporate governance theories and 
practices. Indeed, adoption of the effective Saudi Arabian board structures identified 
in this thesis could help resolve the problems of poorly developed corporate 
governance environments in other emerging markets. To enhance the generalisability 
of the findings of this thesis to other contexts, future comparative studies with robust 
analysis could be of a great significance and may lead to the establishment of a new 
vein of research. 
 1 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Board structure has a substantial influence on the practice of corporate governance in 
advanced markets, as well as in emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia’s. While 
previous studies of corporate governance made a significant contribution to theory 
and practice, they were predominantly developed within the context of advanced 
markets with well-established institutions, hence the applicability of their findings to 
an emerging market with different institutional settings is minimal. Indeed, prominent 
scholars including Fan, Wei and Xu (2011), Kearney (2012), Xu and Meyer (2013), 
Schiehll, Ahmadjian and Filatotchev (2014), and Schiehll and Henrique (2016) 
advocate that relying merely on the widely applied Anglo-American model without 
the integration of relevant theory with considerations of influential social, political, 
and economic contextual elements, a thorough understanding of the financial 
implications of board structure in emerging markets is inconceivable. Although a 
growing body of research utilises this integration approach to comprehensively study 
the effect of board structure on firm financial performance in emerging markets, 
empirical evidence remains relatively scarce, and some contexts are completely 
unrepresented, as is the case with Saudi Arabia. This background provides the basis 
for the research that inspired this thesis, namely that there is an absence of integrating 
theory with context when examining the impact of board structure on firm financial 
performance in some emerging markets. This thesis investigates that topic in the 
context of the Saudi Arabian market. 
 
This introductory chapter represents the beginning of this thesis. The chapter provides 
background relevant to board structure and firm financial performance in emerging 
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markets, and sheds some light on the Saudi Arabian market, economy, and 
institutional settings. Following that, the chapter explains the theoretical and practical 
significance of this research project, lays out its aims and research question, and 
finally presents the structure of this thesis. 
 
1.1 Research Background 
Corporate governance broadly refers to the mechanisms, processes and relations by 
which corporations are controlled and directed. Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) 
defined it as the ‘determination of the wide uses to which organizational resources 
will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the myriad participants in 
organizations’ (p. 371). Crucially, corporate governance is about the way power is 
exercised over corporate entities, and is centred in the board of directors. Directors are 
the owners – or serve as representatives of the owners – who have the final say, and 
also have the power to hire, fire, and compensate top management (Baysinger & 
Butler 1985). While research on board structure has long been theoretically 
established, it lacked thorough discussion and extensive evidence1 (Bhagat & Bolton 
2008). However, corporate scandals in the last two decades involving some of the 
world’s largest public companies such as Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat have drawn 
enormous attention to boards of directors (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach 2010). 
Since then, boards have been at the heart of the policy discussion and the target of 
academic studies. 
 
In this respect, La Porta et al. (2002), Agrawal and Chadha (2005), Withers, Hillman 
and Cannella (2012) and Joseph, Ocasio and McDonnell (2015) explain that firm 
                                                        
1
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicated that while there is some evidence about boards of directors from 
the United States, empirical studies from the rest of the world remain extremely limited. 
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failure is associated with board failure to effectively perform its designated role. 
According to the mainstream Anglo-American model of corporate governance, board 
members are expected to perform three major roles: monitor management and ensure 
accountability, set the strategic direction of the firm, and provide resource access and 
counsel to the firm’s management (Daily, Dalton & Cannella 2003; Newbert 2007; 
Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella 2009). Correspondingly, most of the discussions in 
the literature about the effectiveness of board deliberation have focused on the make-
up of the board. Indeed, prominent corporate governance scholars such as Dalton et 
al. (1998), Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) and Tricker (2015) note that the effectiveness of the board is embedded 
within the relationship of board structure and firm financial performance. Their 
argument is that certain structures of the board of directors influence the firm’s 
financial performance, thereby reflecting board effectiveness and deliberation. 
 
In recent decades, empirical studies have shown that various board structures enhance 
firm financial performance. While these studies have undoubtedly made a significant 
contribution to corporate governance theory and practice, the vast majority of them 
have been developed within the context of advanced markets (Wright et al. 2005; Fan, 
Wei & Xinzhong 2011; Xu & Meyer 2013). The underpinning theories used by these 
studies have originated from research on mature markets with well-established formal 
institutions. Hoskisson et al. (2000), Whetten (2009), Huse et al. (2011) and Marquis 
and Raynard (2015) point out that applying corporate governance theories and 
findings developed in advanced markets to markets in emerging countries, without 
considering the contextual uniqueness of those countries, may not produce valid and 
reliable conclusions.  
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Notably, relying merely on the predominantly Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance when investigating the effect of board structure on firm financial 
performance in emerging markets seems inadequate, considering the fact that those 
markets have weak formal institutions (Millar et al. 2005; Kearney 2012). Instead, 
aligning considerations to the unique social, political, administrative, and economic 
contexts of emerging markets that influence the formation of board structure and 
ultimately firm financial performance appears to be more enlightening. Indeed, 
Filatotchev, Jackson and Nakajima (2013) state that ‘the nature of governance and the 
effectiveness of well-known corporate governance practices differ across countries 
due to the broader sets of complementarities among institutions within the particular 
social, political, and economic environment’ (p. 979). 
 
Several researchers have combined theories relevant to corporate governance with 
contextual considerations when addressing the issue of board structure in emerging 
markets. Yet, two issues remain major drawbacks. First, the contextual considerations 
of emerging markets have not been consistently bundled with theory but rather 
deployed in parallel with it (Judge 2012; Claessens & Yurtoglu 2013; Yoshikawa, 
Zhu & Wang 2014). The lack of integration between theory and context, together with 
unmodified advanced-market contextually developed theory, means an accurate 
understanding of the board phenomenon in emerging markets is unlikely to be 
achieved. According to Huse et al. (2011), understanding the relationship between 
board structure and firm financial performance in emerging markets ‘requires an 
explicit involvement of context that underlies the premise of the research’ (p. 12). 
Schiehll, Ahmadjian and Filatotchev (2014) argue that research has yet to sufficiently 
explain the influence of board structure on firm financial outcomes from a view of 
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corporate governance systems as ‘comprising bundles of interrelated or even 
intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces’ (p. 180). Second, 
while this alignment has been addressed in some recent research concerning board 
structure and firm financial performance, empirical evidence remains very limited 
(Young et al. 2008; Aguilera & Jackson 2010; Estrin & Prevezer 2011; Zhu & 
Yoshikawa 2015), and in some contexts, like the emerging Saudi Arabian market, is 
absent. With this knowledge in mind, this research endeavoured to address the 
aforementioned issues in the context of the Saudi Arabian market. 
 
Despite the fast-changing structure of the Saudi economy in the late 1990s and during 
the 2000s, by the middle of which the number of firms listed on the Saudi stock 
market (Tadawul) had increased to 130, paralleled by the activity and number of 
traders, board structure was rarely discussed nor important for the regulator or 
investors but rather viewed as inessential and secondary (Al-Majed 2008; Tsamenyi 
& Uddin 2008). By the beginning of 2006 and just after market capitalisation reached 
an overwhelming value of around USD950 billion, Tadawul lost around half of its 
value in two months (Al-Twaijry 2007; Samba 2009). This market crash signalled 
serious concerns about corporate governance practices and revealed a lack of 
directors’ effectiveness (IMF 2012). As a result, the Capital Market Authority 
(CMA), which is the regulating association for Tadawul, issued its first corporate 
governance principles at the end of 2006, and revised them in 2009. The premise of 
these codes is to regulate the governance of Tadawul firms and improve their integrity 
and transparency (CMA 2010). Moreover, a major emphasis of these rules was board 
structure, such as chief executive officer (CEO) duality, number of directors, and 
directorial independence. Since the introduction of the Saudi corporate governance 
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codes, board structure in Saudi Arabia has started to gain a lot of attention from the 
regulator, firms, and investors (OECD 2012). 
 
It is evident that board structure has a substantial influence on the practice of 
corporate governance in the emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia. Yet, in 
comparison with advanced markets, there are no effective corporate governance 
practices regarding board structure in the emerging Saudi Arabian market, since the 
market does not have well-established and mature business institutions, a strong legal 
system, and reliable infrastructure to help to manage corporate governance challenges 
(Al-Hussain 2009; Robertson, Diyab & Al-Kahtani 2013; World Bank 2014). Instead, 
business players in the Saudi market tend to rely on strong informal institutions 
embedded in the Saudi economy, business, and society (Hertog 2010; Mazaheri 2013; 
Niblock 2015). In particular, the royal family’s ramified activities, the Saudi 
government’s lax – yet improving – practices, and the Middle East’s (ME) volatile 
geopolitical situation are highly influential in almost all Saudi business spheres.   
 
Including a distinctive public sector and economic capabilities, the unique 
characteristics of the Saudi Arabian context appear to have significant influence on 
past, current and future corporate governance practices, particularly board structure. 
In-depth discussion about the context of the emerging Saudi Arabian market is 
offered in the following chapter. 
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1.2 Significance of the Research 
The significance of this research lies in its contribution to the existing body of 
knowledge concerning corporate governance practices in the context of emerging 
markets. By examining the effect of board structures on firm financial performance in 
Saudi Arabia, this research was designed to uncover how these structures reflect the 
deliberations of the board to shareholders and other stakeholders through firm 
performance. 
 
As clarified earlier, the vast majority of the existing relevant literature was developed 
within the context of advanced markets, and lacks integration between theory and 
context when addressing the issue of board structure in emerging markets (Judge 
2012; Claessens & Yurtoglu 2013; Filatotchev, Jackson & Nakajima 2013; 
Yoshikawa, Zhu & Wang 2014; Schiehll, Ahmadjian & Filatotchev 2014; Marquis & 
Raynard 2015). Moreover, while theory–context bundled board research has started to 
gain some attention in recent years, empirical evidence remains limited (Young et al. 
2008; Aguilera & Jackson 2010; Estrin & Prevezer 2011; Zhu & Yoshikawa 2015), 
and absent entirely with respect to Saudi Arabia. In fact, prior corporate governance 
research conducted within the Saudi context has mainly focused on investigating 
corporate governance practices from legal (Falgi 2009), accounting (Al-Twaijry 2007; 
Al-Moataz 2003; Al-Angari 2004; Al-Ghamdi 2012) and social responsibility 
perspectives (Mandurah, Khatib & Al-Sabaan 2012). To date, there has been no 
empirical research investigating the relationship between board structure and firm 
financial performance within the emerging Saudi context (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi & 
Fadzil 2012; Fallatah & Dickins 2012; Piesse, Strange & Toonsi 2012; Al-Kahtani 
2014; Shehata 2015). It is clear, then, that Saudi Arabia, an important emerging 
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market, is understudied in the literature. Therefore, the significance of this research 
lies in its contribution to new knowledge, theory and practice, as detailed below. 
 
 This is the first corporate governance study that integrates theory with the 
Saudi Arabian political, social, economic, and administrative context in 
relation to board structure and its effect on firm financial performance. 
 
 This is the first study to empirically investigate the effect of board structure on 
firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia, which has been subject to market 
failure but has high growth prospects. 
 
 The extraordinary crash that Tadawul experienced in 2006 has put the 
effectiveness of boards of directors under scrutiny. Uncovering the effect of 
board structure on firm financial performance among the Saudi firms provides 
significant insights to legislators and firms about how to enhance corporate 
governance practices in Saudi Arabia. 
 
 The performance of the Saudi listed companies has fluctuated over time. In 
2012, 30 per cent of those firms faced negative performance as measured by 
Return on Assets (ROA) (Al-Rajhi Capital 2014). By revealing how certain 
board structures can affect firm financial performance in the Saudi market, the 
results of this study will help Saudi firms to improve their profitability and 
protect the interests of shareholders. 
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 Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the ME and one of the largest 
emerging markets. Its gross domestic product (GDP) reached USD750 billion 
in 2014 (IMF 2015). Besides Saudi Arabia’s significant geopolitical location 
in the conflict-ridden ME and its position on the rich Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), it is estimated to hold about one-fifth of the world's proven oil 
reserves and will continue as one of the biggest producers of oil for the 
foreseeable future (OPEC 2014). Since the beginning of the 2000s, Saudi 
authorities have introduced many economic reforms and eased many 
restrictions, which resulted in attracting about USD40 billion of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in 2008 (UNCTAD 2012). These factors add 
distinctive value and significance to this research. 
 
 Given the comprehensive approach adopted by this investigation, the findings 
of this study offer business and strategy professionals and organisations more 
accurate and informative insights with regard to corporate governance 
practices in an important emerging market, thereby its implications are both 
valuable and practical. 
 
 Given the magnitude and position of Saudi Arabia as an emerging market, the 
generalisability of the research findings to other comparable contexts is strong. 
Indeed, the findings of this study could be used as a benchmark for future 
comparative studies, and may lead to the establishment of a new vein of 
research. 
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1.3 Research Aims 
As the preceding discussion suggests, the broad aim of this research was to explore 
the impact of board structure on firm financial performance in the context of the 
emerging Saudi Arabian market through empirical investigation grounded in an 
integration of theory and context.  
 
Specifically, the research had the following aims – to: 
 
1) Understand Saudi Arabia’s historical, political, social and economic settings, as 
well as the Saudi codes and practices of corporate governance, with a focus on 
board structure. 
 
2) Conduct a literature review of research on corporate governance discipline that 
produces insights into board structure, research approaches using multi-theoretical 
perspectives provided by agency theory, class hegemony theory, resource 
dependence theory and stewardship theory. In addition, to review relevant 
contextual considerations related to corporate governance in emerging markets. 
 
3) Develop a conceptual framework that integrates practices of board structure in the 
Saudi market context with the trends in the development of board structure 
identified in the literature review. 
 
4) In the conceptual framework, produce an empirically testable, replicable, and 
comparable model, grounded in an integration of theory and context.  
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5) Gather, analyse, and draw conclusions on quantitative and empirical evidence with 
regard to the produced theoretical model of the relationship between board 
structure and firm financial performance in the emerging Saudi Arabian context. 
 
6) Update corporate governance literature by filling the existing theoretical gap in 
knowledge about board structure in the context of emerging markets, and propose 
recommendations designed to improve corporate governance practices in Saudi 
Arabia and other emerging markets. 
 
1.4 Research Question 
To this point, this thesis has demonstrated the practical and theoretical significance of 
this research project. In addition, it has provided the aims that guide its endeavour to 
thoroughly understand the relationship between board structure and firm financial 
performance in the context of the emerging Saudi Arabian market. Given this 
background, the following is the key question of this research: 
 
 Is there a relationship between board structures and firm financial performance in 
the context of the emerging Saudi Arabia market? 
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1.5 Thesis Structure 
This research project comprises eight chapters, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Thesis structure 
 
 
The thesis begins with Chapter 1 (the current chapter), which introduces the topic and 
provides the foundational background of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the Saudi Arabian emerging market context, by shedding light on 
the history, politics, society, and economy of Saudi Arabia, as well as the Saudi codes 
and practices of corporate governance with a focus on board structure. 
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Chapter 3 contains a review of the literature on corporate governance discipline, 
drawing comprehensive insights from multi-theoretical perspectives provided by 
agency theory, resource dependence theory, hegemony theory, and stewardship 
theory. It also presents a review of significant and relevant theoretical considerations 
for contextual settings in emerging markets. 
 
Chapter 4 proposes eight hypotheses that lead to the conceptual framework, which 
enables development of a model that integrates the Saudi context with theory 
illustrating the effect of board structure on firm financial performance. 
 
Chapter 5 explains the methodology and research design, including the quantitative 
methods, empirical data collection, and methods of analysis. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the results of the hypothesis testing and explains the parameters of 
the data. It includes descriptive statistics, correlation matrices, multivariate analysis, 
and post-estimation tests.  
 
Chapter 7 (Discussion) describes the outcomes of this study in relation to the research 
aims presented in this chapter and the extant literature. 
 
Chapter 8 contains the conclusions drawn from the research, identifies its strengths 
and limitations, implications of the findings for practice, and suggestions for future 
research. 
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1.6 Summary 
This chapter introduces this research project, which consisted of a novel investigation 
of the relationship between board structure and firm financial performance in the 
emerging Saudi Arabian market. It sets the tone for this thesis by identifying that 
there is an important debate on the topic of bundling corporate governance theory 
with emerging markets context. The chapter outlines the research’s theoretical and 
practical significance, articulated its aims and research question, and ultimately 
presented the structure of the thesis. The next chapter contains a thorough review of 
the historical, political, social, economic and corporate governance context of the 
emerging Saudi Arabian market. 
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Chapter 2 – Saudi Arabia and its Emerging Market 
 
In order to facilitate an investigation of a major aspect of corporate, specifically board 
structure, in the Saudi context, this chapter provides a review of the historical, 
political, social, and economic contexts of Saudi Arabia. This chapter also explains 
Saudi corporate governance standards, with an emphasis on the codes related to board 
structure. 
 
2.1 Historical Background 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has gone through three phases. The first phase began in 
1744, when Muhammad Ibn-Saud2 joined forces with Muhammad Ibn-Abdalwahhab 
3
 and established an Islamic emirate in in a small town near Riyadh called Diriyah 
(Lacey 1983). The emirate subsequently expanded to encompass the vast majority of 
the Arabian Peninsula, including the Islamic holy lands of Mecca and Madina. This 
expansion represented a major challenge to the Ottoman Empire, which ruled the ME 
during that time (Wynbrandt 2010). In the beginning of the 19th century the Ottoman 
army launched several military campaigns against the Saudi emirate, which resulted 
in the recapture of the Arabian Peninsula and the collapse of the Ibn-Saud regime in 
1818 (Lacey 1983). 
 
A few years later, an alliance between the Ibn-Saud family and Wahhabi religious 
scholars attacked the Ottoman army, forcing them to retreat from some major cities 
and towns. These territorial gains resulted in the emergence of the second phase of the 
                                                        
2
 Muhammad Ibn-Saud is the founding father of the Saudi royal family; the name of Saudi Arabia is 
derived from him (Reed 2007). 
3
 Muhammad Ibn-Abdal Wahhab was an Arabian Islamic scholar and the founder of the Islamic 
movement called Wahhabism (Haroon 2014). 
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Saudi kingdom in 1850, with its capital again located in Diriyah (Al-Rasheed 2010). 
In comparison to the first phase, however, the second phase involved less territorial 
expansion and increasing internal conflict within the ruling family. Consequently, 
after many military operations against the Ottoman army, the second Saudi kingdom 
fell in 1891 (see Figure 2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1: Expansion and duration of the first and second Saudi states 
 
Source: Lacey (1983). 
 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1923, AbdulAziz Al-Saud4  began a 
political campaign to unite the people of the Arabian Peninsula, most of whom were 
                                                        
4
 King AbdulAziz Al-Saud is considered the founding father of the modern Saudi Arabia, and viewed 
by Saudis as a reformist and righteous ruler. As a King, AbdulAziz Al-Saud owns the credit over the 
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stateless (Bowen 2008). His effort resulted in the establishment of the third and 
continuing Saudi kingdom in 1932, of which he became the first king. With its capital 
in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is divided into 13 administrative provinces (see Figure 2.2), 
all headed by members of the Al-Saud family (Zuhur 2011).  
 
Figure 2.2: Administrative divisions of Saudi Arabia 
 
Source: United Nations (2015). 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia in 1936, which he later started the large-scale of oil production in 1938 
(Reed 2007). 
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Occupying about 80% of the Arabian Peninsula with 2.5 million square kilometres of 
land, Saudi Arabia is the world's 13th-largest country (CIA 2015). Islam is the state 
religion. The country has a fast-growing population of roughly 32 million people in 
2015 (see Figure 2.3), with a median age of 26.4 years.  
 
Figure 2.3: Saudi Arabia’s population, 1950–2080 
 
Source: Saudi Central Department of Statistics & Information (CDSI) (2015), and United Nations 
(2015). 
 
2.2 Politics and Law 
The political system in Saudi Arabia is based on absolute monarchy; the throne is 
limited to male descendants of King AbdulAziz (Fundamental Governance System 
1992). Saudi Arabia has no legally codified or written constitution, but adopts the 
Islamic law (Shari'a) as the basis for its governance. The governance system is very 
centralised: the king is the head of state and the head of the government. According to 
the Saudi Fundamental Governance System (1992), the king is responsible for 
governing the internal and external affairs of the country, organising and coordinating 
the divisions of government, and appointing the heads of the executive, legislative 
and judiciary. 
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The decisions of the king are usually the result of consultations with senior members 
of the royal family and the religious establishment (Shoult 2006). However, the king’s 
economic and financial decisions are influenced by the recommendations of the 
Bureau of Experts (BOE), which was established in 1953 as a technical consultancy 
unit for the king (BOE 2015). Similarly, as it is not feasible to have an elected 
parliament in an absolute monarchy, Saudi Arabia created the Consultative Assembly5 
in 2000 as a formal advisory body for the government (Hertog 2010). Its 150 
members, all of whom are appointed by the king, cannot pass or enforce laws because 
legislative power is vested in the king (Majlis Ash-Shura 2015). 
 
Despite the fact that the Saudi Fundamental Governance System (1992) states that 
‘regulations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are based on fairness, consultation and 
equality’ (p. 8), some scholars and observers have questioned the quality of the legal 
system in Saudi Arabia, especially aspects concerning commerce and business. For 
instance, Niblock (2013) argues that the regulations regarding customer and investor 
protection, bankruptcy, and capital are often ignored and/or inconsistently enforced. 
Hertog (2010) notes that besides the fact that court proceedings are usually delayed, 
the Saudi judicial system often lacks transparency and suffers from interference and 
influence from the royal family. 
 
Nevertheless, Shoult (2006) and Ramady (2010) suggest that the introduction of the 
CMA in 2003, an independent governmental entity responsible for regulating all 
aspects of Saudi Arabian capital markets, has noticeably improved the enforcement 
                                                        
5
 The Consultative Assembly is translated in Arabic as Majlis Ash-Shura. 
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and implementation of commercial laws in the country. According to the CMA 
(2014), its main function is  
 
to regulate and develop the Saudi Arabian capital markets by issuing 
required rules and regulations for implementing the provisions of capital 
market law. The basic objectives are to create an appropriate investment 
environment, boost confidence, reinforce transparency and disclosure 
standards in all listed companies, and to protect the investors and dealers 
from illegal acts in the market  . (p. 24) 
 
Despite its low global ranking for the quality of its judicial system6 (World Bank 
2014), Saudi Arabia started ambitious legal reforms during the 2000s. The best 
examples of these reforms are the creation of a new court system in 2007 (Dammer & 
Albanese 2014), The Specialized Commercial Courts in 2008 (Kechichian 2013), and 
the National Anti-Corruption Commission in 2011 (Nazaha 2012)7. 
 
2.3 Society and Culture 
Saudi Arabia is a regionalised and (to a lesser extent) tribal society, based on Arabic 
traditions and influenced by Islam. While social behaviour is tightly guided by the 
local customs and norms, Saudi social development and change is a continuous 
process. According to the Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington (2013): 
 
Saudi society is continuously experiencing tremendous social development 
and culture change since the beginning of 2000s. The Saudi people have 
                                                        
6
 In 2014, the World Bank ranked Saudi Arabia 127th among 189 countries on judicial system quality. 
7
 Nazaha is the Arabic translation of the word “integrity”, and it is the short title of the National Anti-
Corruption Commission. 
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taken their values and traditions – their customs, hospitality and even their 
style of dress – and adapted them to the modern world (p. 3). 
 
However, scholars such as Falgi (2009), Al-Matari, Al-Swidi and Fadzil (2012) argue 
that despite the fact that Saudi Arabia has hosted millions of other nationals over the 
years, and although Saudis have been exposed to modern technology and education, 
Saudi society has changed very little. In particular, the long-standing social 
superiority of the royal family and some regions, specifically Najd (the central region 
of Saudi Arabia, which includes the capital Riyadh)8, has been the centre of numerous 
debates among social scholars in Saudi Arabia. Sabri (2001), Cordesman (2003), Bray 
and Darlow (2013) argue that the royal family’s complete control of the political 
scene, coupled with their exceptional wealth, confers massive influence over the 
introduction and implementation of laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia. Such vast 
authority and power gives the Saudi royals the highest status in Saudi society (Field 
1984; Al-Rasheed 2010). 
 
Likewise, people originating from Najd are considered to have high status in Saudi 
society, and are the major players in forming the culture of the nation. Despite the 
absence of official figures on regional identity, there is a consensus among social 
scholars that people originating from Najd account for 20–30% of the total Saudi 
population (Ibrahim 2006; Yamani 2008; Katz 2012; Alsaif 2013). Niblock and Malik 
(2007) explain that individuals from Najd have dominated the political and business 
scenes in Saudi Arabia due to ‘their family and personal ties with the royal family’ (p. 
22). The existence of these special ties is largely due to the fact that the royal family 
                                                        
8
 The region of Najd is composed of Riyadh, Qassim and Ha'il provinces. 
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descends from Diriyah, which is part of Najd (Champion 2003; Reed 2007; Al-
Rasheed 2010). Moreover, Al-Juhany (2002) suggests that the fact that most of the 
country’s religious figures were from Najd adds to the region’s social status and 
cultural influence.  
 
Hofstede (1984) argues that the structure of society strongly influences social 
behaviour and cultural attitudes. He proposed that power distance, individualism or 
collectivism, and uncertainty avoidance dimensions are the main pillars of national 
culture that shape social structure. Hofstede (1984) defines power distance as ‘a 
measure of the interpersonal power or influence between a superior and a subordinate 
in which the superior can determine the behavior of the subordinate’ (p. 72). Saudi 
Arabia is a high power distance society according to Hofstede’s (2001) standardised 
power distance index, scoring 73 (the highest score is 94). This notion is in line with 
the ideas of Alanazi and Rodrigues (2003) and Obeidat et al. (2012), who suggest that 
although Saudis consult with others, such consultations are most often limited to a 
few people or groups with social power. 
 
The degree of individualism or collectivism reflects the degree to which organisations 
emphasise competition and assertiveness versus interpersonal sensitivity and concerns 
for relationships. In Hofstede’s individualism/collectivism index (2001), Saudi Arabia 
ranks 41st, meaning that it is a relatively collectivistic (rather than individualistic) 
society like Australia with a rank of 90th. Gregg (2005) and Franken (2007) support 
these findings, arguing that as the family is the primary source of solidarity and unity 
among Saudis, Saudi society puts huge emphasis on collectivism. 
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Uncertainty avoidance refers to the tolerance of society members of uncertainty and 
the unknown, and the degree to which they attempt to avoid these situations (Ting 
2012). Hofstede’s (2001) findings indicate that Saudis are firmly among the highest 
uncertainty avoiders. As a very traditional society, Saudi people tend to be highly 
cautious towards new opinions and ideas, rigid and dogmatic towards cultural change, 
and slow in accepting and adopting modern cultural trends (Noer, Leupold & Valle 
2007; Robertson, Al-AlSheikh & Al-Kahtani 2012). 
 
2.4 Economy 
The Saudi economy is mostly oil-based, with strong government control and wealthy 
families exerting powerful influence over business activities. With its fast-growing 
GDP of USD750 billion in 2014 (see Figure 2.4) and as the world’s third-largest 
holder of foreign exchange reserves (USD738 billion – SAMA 2015), Saudi Arabia is 
the largest economy in the ME and one of the largest emerging markets (IMF 2015). 
 
Figure 2.4: Saudi Arabia’s GDP, 2005–14 (at current prices in USD billion) 
 
Source: SAMA (2015) and IMF (2015). 
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Despite the robustness of the Saudi economy, the country remains largely dependent 
on oil production and exportation. Oil and energy-related industries accounted for 
about 90% of national revenue and 60% of GDP in the early 2000s (SAMA 2014). In 
the early 2000s, the Saudi government sought to increase the diversity of the economy 
to minimise its dependence on oil income, introducing economic reforms in order to 
ease business restrictions, increase privatisation, and strengthen investor protection 
(World Bank 2013). It established the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority 
(SAGIA) in 2000, which aims to enhance the investment environment (SAGIA 2014). 
It also formed the CMA (in 2003) to regulate and develop local capital markets (CMA 
2014), and it became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) after 
enhancing its legal and economic systems (WTO 2005). These reforms eliminated 
many restrictions and improved the business environment, increasing the participation 
of the private sector and foreign investors in the Saudi economy (Ramady 2012). For 
instance, in 2013 50% of Saudi Arabia’s GDP came from the private sector, compared 
to 35% in 2003 (SAMA 2014), FDI into Saudi Arabia increased from USD1 billion in 
1990 to roughly USD 40 billion in 2008 (UNCTAD 2012), and the ban on foreigners 
trading in the local stock market was lifted in 2015 (CMA 2015). 
 
Nevertheless, some obstacles and shortcomings hinder the progress of the Saudi 
economy and discourage new investment. For instance, bureaucracy within the state’s 
departments is considered a major concern for current and new investors alike. 
Government efficiency in Saudi Arabia is ranked 90th in the world (World Bank 
2013); the government’s heavy involvement in running leading Saudi firms is seen as 
reducing the efficiency of the whole economy (Al-Hussain 2009). Al-Majed (2008) 
suggests that ‘the problematic implications of the state’s bureaucracy is [sic] more 
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perceptible when considering that many corporate chairmen and CEOs of companies 
in which the state invests have been appointed and monitored by the government’ (p. 
296). 
 
Al-Rasheed (2010) argues that, as a result of their complete control of the political 
scene, the Saudi royal family has gained a major position in the business community 
in Saudi Arabia. Murawiec (2005) noted that the Saudi royal family has accumulated 
its wealth over the years largely from multi-billion public projects, which are often 
granted to the family's private and semi-public firms. Similarly, the prestige of people 
from Najd has been economically exploited, as they occupy most of the senior 
positions in ministries and state-owned and partially state-owned firms (Long 2005). 
Niblock and Malik (2007) advise that people of Najd descent are second only to the 
royal family as major players in the business scene. Indeed, the current ownership 
structure of Tadawul, whose largest stakeholders are government, royals, and 
individuals originating from Najd (see Table 2.1), illustrates the dominance of these 
three forces over the Saudi market. 
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Table 2.1: The 10 major stockholders in the Tadawul* 
Name 
Ownership 
value** Category  
Public Investment Fund  407,583  Government 
General Organization for Social Insurance  130,637  Government 
Public Pension Fund  90,990  Government 
Al-Waleed Al-Saud  84,142  Prince 
Sabic  51,184  
75% 
Government 
Al-Rajhi Family  21,043  Najd 
Sultan Al-Saud  13,292  Prince 
Al-Rahi Family  8,993  Najd 
Al-Tayyar Family  3,476  Najd 
Al-Rabiah Family  3,098  Najd 
* Figures as at July 2014.   
  ** Numbers are in Saudi Arabian Riyal (SAR)9 million. 
  Source: Tadawul (2014). 
 
This oligopolistic control of Saudi economic activities raises questions about the level 
of corruption and transparency in the country, which could ultimately constrain the 
progress of the Saudi economy and damage the welfare of the nation. However, 
limited but continuous economic reforms, are gradually fostering the liberalisation 
and openness of the Saudi economy and enhancing its efficiency (IMF 2014). 
 
2.5 Corporate Governance  
The Saudi stock market began with the establishment of the first public Saudi firm – 
the Arab Automobile Company – in 1935. By 1965, Saudi Arabia had 14 public 
companies, mostly joint stock financial corporations with foreign banks (Tadawul 
2015). The market was loosely regulated until the introduction of the Companies Law 
in 1965, setting policies regarding the formation of public and private firms, 
bankruptcy, and governance (MCI 2015). Despite the fact that governance was 
included in those laws, the regulator used the term ‘governance’ mainly to impose 
                                                        
9
 1 USD ≈ 3.75 SAR. 
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certain restrictions on foreign ownership and management of Saudi firms. The market 
remained partially and indirectly regulated until 1984, when the government formed 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) to supervise, regulate, and develop the 
Saudi financial markets. Due to growing market complexity and number of listed 
firms increasing to over 100, the government established the CMA in 2003 as a 
specialised administrative agency to oversee Tadawul (Tadawul 2015). 
 
Up to 2006, the Saudi authorities had made noticeable progress with regard to 
regulation and control of public firms’ activities, creating a viable business 
environment (Wilson 2008). Yet, the lack of corporate governance standards 
remained an alarming matter for businesses and investors. Indeed, the country did not 
have governance codes outlining the principles and responsibilities of Saudi public 
firms. Al-Twaijry, Brierley and Gwilliam (2003) explain that internal auditing tended 
to be inadequately implemented and inaccurately reported among Saudi listed firms. 
Al-Hussain (2009) further identifies that the boards of most Saudi public firms lacked 
transparency and independence, and teemed with conflicts of interest.  
 
As a result of the absence of corporate governance standards, Tadawul plummeted in 
2006, losing 50% of its value in two months10 (The World Bank 2010). This market 
collapse caused a massive loss of investor confidence, and demonstrated the urgent 
need for a comprehensive corporate governance code in Saudi Arabia (Ramady 
2010). In response (as noted previously), the CMA issued the first draft corporate 
governance code in Saudi Arabia at the end of 2006 and a revised version in 2009. In 
the code, corporate governance is defined as ‘a framework that determines the rights 
                                                        
10
 Tadawul lost 980 points in one day (February 26, 2006). By the 28th of April 2006 its total loss was 
11,440 points, a fall of around USD500 billion (Al-Twaijry 2007). 
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and responsibilities among the various parties, such as the managers, board of 
directors, shareholders and other stakeholders in the company’ (CMA 2013, p. 4). 
 
Conceptually, the Saudi code of corporate governance follows the Anglo-American 
model, generally referred to as a ‘market model’, which focuses on maximising 
shareholders’ wealth (Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Al-Kahtani 2013). Practically, it was 
influenced by the Cadbury Report (1992)11, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002)12, and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) principles of 
corporate governance (2004)13.  
 
The general premise of the Saudi code is to regulate and develop Tadawul, as well as 
to increase firms’ credibility and transparency (CMA 2010). The code is divided into 
three main provisions: rights of shareholders and the general assembly, disclosure and 
transparency, and board of directors. Provision one provides brief explanations of the 
general rights of shareholders, facilitation of shareholders’ exercise of rights and 
access to information, shareholders rights related to the general assembly, voting 
rights, and dividend rights of shareholders. The second provision points out the 
policies and procedures related to disclosure, with emphasis on disclosure in the board 
of directors’ annual report. The third provision lies down the main functions of the 
board, responsibilities of the board, formation of the board, the functions of audit, 
nomination and remuneration committees, and conflict of interest within the board. 
(see Appendix 1 for the full version of the Saudi corporate governance code.) 
                                                        
11
 The Cadbury Report was the work of a committee set up to investigate the British corporate 
governance system and to suggest improvements to restore investor confidence. It was the first official 
corporate governance report to propose recommendations on the practice of boards and accounting 
standards that aim to mitigate internal risk and corporate failure. 
12
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was an act passed by the United States Congress in 2002. It was the first 
official regulation to comprehensively outline the rights and responsibilities of stakeholders. 
13
 The OECD’s principles of corporate governance summarise best practice. 
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The Saudi code provides corporate governance standards that enhance the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the Saudi market, mitigate firm internal risk, offer greater 
shareholder protection, and increase the level of trust among investors. Indeed, the 
Saudi code adopts the OECD’s six corporate governance principles, which cover the 
basis for an effective corporate governance framework, the rights of shareholders and 
ownership functions, the equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders, 
disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities of the board (OECD 2014).  
 
Nevertheless, the Saudi corporate governance codes can be criticised, mainly with 
respect to their regulatory process, comprehensiveness and implementation. 
Regarding the regulatory process, the code relates to areas that fall within the 
authority of both the CMA and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; the former 
regulates listed firms and the latter regulates all the firms in the country. Such a 
situation may lead to conflict between these regulatory bodies and result in conflicting 
laws. Thus and as the IMF (2012) proposed, the regulator of corporate governance in 
Saudi should become more independent and adopt clearer and more consistent 
regulatory processes.  
 
Further, the Saudi governance code lacks clarification of some important elements of 
corporate governance standards. For instance, while emphasising financial reporting, 
the code does not include any requirements concerning non-financial disclosure such 
as social responsibility, environmental reporting, or sustainability. Although this may 
be seen as a minor issue, these corporate governance shortcomings are likely to have 
greater negative implications over time for investors and companies (World Bank 
2010). The code also suffers from a lack of clarity and cohesion regarding internal 
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trading, dividends policy, voting systems, and board committee structure. Failure to 
explicitly defining governance standards about these issues could trigger the 
expropriation of minority shareholders (Young et al. 2008). 
 
Moreover, it has been reported that the regulator and firms often implement the Saudi 
corporate governance standards inconsistently and inadequately. For example, in 
addition to their vagueness and inconsistency, the sanctions procedures imposed by 
the CMA are not sufficient to effectively deter violations of the code (Falgi 2009). 
This weak enforcement of governance laws has encouraged firms to pay insignificant 
fines rather than fully comply with the code (Al-Kahtani 2014). Al-Matari, Al-Swidi 
and Fadzil (2012) suggest that the implementation problems of the Saudi code are 
largely due to lack of understanding about the importance of corporate governance 
among directors and executives in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The responsibility for effectively implementing corporate governance standards in 
Saudi Arabia lies with the CMA and listed firms. The CMA can establish 
information-sharing mechanisms to efficiently share all relevant information with all 
stakeholders involved in the market. Equally, it is imperative for directors and 
executives of Saudi listed firms to thoroughly understand the Saudi codes and 
increase their awareness of the significance of corporate governance. While the Saudi 
authorities and firms have recently made significant progress in establishing and 
adopting the best practices of corporate governance, issues relating to the 
implementation and efficiency of related regulations remain a concern for investors 
(World Bank 2016). 
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2.6 Board Structure 
Board structure has a significant influence on the practices of corporate governance in 
advanced markets, as well as in emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia (Klapper and 
Love 2004). While it lacks comprehensiveness and suffers from some weakness 
related to its implementation, the Saudi model of corporate governance emphasises 
the importance of boards of directors14. As per the Saudi code (CMA 2010; 2013), 
directors are divided into three categories: independent, non-executive, and executive 
directors. An independent director is defined as one who does not hold (or represent a 
person holding) more than 5% of the shares of the firm or its group, has not worked 
for the firm or its affiliates or group for the last two years, is not a first-degree 
relative15 of any board member or senior management of the company, and is not a 
board member of any company within the group. A non-executive director is defined 
as one who does not have a full-time position at the company, does not receive salary, 
and does not infringe any of the independence conditions mentioned previously. An 
executive director is one who is currently working as a full-time employee for the 
firm or its group. 
 
While it is consistent with the internationally accepted definition of directorship 
(Wright et al. 2013), the Saudi definition differs in classifying non-executive and 
executive directors as ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ directors respectively (OECD 2014). 
Further, the code states that at least three members and no more than 11 members 
should compose the board of directors, in which one-third of members should be fully 
independent. The code forbids executives to hold the majority of the board seats, and 
does not allow the chairperson to be conjoined with any executive position in the 
                                                        
14
 Refer to Appendix 1 that contains the full version of the Saudi corporate governance code, including 
the provision concerning board structure. 
15
 First-degree relatives are fathers, mothers, spouses or children (CMA 2010). 
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firm. While emphasising that the tenure shall not exceed three years, the code does 
not specify the criteria of membership appointment, the number of reappointments a 
board member can have, and the terminating conditions of board membership.  
 
However, concerns have been raised about the lack of implementation of some these 
rules. In particular, given that Tadawul is dominated by government officials, royals 
and individuals originating from Najd, ownership by these influential players could be 
seen as a major factor in determining the appointment of board members. If so, 
independence in Saudi boardrooms is at risk. Al-Kahtani (2014) claimed that the 
regional and family-centred nature of Saudi society makes favouritism and nepotism 
major methods for selecting board members. Similarly, Falgi (2009) found that the 
government usually influences the appointment and removal of board members in 
firms where it holds a sizable number of its shareholdings. Since minority 
shareholders have a modest influence over the voting process, Robertson, Al-
AlSheikh and Al-Kahtani (2012) suggest that independent directors in the Saudi firms 
are often selected based on their personal relationships with the controlling 
shareholders. 
 
Despite the inclusion of many good standards of corporate governance, the Saudi 
code appears to suffer from generality. Indeed, some crucial issues related to board 
structure remain unmentioned or ambiguously stated (e.g., the nature and limit of 
board interlocks, rationale of compensation, and declaration of ownership). It is 
evident that the code’s lack of clarity and comprehensiveness leads to intentional and 
unintentional failure in implementing critical corporate governance standards related 
to board structure among Saudi listed firms. 
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2.7 Summary 
This chapter provides a comprehensive background of the Saudi emerging market as 
well as its corporate governance code. The chapter also explains the historical 
context, political system, social structure, and economic situation of Saudi Arabia. 
The chapter offers a detailed presentation of the Saudi corporate governance code, 
with particular focus on issues related to board structure. The next chapter presents 
the theoretical foundations of the research, and a thorough review of theory and 
theoretical considerations related to emerging markets. 
  
 34 
Chapter 3 – Literature Review 
 
The research literature on board structure has its roots in various disciplines, including 
organisation, finance, sociology and psychology. There is, however, a general 
consensus in the corporate governance discipline that the underpinning theories of this 
phenomenon are agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976), class hegemony theory 
(Mills 1956), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer 1972), and stewardship theory 
(Donaldson & Davis 1991) (refer to Table 3.1). Despite the enormous volume of 
extant research addressing the issue of board structure and firm financial 
performance, little has adopted a comprehensive theoretical approach. Prominent 
scholars such as Zahra and Pearce (1989), Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996), 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Withers, Hillman and Cannella (2012), and Johnson, 
Schnatterly and Hill (2013) argue that reliance on one or two theories is the reason 
why research on the effect of board structure on firm financial performance has 
reported inconsistent findings. They recommend that comprehensive integration of 
board theories will lead to a more thorough and constructive understanding of the 
impact of board structure on firm financial performance. To gain broader insights into 
this relationship, this research built its theoretical foundation on the four previously 
stated theories. Moreover, since the targeted phenomenon was investigated in an 
emerging market, and given the significance of the context clarified in the previous 
chapter, the theoretical foundation included considerations related to the emerging 
markets context. 
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3.1 Board Structure Theories  
3.1.1 Agency Theory 
Modern companies often expand beyond the control of a single owner who is 
incapable of meeting the increased business obligations of the company. Concerns 
about the control mechanisms within public firms were firstly raised by Adam Smith 
(1776), who claims that public firms could never survive in a competitive business 
environment, and argues that the separation of ownership and management makes 
operations inefficient and would therefore bring these firms down. With the 
emergence of modern capitalism at the beginning of the 20th century, Berle and 
Means (1932) assert that management should be separated from ownership, and 
argued that managerial capitalism was able to both passively control and disperse 
ownership. They claim, however, that dispersed ownership creates a control problem 
in that it allows managers to seek personal benefit at the cost of shareholders. For 
instance, owners face two compelling risks: management hides certain information, 
which the owners cannot observe; and management makes decisions which the 
owners cannot control. 
 
Management and business scholars struggled with the risk-sharing dilemma until 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) offered agency theory as a convincing rationale for how 
public firms survive and flourish despite the presumed individualistic tendency of 
managers. According to the theory, owners receive scant attention from managers, 
who focus on enhancing their personal financial wellbeing rather than that of the 
shareholders. Consequently, managers can be viewed as agents, who should act in the 
interests of their shareholders, and owners can be regarded as principals, who should 
control self-interested managers. The theory particularly advocates that to ensure that 
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management is in line with owners’ expectations, a board of directors must work as a 
representative of principals (owners) and be responsible for monitoring agents’ 
(managers’) actions (Fama & Jensen 1983). Since the board adopts a control-oriented 
approach, monitoring duties should be separated from the rest of the firm’s activities 
(Lawler 1986; Eisenhardt 1989). In such a manner, the board avoids vulnerability as 
well as the need to trust individualistic executives (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman 
1995). As agency theory views the board of directors as a key component of the 
control mechanism, the structure of the board is of great significance to firm financial 
performance (Johnson, Daily & Ellstrand 1996; Daily, Dalton & Cannella 2003; 
Dalton & Dalton 2011; Chen, Hsu & Chang 2016). 
 
Specifically, agency theory posits that directors will succeed in performing the control 
role, thereby enhancing firm financial performance, only if board members are fully 
independent from management. It explains that directors’ independence is manifested 
through three channels: professional independence, institutional investors, and large 
ownership. 
 
Initially, independent directors (individuals who are not current or former employees 
of the firm) are assumed to provide more objective monitoring of management actions 
than other directors (Dalton et al. 1998)16. Since these directors are not part of the 
firm management team, they are not subject to the same conflicts of interest that 
might affect the judgments of executive directors (Payne, Benson & Finegold 2009). 
Similarly, independent directors are equally motivated to protect the interests of 
                                                        
16
 Wright et al. (2013) noted that general conditions for a director to be categorised as independent are: 
1) has not been an employee of the firm within the last few years; 2) has not had, within the last few 
years, a direct or indirect business relationship with the firm; 3) has not received any remuneration 
apart from director's fees; 4) has no family ties with any of the firm's directors, advisors, or senior 
management; and 5) does not hold significant ownership in the firm. 
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shareholders and to provide unbiased representation for minority shareholders, given 
their fiduciary obligations (Fama 1980; La Porta et al. 2000). Further, Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998) and Kroll, Walters and Wright (2008) caution that the independence 
of these directors could be challenged by the CEO’s influence over their appointment 
or remuneration. However, agency theorists have long argued that the main purpose 
of independent directors is to actively and objectively monitor management actions 
regardless of any influence from the firm’s stakeholders (Adams, Hermalin & 
Weisbach 2010). Therefore, given the significant contributions they provide by 
monitoring executives’ actions, independent directors improve firm financial 
performance (Dalton & Dalton 2011; Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 2014; Chen, Hsu 
& Chang 2016).  
 
In addition, agency theory advocates that the presence of institutional investors in the 
boardrooms of public firms is likely to solve the control problem caused by the 
separation of ownership and control (Coffee 1993). In fact, after financial scandals hit 
some of the world’s largest public firms (such as WorldCom and Enron) in the early 
2000s, institutional investors started abandoning their customary passive board role 
and became more active players in governing their firms (Dalton et al. 2003). 
Through their equity ownership, they began to have more direct discussions with firm 
management and less dependence on proxy documents. Such influence made 
institutional investors play a more significant role in prompting change in corporate 
governance standards (Aggarwal et al. 2011). At a macro and market level, 
institutional investors often enhance corporate governance practices and business 
liberalisation in some countries, but change in other economies – especially in 
emerging markets – will mainly be in response to government actions and changes in 
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regulations (Gillan & Starks 2003). Importantly, and at a micro and firm-level, Block, 
Barton and Radin (2002) propose that the foremost value of institutional investors is 
to improve the board’s monitoring mechanisms. Institutional investors can tackle 
control problems because they have the motivation to monitor management due to the 
usually large size of their shares in the firm, and are able to make changes because of 
their voting blocks (Bushee, Carter & Gerakos 2010). Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand 
(1996) assert that, while some may argue that many private institutional investors, 
such as banks and insurers, could face conflicts of interest, public institutional 
investors ‘are virtually free of such conflicts’ (p. 415). By having an active role in the 
board, institutional investors, especially public ones, can strengthen the board’s 
monitoring mechanisms, boosting firm financial performance (Dalton et al. 2003; 
Hambrick, Werder & Zajac 2008; Withers, Hillman & Cannella 2012). 
 
Furthermore, under the incentive alignment argument, agency theory suggests that 
large equity ownership aligns the interests of boards of directors and shareholders 
(Jensen 1983; Vafeas & Theodorou 1998). Given their large ownership in a firm's 
equity, directors have an obvious incentive to monitor top management’s decisions 
closely in order to foster firm performance (Fama & Jensen 1983; Singh & Davidson 
2003). Connelly et al. (2010) add that directors with large ownership are likely to be 
more efficient than small and dispersed shareholders in monitoring firm management, 
since they have substantial investments at stake as well as significant voting power to 
protect their investments. Besides their effective monitoring, directors with large 
ownership are likely to engage in responsible investments and be more committed to a 
firm in the long run, all of which would have a positive impact on financial 
 39 
performance (Hermalin & Weisbach 2003; De Miguel, Pindado & Torre 2004; Yeh 
2005). 
 
While it is obvious that directors with large ownership have both an interest in getting 
their money back and the power to demand it, firms and other shareholders can bear 
tremendous costs caused by these directors. These costs mainly arise from the conflict 
of interest argument within agency theory  (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988). For 
instance, recent findings indicate that directors with large ownerships can cause 
conflicts of interest between them and the rest of the board and minority shareholders 
by seeking personal and/or non-profit-maximising objectives through the 
expropriation of minority investors and through the incentive effects of such 
expropriation on other directors and stakeholders, all of which are likely to have 
reduce firm financial performance (Thomsen, Pedersen & Kvist 2006; Adams & 
Ferreira 2007; Renders & Gaeremynck 2012). 
 
Agency theory has gained its popularity due to its simplicity, as it reduces firm 
participants into agents and principals, with emphasis on the control role of the board 
and the notion of self-interest in motivating human action (Daily, Dalton & Cannella 
2003). Nevertheless, exclusive reliance on agency theory when investigating the 
effect of board structure on firm financial performance may result in an incomplete 
understanding of this relationship. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) argue 
that by labelling the motivation of managers and directors as materialistic and self-
serving, the theory does not thoroughly explain the complexity of human behaviour. 
Further, while this approach is favoured when cost control and productivity are 
important factors, the modern fast-changing environment could make this approach 
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less viable. Indeed, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) criticise the theory for limiting the 
responsibilities of the board to the control role and ignoring the significance of the 
board’s interaction with the firm’s external environment. Moreover, Johnson, 
Schnatterly and Hill (2013) found that empirical studies relying solely on agency 
theory have demonstrated conflicting results. To gain a better understanding of this 
phenomenon, they recommend that future research be supported by other relevant 
theories. 
 
3.1.2 Class Hegemony Theory 
The decline of family capitalism worldwide did not result in a spillover of equity 
ownership within the general population; instead, it became largely concentrated 
within the upper class. Indeed, concerns about the concentration of modern economic 
power were first raised in the United States in the beginning of the 20th century. 
Brandeis (1914) describes major banks, such as J.P. Morgan and National City Bank, 
playing a role as a financial oligarchy ‘to control the business of the country and 
divide the spoils’ (p. 27) through their business power and influence across 
businesses17. Social scholars and philosophers were heavily involved in studying this 
phenomenon, yet its economic implications were not thoroughly explained until Mills 
(1956) introduced class hegemony theory from a business and management 
perspective. Contrary to Brandeis, Mills (1956) asserts that ‘not Wall Street financiers 
or bankers, but the elite of large owners and directors in their self-financing 
corporations hold the keys to economic power’ (p. 125). He proposes three conditions 
for the emergence of the power elite: the growing dominance of public firms as 
                                                        
17
 Louis Brandeis was a progressive law scholar, who wrote a book titled “Other peoples’ money and 
how the bankers use it” in 1914, suggesting ways of limiting the power of large banks, which could 
explains his long-standing fight against highly powerful bankers. 
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opposed to state businesses, the increase in size of the federal or national government, 
and the growth of the GDP. 
 
The class hegemony theory holds that modern power is held by elites who sit on the 
boards of companies, and is shared with other elites who hold similar views of reality. 
Indeed, business power elites interlock through boards to progress their personal 
interests, and as a result company goals are substituted by the goals of the business 
power elite (Domhoff 1979). Through interlocks (the number of other directorships 
each director holds), the board of directors is seen as an instrument of maintaining and 
extending the power and status of the ruling elite. Useem (1984) was the first to 
conduct a systematic examination of business power elites. Through analysing a 
combination of archival data and interviews with 129 directors of major American 
and British listed firms, Useem (1984) found that both American and British markets 
are largely controlled by a few big firms ‘linked through concentrated and exclusively 
structured networks’ (p. 26) which is manifested in connected directorships. As a 
result, the elites become a cohesive social and psychological entity with common 
settings of interests, and guide the direction of this entity. 
 
Although network theory and class hegemony theory share assumptions about social 
exchange and networks, Davis and Greve (1997) clarify that the latter is tightly built 
on the notion that corporate networking is diffused only among business power elites. 
The theory specifies that only individuals with prestige or status are invited to join 
boards of directors (Westphal & Khanna 2003). By eliminating other social groups, 
the values and interests of the ruling elites are protected. Accordingly, board 
membership is determined by business and personal relationships between current and 
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prospective directors. Domhoff (2006) found that corporate elites in the boardrooms 
tend to invite new members who have demographic, educational or political 
similarities with them18. Such arrangements make the level of connectivity among 
these directors robust, thereby generating many ties among companies (Palmer & 
Barber 2001). Given that interlocking provides solidity, continuity, and stability 
among prestigious directors, it is therefore seen as a technique to clear the way for 
political and economic cohesion among the elites.  
 
Nonetheless, this directorial interlock can be seen as a co-optation mechanism that 
benefits the firms. Co-optation is defined by Selznick (2011) as ‘the process of 
absorbing new elements into the leadership and policy determining structure of an 
organization as a means of averting threats to its stability and existence’ (p. 14). Stiles 
and Taylor (2002) suggest that directors with prestige or status can reduce firm risk 
by horizontal integration (when some competitors are connected together through 
interlocking directorates) and/or vertical coordination (when suppliers or customers 
are invited to be board members). Burris (2005) further indicates that elite directors 
can reduce political and legal risk through their personal relationships with politicians 
and regulators, resulting in favourable laws for their firms. Correspondingly, the 
interlocks of the elites make their firms occupy a dominant position in the economy, 
able to co-opt forces and mitigate external threats (Markoczy et al. 2013). 
 
Moreover, class hegemony theory advocates that directors with prestige or status play 
a significant role in inter-organisation coordination and collaboration when ties are 
                                                        
18
 Since the 1960s, Professor George Domhoff has been arguing that corporate elites dominate the 
United States economical and political scenes. He published a book titled “Who Rules America” 
published in 1967, 2002, and 2006 which provides extensive qualitative evidence that support his 
argument. 
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broken. According to Davis, Yoo and Baker (2003), as co-optation instruments in 
inter-organisational interactions, directorial interlocks among the elites ensure 
financial and managerial control across member firms. Inter-organisational 
connections can also enhance organisational legitimacy and increase the firm’s 
integration with its environment. For instance, Ward and Feldman (2008) note that 
due to their reputation and influence, small and newly founded companies benefit 
more than well-established firms from the appointment of prestigious directors. 
Mizruchi, Stearns and Marquis (2006) further argue that directors with prestige or 
status are likely to have influence that can facilitate capital funding and reduce 
borrowing cost. In addition, Wurthmann (2014) reports that elite directors are likely 
to have superior access to new board appointments due to their friendship 
connections, established through their interlocks at various types of institutions, such 
as political, social and economic powerhouses. Since directors with prestige or status 
provide vital resources through their interlocks and reputations, firm financial 
performance will be improved (Burris 2005; Ward & Feldman 2008; Huse 2010; 
Wurthmann 2014). 
 
As class hegemony theory predicts, directors with prestige or status appear to have 
massive influence over the corporate community across the globe. For instance, 
although business elites represent a small fraction of the population of the United 
States, they exercise a substantial influence over the business community, operating 
as a governing class through several mechanisms, including their interlocking 
directorates (Domhoff 2014). Nevertheless, Zahra and Pearce (1989) have criticised 
class hegemony theory for ignoring the changing structure of firm ownership. They 
argue that although some individual investors still own a sizable share of company 
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equity, private and public institutional investors owned by citizens have become the 
leading forces in modern markets. King and Pearce (2010) note that the theory lacks 
specificity on how elite directors can enrich firm financial performance, except for the 
assumption that these directors increase the market powers of their firms. Huse et al. 
(2011) caution that previous examinations of this theory have focused on the 
relationship between wealth and power rather than examining actual corporate 
governance practices, and have produced inconsistent results. 
 
On balance, corporate governance scholars advise that exclusive focus on class 
hegemony theory when investigating the relationship between board structure and 
firm financial performance is inadvisable, thereby supplementation with other 
relevant theories is recommended (Huse et al. 2011; Withers, Hillman & Cannella 
2012). 
 
3.1.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
A fundamental element of organisational behaviour research is to understand the 
context of that behaviour – that is, the environment of the firm. This notion is critical 
for those who seek to understand organisations, along with those who manage and 
control them (Hawley 1950). Firms are unavoidably affected by their settings and 
situations. In fact, it has been suggested that all firms involved in business activities 
adjust their behaviours to the conditions of their environments (Katz & Kahn 1966). 
 
Given the considerable impact of environment on business, firms strive to secure 
access to advantageous elements of their environments. Indeed, Starbuck (1965) 
argues that a crucial factor of an organization’s success is to effectively manage its 
 45 
dependence on the environment. Thompson (1967) asserts that effective management 
of dependence on the external environment will eventually result in securing 
favourable resources for the firm. Despite the obvious importance of the environment 
for firms, much of the literature on organisations neglects this aspect. This was the 
case until Pfeffer (1972) introduced resource dependence theory as a comprehensive 
explanation of firms’ dependence on the environment. 
 
Grounded in sociology and organisational theory, resource dependence theory 
acknowledges the influence of external elements on organisational behaviour and 
states that, while limited by their environment, firms (through the board of directors) 
can play an important role in minimising environmental uncertainty and dependence 
(Pfeffer 1973). The theory essentially posits that the board should not be limited to 
monitoring management actions, but it should also be responsible for providing 
critical resources to the firm (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). Pfeffer (1972) suggests that 
‘the board structure is not a random or independent element, but it is, rather, rational 
organizational responses to the conditions of the external environment’ (p. 226). 
Accordingly, higher representation of outside directors makes the board of directors 
into a co-optative mechanism able to obtain vital resources, perform inter-
organisational networking, and increase the firm’s legitimacy (Provan, Beyer & 
Kruytbosch 1980)19. 
 
As the theoretical basis for the directors' resource role (Zahra & Pearce 1989), 
resource dependence theory identifies three dimensions in which outside directors can 
                                                        
19
 Wright et al. (2013) note that general conditions for a director to be seen as an outsider are: 1) is not 
a current employee of the firm, 2) has been an employee of the firm with in the last few years, 3) has 
had within the last few years a direct or indirect business relationship with the firm, 4) has receive any 
additional remuneration apart from the director's fees, 5) has a family ties with any of the firm's 
directors, advisors, or senior management, and 6) does hold a significant ownership in the firm. 
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be effective in performing the resource role. The first dimension is directorial 
interlock with other firms (Withers, Hillman & Cannella 2012). An interlock exists 
when a director sits on two or more boards. An interlock can be direct or indirect. 
Direct interlock occurs when one or more board members of a firm are on the board 
of another firm (Davis & Cobb 2010). Indirect interlock occurs when board members 
of two separate firms work on the board of a third firm, usually with the purpose of 
harmonising the operations of the companies involved (Davis & Cobb 2010). 
 
Scholars have found that direct and indirect directorial interlock play a crucial role in 
providing access to valuable information and opportunities (Daily, Dalton & Cannella 
2003), increasing coordination among businesses (Shropshire 2010), reducing risk 
and transaction costs, and serving as an instrument for the diffusion of know-how 
(Connelly et al. 2011), thus improving the firm’s financial performance. For instance, 
Hillman, Nicholson and Shropshire (2008) found that outside directors with customer 
or supplier interlocks provide the company with timely and critical information, 
reducing transaction costs and environmental uncertainties, and hence increasing firm 
efficiency. Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) also indicate that firms tend to 
utilize directorial interlocks with their competitors to deal with issues regarding 
competition risk and market share. 
 
Similarly, outside directors with bank interlocks can ease capital requirements, 
increase capital flows, and reduce credit cost, thereby enhancing corporate financial 
performance (Geletkanycz and Boyd 2010). Although resource dependence theory 
and class hegemony theory have similar views about how directorial interlocks can 
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benefit firms, the former emphasises that the board member is being recognised and 
organised by corporations rather than social class (Pfeffer & Salancik 2003). 
 
The second dimension in which outside directors can be effective in performing the 
resource role is directors’ social capital, in which directors’ social and personal 
connections with the board and society affect the function of both individual directors 
and the board of directors as a whole (Stevenson & Radin 2009). Social capital, often 
called relational capital, precisely refers to ‘the sum of actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit’ (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998, p. 243). 
 
Resource dependence theorists suggest that a director’s social capital plays a 
significant part in the board’s ability to provide resources to the company, which, in 
turn, is associated with the organisation’s financial performance. Directors’ social 
capital affects the advice and counsel they provide to management (Johnson et al. 
2011), influences decision-making mechanisms within the board of directors (Tian, 
Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011), and works as a channel for the flow of information, 
know-how, and resources both into and out of the firm (Oldroyd & Morris 2012). For 
instance, director social capital in the form of personal relationships with the CEO or 
other board members will most likely clear the way for more open communication, 
increase the quality of financial reporting, and enhance the overall board–CEO work 
dynamics (Kor & Sundaramurthy 2009). 
 
Likewise, directors’ social capital in the form of business identification (e.g., supplier, 
adviser, or attorney), sometimes called affiliated directors, has been found to be 
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involved in facilitating and assisting the CEO with some relevant tasks (Jones, Makri 
& Gomez-Mejia 2008). Moreover, a director’s reputation is considered a crucial 
factor in his/her social capital, which can also be seen as an informational indication 
to external stakeholders about the firm. According to Deutsch and Ross (2003), 
‘directors’ reputations act as a type of goodwill-assets that pay dividends to the 
holders by allowing them to make credible promises that it would not otherwise be 
possible to make’ (p. 1008). Recently, research on IPO (Initial Public Offering) 
companies has shown a positive relationship between reputable directors and firm 
stock price (Certo, Holcomb & Holmes 2009). 
 
Directors’ human capital represents the third dimension of the board resource role 
mechanism. Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2011) define human capital as the 
director’s ‘context-specific knowledge and skills obtained through work experience’ 
(p. 732). Put differently, it is the skills, expertise and knowledge that individual 
directors possess that can be utilised to enhance the resource role of the board. Haynes 
and Hillman (2011) argue that a high level of human capital within individual 
directors provides the firm with access to more advanced knowledge and generates 
more productive information capabilities. Indeed, recent studies demonstrate the 
significance of directors’ human capital on firm financial performance. For example, 
directors’ industry experience influences their ability to process and communicate 
information in the boardroom (Ployhart & Moliterno 2011). Such experience has been 
reported to have a positive effect on sales growth and the reaction of equity markets 
following both acquisitions and CEO successions (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 
2011). Similarly, the banking and financial expertise of the board member affects a 
variety of firm matters, such as financing strategies, earning management, and 
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decisions to hire and fire auditing firms (Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2007). Also, De 
Villiers, Naiker and Van Staden (2011) reveal that firms tend to appoint attorney-
directors to control costs related to poor environmental performance. 
 
To sum up, board interlock and human capital have been linked to the provision of 
tangible and intangible resources. This provision of resources by board members, in 
particular outside directors, has been shown to have a positive effect on firm financial 
performance (Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009; Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach 2010; 
Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013). Hence, resource dependence theory contributes 
substantially to the understanding of the board’s role as a linking mechanism, aligning 
the company with its environment. 
 
Nevertheless, this approach has a few limitations. The first is that it does not clearly 
define or specify the methods in which directors create their strategies to tie the 
company to its environment (Zahra & Pearce 1989). Secondly, since the board is 
structured and developed to achieve a better fit with the environment, this perspective 
oversimplifies the processes and individuals involved in composing an effective 
board, thus ignoring the complex nature of organisational adaptation to the 
environment (Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire 2008). The final limitation comes 
from Withers, Hillman and Cannella (2012), who assert that while resource 
dependence theory has become accepted and used in many studies, it has not been as 
systematically examined as might be thought. 
 
To overcome these limitations, Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014) recommend more 
empirical research. They further suggest that using resource dependence theory along 
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with other relevant theoretical perspectives would enable researchers to gain a more 
robust understanding of the relationship between board structure and firm financial 
performance. 
 
3.1.4 Stewardship Theory 
Most organisational theories have been predominantly influenced by agency theory, 
which views management in modern firms as agents whose interests may differ from 
those of owners. To overcome this interest divergence problem, agency theory 
suggests applying control mechanisms to monitor the agent’s presumed individualistic 
behaviour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Although agency theory appears to be the 
dominant approach underlying most corporate governance studies, scholars in 
psychology and sociology have identified theoretical limitations to this approach. 
Precisely, the assumptions made by the economic rationality perspective about 
individualistic utility and extrinsic motivations may not hold for all stakeholders, 
including board members (Hirsch, Michaels & Friedman 1987). Perrow (1986) 
clarifies that ‘there is no innate tendency to either self or other regarding behaviour in 
people; either can be evoked depending on the structure’ (p. 234). He further explains 
that when agency theorists examine the structures favoured by capitalism and 
bureaucracy based on self-regarding behaviour, they assume that this is human nature. 
Yet, they neglect the enormous amount of neutral and other aspects regarding 
behaviour that exists and the structures that might change it. He concludes by arguing 
that what agency theory takes for granted should be taken as a problem, and therefore 
an additional theoretical perspective built upon a non-economic approach is needed to 
further explain organisations’ complexities. 
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Donaldson and Davis (1991) filled this knowledge gap by introducing stewardship 
theory as a theoretical approach that defines business relationships based upon 
behaviour, in which managers are seen as stewards and motivated to act in the best 
interests of shareholders. The theory posits, ‘the model of man is based on a steward 
whose behaviour is ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviours 
have higher utility than individualistic, self-serving behaviours’ (Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson 1997, p. 24). In other words, the manager strikes a balance between 
individual interests and the firm’s goals, and by working collectively towards serving 
the firm, personal needs are achieved. Hence, the opportunity of the steward is 
controlled by the notion that the benefits reaped from pro-organisational behaviour 
are greater than the benefits received from individualistic behaviour (Fox and 
Hamilton 1994). 
 
Stewardship scholars have suggested three behavioural premises that underpin the 
theory. The first is manager motivation, in which the focus is on intrinsic rewards 
rather than financial, tangible and exchangeable (extrinsic) rewards (Muth & 
Donaldson 1998). Opportunities for growth, achievement, recognition and affiliation 
are examples of intrinsic rewards. In such a way, relationships built on stewardship 
theory are strengthened by these non-financial, intangible rewards, thereby managers 
are determined to work in line with shareholders’ interests (Miller & Breton-Miller 
2006). 
 
The second premise is manager identification with the firm, which refers to the 
manager establishing his/her involvement with the firm based on the adoption of the 
company’s values, objectives and vision, creating a mutually beneficial relationship 
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(Mael & Ashforth 1992). Given strong identification with their firms, managers are 
expected to engage in collaborative, selfless, and intangible rewarded behaviours, and 
be committed to helping their firms succeed (Caldwell, Karri & Vollmar 2006). 
 
The final premise is personal power, which is a central factor in the relationship 
between managers and shareholders (Pettigrew & McNulty 1995). Personal power, 
such as expertise and knowledge, is an inherent element of the manager’s 
characteristics, and is not affected by managerial level. Although usually requiring 
lengthy development, personal power is more sustainable than institutional or 
organisational power, hence personal power is regarded as the spine of stewardship 
theory (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997). 
 
Based on these premises, stewardship theory explicitly emphasises that inside 
directors should occupy a major presence in the boardroom to monitor the strategic 
direction of the firm (Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011)20. Precisely, it theorises that the 
primary mission of the board is to formulate firm strategies, set policies and 
expansion plans, and allocate resources, bearing in mind that the focus is within firms 
and on internal matters, rather than emphasising external elements affecting 
shareholders (Stiles 2001). Pugliese et al. (2009) go further and argue that boards of 
directors should act mainly as consultants to the CEO on strategy, advising and 
assessing management plans. That said, it is no surprise that stewardship theorists are 
strong advocates for CEO duality (Boyd 1995; Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011; Krause, 
Semadeni & Cannella 2014).  
 
                                                        
20
 Lussier & Sherman (2014) define an inside director as a board member who is a current employee of 
the firm, which often hold a high managerial position such as the president, CEO or senior manager. 
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Stewardship theorists have posited three main reasons behind the notion that inside 
directors are the key and most suitable players to perform the board strategy 
formalisation role. Firstly, Coles, McWilliams and Sen (2001) suggest that inside 
directors are appropriate candidates for the role due to the fact that managers are 
assumed to be trustworthy and will not misuse firm resources. Secondly, inside 
directors provide a significant strategic contribution because they are better informed 
about firm operations, have more knowledge of business details, and have extensive 
access to information (Petrovic 2008). Thirdly, given that managers are (presumably) 
committed to a long-term association with the firm, this stability maximises the 
significant role of inside directors in articulating firm strategy (Simsek 2007; 
Musteen, Barker & Baeten 2010). 
 
It appears, then, that stewardship theory opposes agency theory’s premise about the 
need for independent directors, viewing such independence as inessential (Dalton et 
al. 1998). Further, stewardship theory advocates also challenge resource dependence 
theory’s view on outside directors, which is that such directors are part-timers who 
are likely to dedicate limited time to any single firm and lack sufficient knowledge of 
the firm and its operations to foster the strategy formalisation role of the board (Stiles 
2001). Since the main principle of this approach is the board’s effective performance 
of its strategy role, stewardship theory holds that a board of directors with a higher 
representation of inside directors will perform better than those with a lower 
proportion, hence improving firm financial performance (Pugliese et al. 2009; Boyd, 
Haynes & Zona 2011; Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 2014). 
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In brief, stewardship theory projects positive results on firm financial outcomes for 
having a facilitative leadership composition, which brings together the authority and 
the command of the inside directors. Some stewardship advocates propose that the 
sensible extension of the board concept is either towards an inside-directors-
dominated board or towards no board at all. Turnbull (2000), Clarke and Dela-Rama 
(2008) and Carter and Lorsch (2013) also suggest that a board ruled by outside 
directors is a structurally ineffective mechanism. From this perspective, the whole 
logic for having a board becomes questionable. However, these views have been 
contested. In particular, Petrovic (2008) explains that outside directors’ indirect 
involvement in the day-to-day activities of the firm makes them critical in offering an 
external perspective to help develop the firm’s strategy and provide fresh views. 
Moreover, Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997), the founders of the theory, have 
state that ‘the role of a long-term relationship is central to the choice of stewardship 
theory in board functionality’ (p. 62). 
 
Yet, some studies reveal a systematic negative relationship between inside directors’ 
tenure and strategy role or strategic change. For example, Karaevli and Zajac (2013) 
demonstrate that inside directors with long tenure often ignore calls for strategic 
change. The findings of Luo, Kanuri and Andrews (2014) further support this notion, 
implying that even experienced inside directors cannot devote sustained effort to their 
firms in the current modern and highly competitive marketplace. However, Yunlu and 
Murphy’s (2012) meta-analysis found that the relationship between inside directors’ 
tenure and their strategy role is not always negative; they identified that inside 
directors tend to make fewer changes in strategy as their tenure increases. More 
importantly, given the theoretical perspective that board independence embedded 
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within outside directors is not critical, some corporate governance scholars warn that 
the dominance of inside directors in boardrooms is associated with bankruptcy and 
fraudulent financial reporting (Dunn 2004; Hermann & Nadkarni 2013). 
 
It appears therefore, that when investigating board structure and firm financial 
performance, stewardship theory should not be used solely or as a counter-theory for 
agency theory. Instead, used alongside other relevant theories such as agency, class 
hegemony, and resource dependence theories, stewardship theory can offer a 
complementary, more comprehensive explanation and insights when examining this 
relationship (Turnbull 2000; Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001; Christopher 2010; 
Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013; Lussier & Sherman 2014). Table 3.1 provides a 
summary of agency, class hegemony, resource dependence, and stewardship theories’ 
explanations of the relationship between board structure and firm financial 
performance.
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Table 3.1: Agency, class hegemony, resource dependence, and stewardship theories’ explanations of the relationship between board structure 
and firm financial performance 
  Agency Theory Class Hegemony Theory Resource Dependence Theory Stewardship Theory 
 Board Composition  Independent directors and 
institutional directors 
Directors with prestige or 
status and their affiliates 
Outside directors Inside directors 
Formalization Base Independence Social class Human and social capital Knowledge of the firm 
and industry 
Board Role Control Resource Resource Strategy 
The Role Applications Board monitors actions of 
agents to reduce agency cost 
and ensure firm efficiency to 
protect principals' interest. 
Board perpetuates the power 
and control of the ruling 
capitalist elite over social and 
economic institutions. This 
reduces transaction costs for 
member firms, provides 
legitimation, and supports 
existing power elites. 
Board works as a co-optative 
and boundary-spanning 
mechanism to extract 
resources vital to the firm, 
thereby enhancing 
organizational legitimacy and 
performance. 
Inside directors are 
trusted, involvement 
oriented, with long-term 
commitment. Due to 
having self-actualising 
and collective serving 
behaviour, their interests 
are aligned with 
shareholders’ interests. 
Time Focus Short-term Short-term and long-term Short-term and long-term Long-term 
Assumptions about 
People 
Individualistic Individualistic Individualistic Collectivistic 
Management 
Commitment / 
Involvement 
Limited Limited Moderate Strong 
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Table 3.1 continued Agency Theory Class Hegemony Theory Resource Dependence Theory Stewardship Theory 
Compensation 
Emphasis / Sensitivity 
High Moderate Moderate Low 
Theoretical Origin Economic and finance Marxist sociology Organization and sociology Psychology and sociology 
Firm Performance 
Criteria 
Survival, low operating cost, 
and profitability 
Oligopolistic market power 
and profitability 
Relative market position, 
growth in resources, and 
profitability 
Goal achievement, long-
term growth, and 
profitability 
Empirical Support Moderate Limited Moderate Moderate 
Representative 
Studies 
Jensen & Meckling 1976, Fama 
& Jensen 1983, Lawler 1986, 
Zahra & Pearce 1989, 
Eisenhardt 1989, Coffee 1993, 
Mayer et al. 1995, Johnson, 
Daily & Ellstrand 1996, Dalton 
et al. 1998, Hermalin & 
Weisbach 1998, Coles, 
McWilliams & Sen 2001, 
Block, Barton & Radin 2002, 
Hillman & Dalziel 2003, Daily 
et al. 2003, Dalton et al. 2003, 
Hambrick, Werder & Zajac 
2008, Bhagat & Bolton 2008, 
Bushee, Carter & Gerakos 
2010, Dalton & Dalton 2011, 
Withers, Hillman & Cannella 
2012, Chen et al. 2015 
Mills 1956, Useem 1984, 
Domhoff & Dye 1987, Zahra 
& Pearce 1989, Mizruchi 1996, 
Palmer & Barber 2001, Taylor 
2002, Westphal & Khanna 
2003, Davis, Yoo & Baker 
2003, Burris 2005, Domhoff 
2006, Mizruchi, Stearns & 
Marquis 2006, Ward & 
Feldman 2008, Huse et al. 
2011, Markoczy et al. 2013, 
Wurthmann 2014, Domhoff 
2014 
Pfeffer 1972, Pfeffer 1973, 
Pfeffer & Salancik 1978, 
Provan, Beyer & Kruytbosch 
1980, Zahra & Pearce 1989, 
Daily, Dalton & Cannella 
2003, Deutsch & Ross 2003, 
Pfeffer & Salancik 2003, 
Hillman, Nicholson & 
Shropshire 2008, Stevenson 
& Radin 2009, Hillman, 
Withers & Collins 2009, 
Davis & Cobb 2010, 
Shropshire 2010, Geletkanycz 
& Boyd 2010, Adams, 
Hermalin & Weisbach 2010, 
Connelly et al. 2011, Withers, 
Hillman & Cannella 2012, 
Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 
2013 
Donaldson & Davis 1991, 
Mael & Ashforth 1992, 
Fox & Hamilton 1994, 
Pettigrew & McNulty 
1995, Davis, Schoorman 
& Donaldson 1997, 
Dalton et al. 1998, Muth 
& Donaldson 1998, Coles, 
McWilliams & Sen 2001, 
Miller & Breton-Miller 
2006, Petrovic 2008, 
Pugliese, et al. 2009, 
Boyd, Haynes & Zona 
2011, Yunlu & Murphy 
2012, Karaevli & Zajac 
2013, Krause, Semadeni 
& Cannella, 2014, Luo, 
Kanuri & Andrews 2014 
 58 
3.2 Relevant Corporate Governance Theories in Emerging Markets 
The extensive review of research on the relationship between board structure and firm 
financial performance presented above shows that most of the literature is based on 
investigations of advanced markets, yet has been used in support of research on 
emerging markets. Indeed, Mueller (2006), Fan, Wei and Xu (2011) and Filatotchev, 
Jackson and Nakajima (2013) advise that agency, class hegemony, resource 
dependence and stewardship theories were developed in the context of advanced 
economies, with little or no consideration of emerging countries’ unique social, 
political, and economic contexts. These theories do not account for firm and market 
characteristics in emerging markets (Wright et al. 2005). 
 
Recent research emphasises that sensitivity to context is particularly crucial for 
understanding corporate governance practices in emerging markets (Whetten 2009; 
Mallin 2013). Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman and Dykes (2005) state that ‘the absence of an 
explicit recognition of context gives these theories broad generalizability, since they 
allow flexibility in defining key elements of the theory that are likely to be socially 
embedded’ (p. 1511). Consequently, a growing number of corporate governance and 
management scholars have called for consideration of other dimensions relevant to 
emerging markets – notably the fundamental and special elements influencing board 
structure and firm financial performance in these markets (Fan, Wei & Xu 2011; 
Claessens & Yurtoglu 2013; Cornelissen & Durand 2014). 
 
One of the most prominent and relevant such dimensions is the emphasis on 
institutions, which has been the leading approach for studying business and 
management in emerging countries (North 1990; Hoskisson et al. 2000; Allen 2005). 
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Various institutional elements at country and market levels, such as political, 
economic, social, and educational bodies, affect corporates practices and help to 
shape their strategic directions (Di Maggio & Powell 1991). Due to the fact that 
institutions in emerging markets are less stable than their advanced counterparts, they 
often lack the legal endorsement that come with mutual trade benefits between 
business players (Klapper & Love 2004). As a result, companies under the influence 
of poor-quality state governance tend to adopt unconventional governance patterns. In 
particular, to overcome the poor governance of the overall environment, companies in 
emerging markets tend to be guided by informal institutions like influential families 
and business groups (Peng 2006). These types of business arrangements will most 
likely result in inactive and inefficient corporate governance codes among emerging 
countries, which in turn perpetuate or create weak governance environments (Bae et 
al. 2012). Also, the slow pace of privatization causes another constraint for emerging 
markets companies. Fan, Rui and Zhao (2008) argue that the adoption and 
implementation of privatisation in emerging markets suffer considerably from the 
bureaucracy and inefficiency of government representatives who manage the largest 
firms in these markets, which are state-owned or partially state-owned enterprises. In 
such a context, firms are typically associated with low productivity, therefore less 
profitability (Chen & Yu 2012). 
 
Moreover, formal regulatory bodies that regulate corporate governance practice such 
as legal, accounting standards, and compliance authorities are either absent or 
ineffective in emerging markets (Tsamenyi & Uddin 2008). Notably, bankruptcy 
regulations are frequently ignored and weakly enforced, court proceedings are 
delayed, and investor protection is weak, which ultimately results in higher capital 
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cost (La Porta et al. 2000; Claessens & Yurtoglu 2013). Chen, Chen and Wei (2009) 
further explain that, in emerging markets, companies cannot fully prevent additional 
capital cost triggered by a poor legal system, but they can be reduced by adopting 
good governance. In fact, Naciri (2013) demonstrates that companies with 
independent audit committees, more government representative directors, and higher 
state ownership have lower capital cost and better financial performance. 
 
To mitigate the problems of the agents exploiting certain information and making 
decisions which the principals cannot observe and control, the board performs the 
control role, ensuring managers act in the interests of shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). According to Grossman and Hart (1983) ‘most analyses of Principal-
Agent (PA) conflicts assume that the principal chooses an incentive scheme to 
maximise expected utility subject to the agent's utility being at a stationary point’ (p. 
7). Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman and Dykes (2005) argue that since the PA relationship is 
based on a contract, then it is appropriate to expect this contact is embedded within a 
context. In this regard, Hoskisson et al. (2000) and Filatotchev, Jackson and Nakajima 
(2013) acknowledge that PA conflicts exist in advanced markets, but they emphasise 
that these conflicts are more likely to appear in emerging markets due to weak 
institutions and uncertainty resulting from poor legal protection, high market 
volatilities, and shortages in skilled managers. Given that the institutional context in 
emerging markets makes the enforcement of business contracts more challenging and 
expensive, concentrated ownership is likely to occur (Phan 2001). Su, Xu, and Phan 
(2008) clarify that concentrated ownership substitutes for poor corporate governance 
mechanisms in emerging markets to reduce traditional PA conflicts. Directors with 
large ownership are not liable to being disciplined by management; this enables them 
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to function as a protective mechanism against potential opportunistic behaviour by the 
agents (Filatotchev, Zhang & Piesse 2011). Likewise, directors with large equity 
share have strong incentives to manage their firms effectively and generate profit, as 
their wealth is dependent on the wellbeing of the firm. In most cases in emerging 
countries, they are the ultimate promoters and most effective monitor of the firm, 
having the greatest stake (both in tangible and intangible terms) in the success and 
failure of the firm (Douma, George & Kabir 2006). 
 
Nevertheless, corporate governance scholars warn about the harmful consequences 
that may arise from ownership concentrated in the hands of few directors. Combined 
with weak institutions, concentrated ownership in emerging markets often leads to 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, resulting in the development 
of principal–principal (PP) conflicts (Young et al. 2008). PP conflicts occur when the 
controlling shareholders oppress the minority shareholders through their presence on 
the board of directors, or through their affiliation with other directors and business 
allies in business-group-controlled or family-based corporations (Phan 2001). 
 
Generally, family owners and business groups are the two, usually interrelated, kinds 
of controlling shareholders. In emerging markets, controlling shareholders are often in 
the hands of one family or a few families (Peng & Jiang 2010). The managerial styles 
of family-controlled boards are based on trust and run by informal means of 
communication (Allen 2005) but can be very influential, with both positive and 
negative consequences (Miller, Breton-Miller & Lester 2011). Such powerful 
influence can improve the board’s monitoring activities by aligning ownership with 
control (Lubatkin et al. 2005). On the other hand, family-controlled boards can also 
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exploit minority shareholders by abusing company resources and inviting unqualified 
family members to the boardrooms. Young et al. (2008) note that ‘sibling rivalry, 
generational envy, non-merit-based and irrational strategic decisions can terminate 
firm value’ (p. 204). As the business environments in emerging markets become 
larger and more complex, boards of directors requires more formal and systematic 
governance mechanisms, hence professional-based rather than family-controlled 
boards are vital (Gedajlovic et al. 2012).  
 
Business groups are the other type of controlling shareholders in emerging 
economies. A business group is ‘a collection of legally independent firms that are 
bound by economic (such as ownership, financial, and commercial) and social (such 
as family, kinship, and friendship) ties’ (Yiu, Bruton & Lu 2005, pp. 183). While 
business groups occur all over the globe, they are comparatively dominant in 
emerging markets. Due to their highly coordinated actions, strong interlocks, and 
diversified investments, boards controlled by business groups can play a crucial role 
in substituting for the weak institutional environment, particularly in banking, 
employment, and product markets, thereby providing more competitive advantages to 
the firm (Wan 2005). However, the affiliation between business groups permits 
significant opportunities for collusion or unethical trade, and minority shareholders 
may find it difficult to detect and confront such behaviour (Bae et al. 2012). However, 
as the institutional environments in emerging markets develop, the risks associated 
with business groups’ practices will become less relevant than other governance 
threats (Pattnaik, Chang & Shin 2013). 
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Principal–principal conflicts have damaging effects on firms and the whole economy. 
Indeed, PP conflicts have been reported to negatively impact firm valuations, 
dividends, stock prices, firm strategies, investment in research and development 
(R&D), and lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders (Young et al. 2008; 
Bae et al. 2012). A summary of PA and PP conflicts is provided in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2: Summary of principal–agent (PA) and principal–principal (PP) conflicts 
    
  
PA Conflicts as depicted by Agency Theory 
 
 
PP Conflicts commonly occur in Emerging Markets 
 
    Goal Incongruence Between fragmented, dispersed shareholders and 
professional managers. 
Between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders. 
Manifestations Strategies that benefit entrenched managers at the 
expense of shareholders in general (e.g., shrinking, 
pet projects, excessive compensation, and empire 
building). 
 Strategies that benefit controlling shareholders at the 
expense of minority shareholders (e.g., minority 
shareholder expropriation, nepotism and cronyism). 
Institutional Protection of 
Minority Shareholders 
Formal constraints (e.g., judicial reviews and 
courts) set an upper bound on potential 
expropriation by majority shareholders. Informal 
norms generally adhere to shareholder wealth 
maximisation. 
 Formal institutional protection is often lacking, 
corrupt, or un-enforced. Informal norms typically 
favour the interests of controlling shareholders over 
minority shareholders. 
Market for Corporate Control Active as a governance mechanism ‘of last resort’.  Inactive even in principle. Concentrated ownership 
thwarts notions of takeover. 
Ownership Pattern Dispersed – holding 5–20% equity is considered 
‘concentrated ownership’. A shareholder with 5% 
equity stake is regarded as a ‘blockholder’. 
 Concentrated – often more than 50% of equity is held 
by a controlling shareholder. Often structured as a 
‘pyramid’ where cash flow rights are greater than 
ownership rights. 
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Table 3.2 continued PA Conflicts as depicted by Agency Theory PP Conflicts commonly occur in Emerging Markets 
 
Board of Directors 
 
Legitimate legal and social institutions with 
fiduciary duty to safeguard shareholders’ interests. 
Research focuses on factors that affect day-to-day 
operations such as insiders vs. outsiders, 
background of directors, committee structures, etc. 
  
In emerging economies, boards often have yet to 
establish institutional legitimacy and thus are 
ineffective. Research indicates they are often the 
‘rubber stamp’ of controlling shareholders. 
Top Management Team Professional managers who have often made their 
way up through the ranks or are hired from outside 
after extensive search and scrutiny of qualifications. 
Monitored internally by boards of directors and 
externally by managerial labour market. 
  Typically family members or associates. Monitored 
mainly through family consensus or self-regulation 
adhering to ‘gentlemen’s agreements’. 
    Source: Young et al. (2008). 
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In addition, corporate governance scholars consider transparency in emerging markets 
as a critical dimension when investigating board structure and firm financial 
performance. Transparency refers to the openness of administrative functions, the 
economy, and to several aspects of corporate governance (McGee 2009). 
Unsurprisingly, the OECD (2004) lists transparency as the core element of good 
corporate governance. Millar et al. (2005) emphasises that ‘transparency is more than 
pure financial transparency; as it can also be based on factors such as governmental, 
organizational and other types of transparency mechanism’ (p. 163).  
 
Notably, transparent information flows between directors and the rest of the 
stakeholders strengthen the board performance in the control, resource and strategy 
roles (Turnbull 2000). On the other hand, lack of transparency results in ambiguous 
board structures, damages in-and-out communication, and eventually worsens firm 
value and performance. In this regard, lack of transparency across various dimensions 
within board structures in emerging market firms has been regarded as a major 
concern. For instance, relatively small board size in emerging markets could generate 
problems related to transparency, as information is available to a smaller group of 
directors (Elsayed 2011). Moreover, as the flow of information is often controlled 
within a closed system and based on personal relationships, the boardroom will not be 
transparent as it should be (Kaymak & Bektas 2008). Millar et al. (2005) points out 
that lack of transparency in the boardroom is one of the central causes of firm collapse 
in emerging markets. 
 
Similarly, despite the emphasis of previous research regarding the control (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976) and resources (Pfeffer 1972) roles of outside directors, Peng (2004) 
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suggests that listed firms in emerging markets may appoint outside directors for only 
symbolic purposes. He argues that public firms are likely to be under pressure to 
maintain legitimacy and transparency as a response to political and public demands. 
Although these companies may strategically comply with these demands for more 
independent directors, they will subtly limit the independence of those directors (Peng 
2004). A common practice is that of appointing directors who formally appear to be 
independent, but whose independence is undermined due to their social and personal 
links with other board members and/or management (Khanna & Thomas 2009). 
 
Gibson (2003) proposes that while some public firms in emerging countries may have 
endorsed corporate governance codes from developed economies, these codes are 
often ignored or partially implemented. For example, when part of the board structure 
or practices conflict with legal requirements, firms may choose to face the relatively 
insignificant and symbolic fines imposed by the regulatory body instead of 
implementing corporate governance codes. Thus, the decrease of market valuation 
and operating performance among firms in emerging markets can be due to poor or no 
implementation of robust corporate governance mechanisms (Klapper & Love 2004; 
Wright et al. 2005; Filatotchev, Jackson & Nakajima 2013). 
 
Although previous research is limited, it is worthwhile mentioning that some authors 
have reported certain approaches regarding board structure in emerging markets that 
have a positive impact on firm financial performance. For instance, Ellstrand, Tihanyi 
and Johnson (2002) find that boards with a higher percentage of inside directors are 
associated with low firm financial performance in markets with high levels of 
political and geopolitical risk. On the other hand, a higher percentage of outside 
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directors predicts positive organisational financial performance in markets with higher 
levels of political risk. Similarly, Ameer, Ramli and Zakaria (2010) show that boards 
dominated by outside and foreign directors increase firm financial performance. They 
also find that high institutional and foreign equity ownership improve overall board 
functionality, thereby raising firm profitability.  
 
Lastly, as institutions and learning processes in emerging countries are improving, 
Hoskisson et al. (2000) recommend the development of a multi-theoretical and 
comprehensive approach to study corporate governance practices in these countries. 
An approach that combines the use of corporate governance theories tested in 
advanced economies, aligned with considerations of the distinctive social, political, 
and economic contexts of emerging markets, can provide new insights into the 
processes that firms follow and codes that regulators introduce (Wright et al. 2005). 
Such an understanding would make a significant contribution to corporate governance 
literature, and could improve corporate governance practices in emerging markets 
(Mallin 2013; Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013; Cornelissen & Durand 2014). Table 3.3 
provides a summary of the main considerations of the emerging markets context when 
investigating the relationship between board structure and firm financial performance. 
 
 
 69 
Table 3.3: Summary of the main considerations of emerging markets context when investigating the relationship between board structure and 
firm financial performance 
Authors Primary Theoretical Approaches Data and Context 
Analytical 
Techniques Main Findings 
Phan (2001) Agency theory Theoretical paper NA Owners in emerging markets tend to retain control while 
transferring the risk of ownership through their social or 
business associates. This has led to serious problems associated 
with the reduction of minority shareholder rights by the 
controlling shareholder 
 
Klapper & 
Love (2004) 
Institutional theory Secondary dataset of 
495 companies in 25 
countries between 1995 
and 1999 
OLS regression Firms can compensate for ineffective laws by establishing good 
corporate governance 
Peng (2004) Agency, Resource 
Dependence and 
Institutional theories 
Secondary dataset of 
530 companies between 
1992 and 1996 
Survival analysis By providing legitimacy and transparency to the firm, outside 
directors have a positive effect on firm growth in emerging 
markets 
Allen (2005)  Cooperative Theory and 
Institutional theories  
Theoretical paper NA In the absence of effective regulations, relying on reputation 
and trust can improve corporate governance in emerging 
markets; this will lead to better performance 
Wright et al. 
(2005) 
Agency, Resource 
Dependence, 
Transaction and 
Institutional theories 
Theoretical paper NA Business arrangements have evolved in emerging countries as a 
way of dealing with problems of underdeveloped market 
institutions. Yet, as emerging economies develop, institutional 
theory will become less relevant than other corporate 
governance approaches 
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Table 3.3 continued 
 
    
Authors Primary Theoretical Approaches Data and Context 
Analytical 
Techniques Main Findings 
Millar et al. 
(2005) 
Institutional theory Theoretical paper NA Transparency is a main factor of the success or failure of 
corporate governance implementation in emerging markets 
 
Mueller (2006) Agency and 
institutional theories 
Secondary dataset of 60 
countries between 1960 
and 1998 
Content Analysis Investors would buy shares in emerging markets firms even 
without having robust legal protection, because they expect 
their investment will receive high returns 
Khanna & 
Thomas (2009) 
Resource dependence 
theory 
Secondary dataset of 
457 firms for 1996  
Panel Analysis Connecting with other firms can compensate for the 
transparency problem in emerging markets. Hence, interlock 
mechanisms are positively associated with firm return 
 
Hoskisson et al. 
(2000) 
Institutional, 
transaction cost and 
resource dependence 
theories 
Primary dataset of 75 
questionnaires during 
1990s, and secondary 
dataset of 65 countries 
during 1985 and 1997 
NA As institutions and learning processes in emerging countries are 
improving, corporate governance in emerging markets is 
expected to follow 
Gibson (2003) Agency and 
institutional theories 
Secondary dataset of 
1,204 firms in eight 
emerging markets from 
1993 to 1997  
Logistic 
regression 
While some public firms in emerging countries may have 
endorsed corporate governance codes from developed 
economies, these codes are often ignored or partly implemented 
Ameer et al. 
(2010) 
Agency, resource 
dependence and 
institutional theories 
Secondary dataset of 
277 listed Malaysian 
firms over 2002–2007 
OLS regression Boards dominated by outside and foreign directors improve 
firm performance. Also, institutional and foreign equity 
ownership improve the board’s overall functionality, thereby 
enhancing firm performance 
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Table 3.3 continued       
Authors Primary Theoretical Approaches Data and Context 
Analytical 
Techniques Main Findings 
Ellstrand et al. 
(2002) 
Agency, stewardship, 
institutional, and 
geopolitical theories 
Secondary dataset of 
112 firms listed in the 
Fortune 500 for the year 
1991 
OLS Regression Boards with a higher percentage of inside directors are 
associated with lower levels of political risk. Boards with a 
higher percentage of outside directors are associated with 
higher levels of political risk 
Chen & Yu 
(2012) 
Agency and 
institutional theories 
Secondary dataset of 
498 firms listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange 
from 1996 to 2001 
OLS Regression Emerging markets suffer considerably from the bureaucracy 
and inefficiency of government representatives who manage the 
largest firms in these markets, mainly state-owned or partially 
state-owned enterprises 
Young et al. 
(2008) 
Agency, resource 
dependence and 
institutional theories 
Theoretical paper NA Combined with weak institutions, concentrated ownership often 
leads to conflicts between controlling and minority 
shareholders, resulting in PP conflicts. PP conflicts, which are 
more likely to appear in emerging markets, have damaging 
effects on firms and the whole economy 
Claessens & 
Yurtoglu (2013) 
Agency, resource 
dependence, 
stakeholder, 
institutional, and 
corporate social 
responsibility 
theories 
Theoretical paper NA As emerging markets become more open, the exposure to 
outside ideas and influence is likely to advance governance 
reforms 
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Table 3.3 continued       
Authors Primary Theoretical Approaches Data and Context 
Analytical 
Techniques Main Findings 
Filatotchev, 
Jackson & 
Nakajima 
(2013)  
Agency and 
institutional theories 
Theoretical paper NA PA conflicts are more likely to appear in emerging markets due 
to weak institutional infrastructure and uncertainty resulting 
from poor legal protection, high market volatilities, and skilled 
manager shortages 
Bae et al. 
(2012) 
Agency and 
institutional theories 
Secondary dataset of 
608 firms listed on the 
Korean Stock Exchange 
from 1997 to 1999 
Panel analysis Business groups in emerging markets represent a significant 
risk of collusion or unethical trades. Minority shareholders may 
find it difficult to detect and confront such behaviour 
La Porta et al. 
(2000) 
Agency, stewardship, 
legalistic, and 
institutional theories 
Theoretical paper NA Bankruptcy regulations in emerging markets are frequently 
ignored and weakly enforced, court proceedings are delayed, 
and investor protection is weak, which ultimately result in 
higher capital cost 
Gedajlovic et 
al. (2012) 
 International 
Business, 
Entrepreneurship, 
and Institutional 
theories 
Theoretical paper NA As business environment in emerging markets become larger 
and more complex, the board of directors requires more formal 
and systematic governance mechanisms 
Pattnaik et al. 
(2013) 
Capital and 
Institutional theories 
Secondary dataset of 
119 firms listed on the 
Indian Stock Exchange 
from 1999 to 2003 
GLS regression As institutional environment in emerging markets develop, 
potential risk associated with business groups’ practices will 
become less relevant than other governance threats 
 73 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter lays down the theoretical foundations of this thesis. It firstly presents a 
review of four theories from the mainstream corporate governance literature – agency 
theory, class hegemony theory, resource dependence theory, and stewardship theory – 
that explain the effect of board structure on firm financial performance. This multi-
theoretical approach was adopted due to its ability to thoroughly capture the required 
aspects of the phenomenon under study. Since this research was situated within an 
emerging market, the chapter explores several theoretical considerations related to 
emerging markets that affect board structure and firm financial performance. To 
comprehensively and accurately understand this relationship, the contextual 
considerations of emerging markets were bundled with the four theories to form the 
hypotheses, which are offered in the next chapter along with the conceptual 
framework of the research. 
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Chapter 4 – Research Hypotheses and Conceptual Framework 
 
The review of literature presented in Chapter 3 suggests that the relationships between 
board structure and firm financial performance has not been sufficiently explored, 
especially in emerging markets such as Saudi Arabia.  
 
For a better understanding of this phenomenon, this chapter describes the 
development of eight hypotheses underpinned by an integration of agency, class 
hegemony, resource dependence, and stewardship theories, with consideration of the 
context of the emerging Saudi Arabian market. This approach will more accurately 
address the relationship between board structure and firm financial performance in the 
Saudi Arabian market than was possible in previous research. Finally, to illustrate the 
variables and direction of this relationship, a conceptual framework is presented. 
 
4.1 Research Hypotheses 
Bundling of the theories and contextual considerations presented in Chapter 3 was 
used to develop testable hypotheses for this research. The targets of the hypotheses 
are elements of board structure that reflect on the financial performance of Saudi 
firms. Since no previous theoretical and practical frameworks using the bundling 
approach have been employed to examine the relationship between board structure 
and firm financial performance within the Saudi context, this research proposed 
original eight hypotheses. 
 
The research began its development of hypotheses about board structure by 
suggesting that outside directors with Saudi royal status have positive impact on firm 
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financial performance. Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, so it is clear that the 
members of the Saudi royal family have powerful influence on the initiation and 
implementation of laws and regulations (Field 1984; Cordesman 2003; Bray & 
Darlow 2013). Vast authority and power give the Saudi royals the highest status in 
Saudi society (Stenslie 2012). Their number, estimated at around 20,000, makes the 
Saudis the world's largest and one of the most influential royal families (Mazaheri 
2013). Sabri (2001) suggests that the main sources of their fortune are large state 
stipends and sale of state lands granted as gifts. 
 
The laissez-faire economy in Saudi Arabia has attracted royals to enter business to 
further expand their fortunes. A senior member of the royal family once said, ‘Since it 
is a big family and we cannot all have government jobs, some have to make a living’ 
(Wilson & Graham 1994, p. 23). Their involvement in the Saudi economy has been 
claimed to be accommodated through privileges and favouritism. Al-Rasheed (2010) 
emphasises that royals in Saudi Arabia rely heavily on their political and social status 
to win business contracts. Wilson (2012) goes further, arguing that they often block 
reform attempts initiated by the state or activists so that their dominance and influence 
across the spectrum of the economy remain secure. 
 
Given the fact that Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy and has weakly enforced 
institutions, Saudi royals are dominant players on the political and social scenes. This 
has major implications for corporate governance, and particularly board structure; as 
argued earlier, directors with royal status provide a board with solidity, continuity, 
and stability. Precisely, they can influence legislators to create favourable laws for 
their firms and block reforms that negatively affect their business interests. Applying 
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class hegemony theory, and informed by the institutional Saudi context (Burris 2005; 
Huse et al. 2011; Wurthmann 2014), having outside directors with royal status in the 
boardroom would give a company valuable influence for maintaining and extending 
power and resources. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Outside directors with royal status are positively associated with firm 
financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
As discussed in Chapter two, regional status has significant influence in Saudi society 
(Ali 2008); in particular, people from Najd have high social status, as the royals and 
many major religious figures originate from that region. Family and personal ties to 
royalty means individuals from Najd have long dominated the administrative and 
business scenes in Saudi Arabia (Niblock & Malik 2007).  
 
It has been argued that many members of this social group have economically 
exploited their privileged social status since the beginning of the modern Saudi state. 
Despite Najd accounting for around 25% of the total Saudi population (Ibrahim 2006; 
Yamani 2008; Katz 2012; Alsaif 2013), people from Najd occupy most of the senior 
positions in ministries and state-owned and partially state-owned firms (Long 2005). 
However, while Gamlas (2008) acknowledges that the dominant players in the Saudi 
economy are of Najd descent, he argues that this dominance is due to their genuine 
success in business rather than reliance on favouritism from royals or government. He 
claims that the people of Najd have been recognised for their skill in trade for 
centuries, hence there are no political reasons for their significance in Saudi business. 
Wilson (2012) supplements Gamals’ notion by stating that Najd traders advanced 
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their business activities during the economic boom in Saudi Arabia from the 1970s 
onward. 
 
While the reason behind their dominance over the Saudi economy is debatable, there 
is general agreement among scholars that people originating from Najd have greater 
control over Saudi business activities than people from any other region in Saudi 
Arabia. Hence, this research argues that since they occupy a dominant position in the 
Saudi economy, Saudi firms can benefit from the networks of outside directors of 
Najd descent, through co-opting forces and mitigating external threats. As outside 
directors, they can reduce political and legal risk through their personal relationships 
with politicians and regulators, resulting in laws favourable to their firms. The 
provision of vital resources by these directors through their board interlocks and 
reputations would as a result enhance firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. In 
keeping with class hegemony theory and institutional theory views on the ruling elite 
and the value of status and influence in Saudi business and society (Whetten 2009; 
Huse et al. 2011; Wilson 2012; Wurthmann 2014), this research proposes the 
following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Outside directors originating from Najd are positively associated with 
firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Large investors are the third most important players in the Saudi economy after royals 
and individuals of Najd descent. These investors are generally clustered in a few 
powerful families and business groups. Solomon (2011) indicates that around a third 
of Saudi listed firms are owned and/or controlled by founding families and business 
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groups. Their managerial style in running the boardrooms is largely based on trust and 
informal means of communication (Ramady 2010). In Oukil and Khalifah’s (2012) 
study of Saudi firms located in the Eastern Province, 41% of outside directors were 
found to be appointed due to social or economic connections with the major 
stockholders or the chairperson.  
 
Such managerial style is very influential, yet can have both positive and negative 
consequences. On one hand, as noted in chapter three, family-controlled boards may 
exploit minority shareholders by abusing company resources and/or inviting 
unqualified family members onto boards. The head of the Council of Saudi 
Commerce Chambers (CSCC), Abdulrahman Al-Zamil, states that ‘sibling rivalry, 
generational envy, non-merit-based and irrational strategic decisions are the one of 
the biggest threats to firms in Saudi Arabia’ (Alsharq 2013, p 12). Further, 
coordination among business groups presents opportunities for corruption. Combined 
with weak institutions, concentrated ownership by outside directors can lead to 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders. This situation can reduce 
firm financial performance (Young et al. 2008). 
 
On the other hand, as the institutional context in Saudi Arabia makes the enforcement 
of business contracts more challenging and expensive, relying on trusted family 
members through informal social arrangements to manage firms could help to 
minimise risk. As has been observed in other emerging markets (Su, Xu & Phan 
2008), concentrated ownership could substitute for poor corporate governance 
mechanisms in Saudi Arabia and reduce traditional PA conflicts. Consequently, by 
aligning ownership with control, inside directors with large ownership can improve 
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the board’s monitoring activities, enhancing firm financial performance. Indeed, 
Fontaine and Ahmad (2013) advocate that the success of some Saudi firms is due to 
the fact that executive power lies in the hands of the controlling shareholders. For 
instance, the Al-Rajhi bank becoming the largest Islamic bank per capita in the world 
is arguably due to its alignment of management and ownership (Farid 2012). 
 
This research argues that directors who are also large investors play a significant role 
in the boardrooms of Saudi firms. They counter the weak institutional environment of 
the Saudi market by aligning control and ownership. This formula can improve 
monitoring mechanisms, thereby improving firm financial performance. However, 
large-investor-outside-director objectiveness, input to board deliberation, and overall 
performance can lead to the expropriation of value from minority shareholders to the 
majority. In such a situation, monitoring of management actions would be weakened 
and eventually worsen firm financial performance. On balance, this research puts 
forward the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Outside directors with large equity ownership are negatively 
associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Inside directors with large equity ownership are positively associated 
with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The question about the value of inside directors on the boards of Saudi companies is 
intriguing, reflecting a tension between the local business environment and insights 
from Anglo-American developed economies on the importance of having one or more 
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inside directors on the board (reflecting stewardship theory). In the Saudi context, the 
general feeling of local business and society is that inside directors have very little 
influence in Saudi companies, mainly because of their low representation in 
boardrooms. A study by Ezzine (2012) reveals that fewer than 10% of board members 
of Saudi listed firms are insiders. This low ratio indicates shareholders do not see 
great value in the presence of inside directors on Saudi boards. Moreover, as 
corporate governance in Saudi Arabia is largely driven by cultural norms and 
customs, and since founding families control many Saudi listed firms, Sarayrah 
(2004) argues that Saudi company boards have for a long time perceived managers as 
merely reporters and ‘servants’ (p. 68). Following this line of argument, inside 
directors in Saudi firms add little value to organisation performance. 
 
However, stewardship theorists advocate that because inside directors are better 
informed about the day-to-day work of the firm and the details of strategic plans they 
can be more effective in shaping the direction of the firm than other categories of 
director (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson 1997; Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011). If this 
contention is correct, a board of directors with a higher representation of inside 
directors will perform better than those with a lower proportion, improving firm 
financial performance (Pugliese et al. 2009; Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 2014). 
In the Saudi context, the low representation and hence influence of inside directors in 
the Saudi boardrooms could be due to the lack of skilled Saudi executives able to 
articulate firm strategies and lead effectively. Indeed, the findings of Sadi and Al-
Buraey (2009) support this notion, and further indicate that due to the lack of skilled 
labour among Saudis, the benefits of replacing expatriates with locals may be offset 
by a decrease in productivity and competitiveness. Moreover, Ali (2008) found that 
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non-Saudi executives have superior human capital to their Saudi counterparts. The 
GCC Board Directors Institute (2013) elaborates: ‘there is a considerable and 
increasing support for appointing inside directors from outside Saudi Arabia, and 
especially advanced markets, to bring more know-how to the table and enhance 
discussions and share experiences’ (p. 5). Hence, inside non-Saudi directors are 
regarded as valuable for their developed economy business knowledge and 
experience. Theoretically, that means resource dependence theory, with its views on 
the significance of the human capital of board members (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 
2013) is relevant to the Saudi context given the skills, expertise and knowledge 
possessed by non-Saudi executives will be utilised to enhance the resource role of 
boards. 
 
Influenced by previous notions, this research argues that inside non-Saudi directors 
can bring significant human capital through their education, business training, 
experience, professional networks and performance track record. This view reflects 
the Anglo-American institutional expectations, which this research argues on balance 
override local Saudi business and society views. Quality stewardship from a inside 
non-Saudi director seems likely to enhance firm financial performance, hence: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Inside non-Saudi directors are positively associated with firm financial 
performance in Saudi Arabia.  
 
Additionally, while the Saudi government is the only public institutional investor in 
Saudi Arabia, the significance of the presence of SGRDs in boardrooms and the 
quality of their contribution to board deliberation is a subject of debate. As SGRDs 
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are employees of an inefficient public sector, some scholars have argued that they 
lack the necessary flexibility and skills to function effectively. For instance, Falgi 
(2009) suggests that SGRDs are state employees who mostly do not have appropriate 
knowledge and experience in companies’ areas of business. He further criticises them 
for giving inadequate time and effort to their board assignments and for their silence 
at board meetings. His argument is empirically supported by Al-Hussain (2009), who 
reports that companies with a high level of Saudi government representation recorded 
the lowest stock return ratios. 
 
Contrary to that view, other scholars suggest that SGRDs are effective in monitoring 
management, protecting interests of minority stakeholders, and encouraging good 
corporate governance. Al-Majed (2012) proposes that the firms in which SGRDs are 
present are the most profitable of all Tadawul firms. He explains that investors feel 
safer investing in firms with SGRDs on their boards due to the assumption that their 
investment will be protected by the government when the times of hardship arrive. In 
fact, Al-Kahtani (2014) advises that since the state is by far the major shareholder in 
the Saudi market, and since governance practices have gradually improved in recent 
years, it is ‘unfair to regard SGRDs as weak monitors and lack[ing] an understanding 
of quality’ (p. 317) but rather their positive contribution should be acknowledged.  
 
Having presented both views, this paper opts for the latter perspective for three 
reasons. First, despite the fact the SGRDs are employees of a weakly functioning 
public sector, the suggestion made by Falgi (2009) that they are poor board monitors 
was based on insufficient data. Second, while Al-Hussain (2009) finds a negative 
impact of SGRDs on stock return ratios, the results were probably profoundly 
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influenced by the crisis that hit the Tadawul in 2006. Indeed, Al-Hussain’s data 
covered 2006, hence it is plausible that the results suffered from analytical problems 
given the period of analysis covered a serious anomaly – a major crash. Third, 
although no previous empirical research suggests SGRDs’ positive impact on firm 
financial performance, recent studies indicate their importance to firm value and 
governance practices in Saudi Arabia (Al-Kahtani 2014). Indeed, the adoption of 
good governance standards by Saudi listed firms in recent years could be explained by 
the effectiveness of SGRDs in playing the control role. In this context, and in line 
with agency theory (Johnson et al. 1996; Withers et al. 2012), SGRDs plausibly have 
a positive effect on financial performance of the Saudi listed companies. 
Consequently, this research proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: SGRDs are positively associated with firm financial performance in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
This research argues that there are two additional scenarios in which SGRDs can 
contribute positively to firm financial performance: (1) SGRDs work jointly with 
outside directors with royal status, and (2) SGRDs work jointly with inside non-Saudi 
directors. 
 
Beside their positive impact on firm financial performance proposed previously, the 
presence of directors with royal status could be beneficial when SGRDs are present in 
the boardroom. According to class hegemony theory, outside directors with prestige 
or status provide vital resources through their interlocking and reputation, which 
boosts firm financial performance (Burris 2005; Ward & Feldman 2008). As an 
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example, Reed (2009) suggests that the Saudi royal family has accumulated its wealth 
over the years from multi-billion dollar public projects granted by the state to the 
family’s private companies. 
 
In fact, scholars in the political economy field document that the involvement of the 
Saudi royals in the Saudi economy has been largely associated with state sponsorship. 
According to Sabri (2001), many public contracts have been given to royals ‘with 
minimal business acumen on the basis of their strong kinship and business ties to the 
government bureaucratic officials’ (p. 20). Wilson (2012) claims that Saudi royal 
entrepreneurs, together with government officials, have played a fundamental role in 
restructuring the economy. In addition, he suggests that the creation of the Supreme 
Economic Council in 1999 helped to boost the policymaking influence of a selected 
group of royal private sector elites. 
 
Although SGRDs undoubtedly have some drawbacks, resource dependence theory 
suggests that such directors can provide access to key public servants and politicians 
and lend legitimacy to firms. Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) write that 
‘regulation is, at its most basic level, a tie with the government – a link to legitimacy’ 
(p. 246). Accordingly, in the Saudi context, the presence of SGRDs on a board 
provides legitimacy to a firm tendering for lucrative state contracts, in addition to 
their information and access. 
 
This research argues that given the current Saudi political and institutional conditions, 
outside directors with royal status could use SGRDs as the coordinating channel of 
information and legitimacy. SGRDs would then formalise the power and influence of 
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outside directors with royal status, enabling them to use their high social esteem to 
lobby for access to major government-funded projects. Indeed, government highly 
funded projects would be in turn allocated to the Saudi firms with this board cluster. 
Class hegemony, resource dependence, and institutional theories (Huse 2010; 
Wurthmann 2014; Wan 2005; Cornelissen & Durand 2014) suggest that having 
SGRDs with outside directors with royal status in the boardroom would financially 
benefit the firm through the provision of social and business power, as well as 
influence in relation to government decisions on public projects. Therefore, the 
research put forward the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 7: SGRDs jointly with outside directors with royal status are positively 
associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
Since it owns a considerable stake in Saudi listed companies, the Saudi government is 
expected to have an influence in running them. Al-Majed (2008) reports that ‘the 
influence of the state is more perceptible when considering that many corporate 
chairmen and CEO s of companies in which the state invests have been appointed by 
the government’ (p. 296). It appears that these directors are important for Saudi 
companies, not just for the legitimacy they provide, but also for their influential role 
in corporate leadership. Yet, while SGRDs can enhance governance mechanisms, 
their documented poor productivity and efficiency is likely to be an obstacle. 
 
Complementary to SGRDs’ presence on the board, inside directors are an important 
source of firm-specific knowledge and human capital, as suggested by stewardship 
theory. Specifically, and considering the Saudi context where foreign executives tend 
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to have more valuable human capital than their local counterparts, the presence of 
inside non-Saudi directors in the boardroom would enhance the overall efficiency and 
effectiveness of the board of directors (Nicholson & Kiel 2007). In fact, Ali (2008) 
indicates that the increasing profitability of Saudi firms in the last two decades has 
been influenced by the increasing productivity and efficiency of the overseas 
management of those firms.  
 
In the light of the above, this thesis argues that the influential and presumably 
impartial leadership of SGRDs can be seen as an advantageous platform for 
executives to join the board, providing them with protection against controlling 
shareholders and a viable environment to perform their strategic role. In turn, inside 
directors, namely non-Saudis, would be perceived as trusted stewards, who offer their 
valuable human capital to the board, and help the firm in articulating strategies that 
yield favourable financial outcomes. By aligning the assumption of agency theory in 
relation to the role of government representative directors (Hillman, Cannella & 
Paetzold 2000; Peng 2004) with resource dependence and stewardship theories’ views 
on the value of inside directors in the Saudi context (Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 
2014), there is the possibility of a multiplicative effect. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 8: SGRDs jointly with inside non-Saudi directors are positively associated 
with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
Based on the above hypotheses, the conceptual framework was assembled to 
demonstrate the relationships of the variables of interest embedded in the research 
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hypotheses. In this research, the conceptual framework reflects the hypotheses 
underpinned by bundling agency, class hegemony, resources dependence and 
stewardship theories with theoretical considerations related to the emerging markets 
context, to address the relationships between board structure and firm financial 
performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
The conceptual framework (Figure 4.1) illustrates the links between the elements of 
board structure and firm financial performance that were investigated in this study. 
The elements of board structure and firm financial performance are operationalised as 
independent and dependent variables respectively. In line with the hypotheses, 
relationships between the independent and dependent variables are regarded as either 
positive or negative. 
 
To demonstrate, the conceptual framework identifies outside directors with royal 
status, outside directors originating from Najd, inside directors with large equity 
ownership, inside non-Saudi directors, and SGRDs to have a positive impact on the 
dependent variable. Further, two moderation terms are introduced to reflect the 
hypothesised positive effects of SGRDs and outside directors with royal status, and 
SGRDs and inside non-Saudi directors, on the dependent variable. On the other hand, 
outside directors with large equity ownership are posited to have a negative impact on 
the dependent variable. Lastly, the conceptual framework includes firm size, firm age, 
board size, number of board committees, number of board meetings, inside directors, 
independent directors, and outside directors as control variables. 
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H4 Inside directors with large equity 
ownership + Board structure 
H2 Outside Najd directors + 
H3 Outside directors with large equity 
ownership – 
H5 Inside non-Saudi directors + 
Control variables: 
• Firm size 
• Firm age 
• Board size 
• Number of committees 
• Board meeting 
Attendance 
• Inside directors 
• Independent directors 
• Outside directors 
Firm financial 
performance 
H8 SGRDs x inside non-Saudi directors + 
Figure 4.1: The conceptual framework adopted in this research 
H6 SGRDs + 
H7 SGRDs x outside royal directors + 
H1 Outside royal directors + 
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4.3 Summary 
The review of relevant literature indicates that relationships between board structure 
and firm financial performance have not been adequately studied in the emerging 
Saudi Arabian market.  
 
To enhance the understanding of this phenomenon, eight hypotheses were developed. 
Development of the hypotheses was based on a comprehensive approach in which 
agency, class hegemony, resource dependence and stewardship theories were bundled 
with significant contextual considerations of the emerging Saudi Arabian market. 
Following that, a conceptual framework reflecting the hypotheses was constructed to 
illustrate the dependent, independent and control variables and their directions. 
 
The next chapter will thoroughly explain how this research was designed and 
approached, and the interpretation of its theory, data and findings. 
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Chapter 5 – Methodology and Research Design 
 
The effect of board structure on firm financial performance has become a popular area 
of research. As shown in the previous chapter, the researcher proposed eight 
hypotheses to be tested to further enrich the understanding of this relationship in the 
Saudi context. This chapter outlines the philosophy and procedures by which the 
researcher examined the targeted phenomena, including the methodological 
approaches and justification of their appropriateness. Research design issues, 
including the choice of research methods, empirical data collection, and methods of 
analysis are addressed. 
 
5.1 Methodology 
Methodology relates to the organising principles that provide philosophical positions 
for guiding the research process. Eriksson and Kovalainen (2015) refer to 
methodology as ‘the philosophy of investigation’ (p. 16). The prime focus of 
methodology is to explain how a given issue or problem can be approached. In the 
social sciences, the philosophical position of research affects the way it is conducted 
and perceived. Bryman and Bell (2015) state that business and management studies 
do not always adopt a specific methodology, but rather researchers establish the 
methodological aspect depending on their research setting. Scholars specify that the 
philosophical concepts which management and business studies should consider are 
ontology and epistemology (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 2012; Cooper & Schindler 
2013). 
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5.1.1 Ontology 
Ontology refers to the philosophical study of the nature of being; its purpose is to 
answer the questions, what is being? What are the features common to all beings 
(Maedche 2012)? To put it simply, ontology tells us about what reality is like and the 
basic elements it contains. Corbetta (2003) indicates that the application of ontology 
in management and business research lies in whether realities are things in their own 
right or representations of things. In other words, an ontological position helps the 
researcher to consider whether the studied phenomena are independent from or 
dependent on other situations. 
 
Ontology is divided primarily into realist and nominalist approaches. Realists view 
entities as ‘independently existing’ (Phillips 1987, p. 205); processes or structures 
operate in particular settings to generate outcomes of interest. On the other hand, 
nominalists perceive entities as existing dependently, meaning that ‘everything in the 
world in of such nature that it can interact with everything else; while causal 
isolations are possible, they are contingent’ (Azevedo 1997, p. 66). For the purpose of 
this research, realism is regarded as an appropriate general ontological approach. 
 
Positivists have been criticised for their naive realism, in which reality is 
understandable and knowledge can easily be captured and generalised in a context-
free form (Denzin & Lincoln 2011). As a reaction to this critique, post-realism 
paradigms have emerged that strive to address the ontological weaknesses of pure 
realism. Among the most prominent of these is critical realism, which was largely 
established by the writings of Bhaskar (1975, 1978, 1989). While critical realism 
recognises the existence of knowledge independent of humans, as realism does, it 
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differs by going further to argue that knowledge is contextually embedded and fallible 
nature of scientific inquiry (Harré 1985; Bhaskar 1989; Archer et al. 1998). Moreover, 
critical realists hold that the nature of the world is subject to empirical investigation, 
in which knowledge is being generated from the complex interactions of mechanisms 
that give information on the entities under observation (Danermark et al. 2002). 
Because this research was an empirical investigation of the phenomenon of board 
structure and firm financial performance in the context of Saudi Arabia, and since this 
phenomenon is viewed independently in the real world of the Saudi Arabian business 
environment, this research adopted critical realism as an ontological position. 
 
5.1.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with answering the question ‘how 
can the world be known?’ According to Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Jackson (2012), 
epistemology defines how knowledge can be produced and argued for, and the criteria 
by which knowledge is possible. In other words, it represents assumptions about ways 
of investigating the nature of the world. Woodside (2010) clarifies that as a 
philosophical position determines the way the observer is observing knowledge, 
directions of enquiry depend on the individual’s objectivity or subjectivity when 
looking into knowledge. 
 
Epistemology is generally divided into positivist and interpretivist approaches. 
Positivism assumes that the investigator is objective and maintains a non-interactive 
stance with regard to knowledge (Miller & Yang 2008). In addition, positivists 
assume that reality can be explained by measurable entities, yielding explanation in 
the sense of hypothetico-deducted logic (Bernstein 2011). This means that the 
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language of the research is formalisable and literal, with meanings separate from 
facts. As a result, the validity of generalisations is derived from the independence of 
the inquirer. On the other hand, the interpretivism (or anti-positivism) perspective 
argues that reality is subjectively perceived and developed through inductive evidence 
rather than formulated and testable hypotheses (Wright 2004). Thus, the validity of 
generalisations does not depend upon statistical inference but on the researcher’s 
interactions with the subject of study. 
 
Mayers (2013) suggests that optimally, ‘units of analysis which make up reality 
would be classified objectively into subjects and predicates’ (p. 37). In fact, he 
recommends that management and business studies aiming to empirically test theories 
in order to increase the predictive understanding of a phenomenon are best served by 
positivism. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) further advise that research in the 
field of corporate governance, such as the study which is the subject of this thesis, has 
long been situated within positivism. Therefore, since this research is objectively 
testing hypotheses grounded by theory via an empirical investigation, this research 
adopted positivism as an epistemological position. 
 
5.2 Research Design 
Having determined the overall methodology of this thesis, the next question is what 
research design should be used. Research design refers to the structure that outlines 
the way the study is carried out and accomplished. Yin (2014) explains that the 
research design is the blueprint of the research, which connects the measurable data to 
the research’s questions and ultimately to its conclusion. It also involves gathering 
relevant observations to identify the type of evidence required to answer the research 
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questions, test hypotheses, and to accurately describe or explain a phenomenon. This 
research follows Creswell’s (2014) categorisation, in which he suggests that the key 
aspects of research design are: research methods, data collection, research 
measurement, and data analysis. 
 
5.2.1 Research Methods 
While there are several definitions in the literature, research methods can be simply 
defined as ‘the strategy of enquiry’ (Mayers 2013, p.153). Research methods are 
concerned with the selection of the organisation of the research, the decision on how 
the data is going to be acquired, and on how the theoretical feedback loop or 
contribution is created. In addition, they involve the adoption of epistemological and 
ontological commitments, which vary depending on the research methods. 
 
Generally, research methods are divided into two major types: quantitative and 
qualitative 21 . Quantitative methods are employed in research based on the 
measurement of numbers or amounts, in which the studied phenomenon is expressed 
in term of quantity. Bryman and Bell (2015) state that quantitative methods entail 
collecting numerical data and exhibiting a view of the relationship between theory 
and research as deductive, a predilection for a natural science approach (and 
positivism in particular), and as having an objectivist conception of social reality. In 
this manner, the key purpose of quantitative research is for the researchers to 
generalise their findings onto a larger population through a structured research 
process. In contrast, qualitative methods emphasise word descriptions rather than the 
quantification of data. They tend to follow the emergent theory approach, in which the 
                                                        
21
 Combining quantitative and qualitative methods in a single research can be considered another type 
of research methods. However, many scholars suggest that mixed-methods research is an alignment of 
the two methods rather than an independent type (Bryman & Bell 2015). 
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process of research is unstructured and vulnerable to the researcher’s subjective 
interpretation (Veal 2005). Qualitative studies then are principally about exploring 
issues, discovering phenomenon, and answering experimental questions. 
 
Choice of methods is subject to the settings and aims of the research. In this research, 
quantitative methods were deemed appropriate. The choice was influenced by the 
underpinning philosophical approach of this research, given the suggestion of 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) that quantitative methods are the ideal partner 
for corporate governance research situated within positivism. The fact that the 
hypotheses of this study were formed deductively and transformed into empirical 
entities to statistically generate the findings of this research also determined the 
selection of quantitative methods. Zikmund et al. (2013) recommend that business and 
management researchers planning to statistically measure particular elements of a 
phenomenon, and test and analyse its underlying hypotheses, should employ 
quantitative methods. Moreover, the way the data is collected (refer to Data 
Collection, section 5.2.2) further influenced the choice of quantitative methods. 
 
Since this research adopted a positivist philosophical position through its objective 
perception of the targeted phenomenon, and involved the empirical examination of 
deductive and measurable hypotheses, the employment of predominantly quantitative 
methods in this research was justified. 
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5.2.2 Data Collection 
In empirical research, data is collected though primary or secondary sources. Primary 
data is first-hand data, in which researchers collect original information exclusively 
for the purpose of their studies, using methods such as interviews, questionnaires and 
observation (Sekaran & Bougie 2013). Primary data enable the research to obtain new 
insights, but its collection can be very time-consuming. It may also suffer from a low 
response or participation rate, may require special skills, and most notably encounter 
restrictions in accessing information related to board deliberations (Bajpai 2011). 
 
Secondary data is information gathered from existing sources. Researchers do not 
directly collect information from subjects or respondents; the data has already been 
collected by another agency. It is sometimes available in hard-copy documents or can 
be downloaded from the Internet (Cooper & Schindler 2013). Secondary data has 
weaknesses; for instance, Denscombe (2007) warns from the inappropriateness of 
such data, in which researchers eventually answer their research questions partially 
with the subsequent lack of validity. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2012) add that 
missing information and lack of control over data quality can be obstacles for studies 
using secondary data. Nevertheless, the advantage of using secondary data is that the 
time spent on collecting it is considerably less than in studies that use primary data 
(Murthy & Bhojanna 2008). In addition, secondary data is very useful when studying 
long-term social and economic change, since it is not feasible to conduct a new study 
that adequately captures past change and/or developments (Zikmund et al. 2013). In 
other words, secondary data further ensures the feasibility of cross-sectional studies, 
enabling the generation of new and comparable insights. In fact, Buglear (2007) and 
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Bryman and Bell (2015) concur that secondary data is an ideal partner with business 
research conducting quantitative statistical examination. 
 
Since this research aimed to empirically investigate the effect of an element of 
corporate governance, namely board structure, on firm financial performance in Saudi 
Arabia, and given that corporate governance standards are mainly implemented by 
public firms, the targeted population was the companies listed in Tadawul. The 
collection of primary data from Tadawul firms was impossible, for two reasons. First, 
access to the required data sources was restricted; and given its impracticality, the 
researcher opted for not collecting primary data from the board members of Tadawul-
listed firms. Second, primary data could not capture the past changes and 
developments of the relationship between board structure and firm financial 
performance which were essential to this study. 
 
For the reasons given above, this research relied on secondary data, namely the annual 
reports of Tadawul-listed firms, accessible through Tadawul or the firms’ webpages. 
Annual reports provided all the information required by this study (except information 
about directors who originated from Najd). Annual reports are certified by the CMA 
and one of the Big Four accounting firms22; they provide the research with a high 
level of data validity and reliability. To identify directors who originated from the 
region of Najd, this research used Assembling the genealogies of the localized families 
in Najd (Al-Jassir 2001), the most significant genealogical resource for the Najd 
region (Rifai & Rifai 1990; Al-Dobib 2002; Al-Roais 2009; Wail 2012). In Saudi 
                                                        
22
 The term ‘Big Four’ refers to the four companies of Deloitte, PwC, Ernst & Young and KPMG. 
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Arabia, the regional background of the individual is identifiable in the family name, 
making regional identification simple. 
 
The study population was all 131 firms continuously listed on Tadawul between 2009 
and 2013. Nonetheless, only two observations of the independent variable ‘outside 
directors who originated from Najd’ were not found in the data sources. Similarly, the 
number of observations may be reduced in some analyses due to some observations 
being statistical outliers and therefore needing to be removed23. The research hence 
clarifies that the chosen size of the population is the result of the maximum available 
combination of size and duration this research can reach. Such an approach ensures 
that the totality of data enables complete and valid answers to the research questions. 
 
5.2.3 Research Measurement 
Research measurement is an essential aspect of quantitative research and an important 
part of research design. It is defined as the assignment of numbers to characteristics, 
objects, persons, states, or events, according to certain rules (Pedhazur & Schmelkin 
1991). According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), research needs to transform its 
hypotheses into measurable entities. In the context of this research, this 
transformation means to empirically measure the collected secondary data to confirm 
or reject the hypotheses. The computation and characteristics of the conceptual 
framework of this research (see Chapter 4), namely, the dependent variable, 
independent variables, and control variables, are explained below. 
 
  
                                                        
23
 This eventuality is discussed in the next chapter. 
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5.2.3.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of this research is firm financial performance. The hypotheses 
developed in this study propose that certain elements of board structure in Saudi listed 
firms increase the board’s effectiveness in performing its control, resource and 
strategy roles, which will in turn improve the financial performance of the firm. This 
improved financial performance can be represented in accounting-based or market-
based measures of performance. Management and strategy scholars tend to 
operationalise accounting performance using measures such as net profit, operating 
margin, cash flow from operations, return on sales, return on invested capital, and 
ROA (Bruton et al. 2010; Miller et al. 2014; Martin, Gözübüyük & Becerra 2015). On 
the other hand, market measures of performance focus on investors, and include 
Tobin's Q ratio, share price, and return on investment (Chahine & Filatotchev 2008; 
Okhmatovskiy 2010; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014). 
 
This research opted for ROA to represent the dependent variable and measure firm 
financial performance. ROA was chosen for five reasons. Firstly, despite the 
arguments for adjusting income in the ROA calculation to account for implicit interest 
or indirectly invested capital, Wahlen, Baginski and Bradshaw (2014) advise that in 
all but extreme cases such adjustment usually results in only minor changes in the 
analyses of ROA. Therefore, this research follows the conventional calculation of 
ROA, through dividing net income by total assets. 
 
Secondly, as an accounting-based measure of performance, ROA is historical and so 
has a backward and inward-looking focus (Hill, Upadhyay & Beekun 2015). 
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Developed as a reporting mechanism, ROA seems an appropriate measure to 
represent the impact of past successes of board deliberations. 
 
Thirdly, the inclusion of liabilities makes ROA a valuable internal performance 
measurement tool, particularly in evaluating the financial performance of different 
departments or divisions of firms (Bhagat & Bolton 2008). In this way, it accurately 
reflects the effectiveness of the board in performing their designated roles. 
 
Fourthly, ROA is a well understood and widely used measure of firm financial 
performance in the management and strategy literature (Christensen & Montgomery 
1981; McNichols 2001; Carton 2006; Fiss 2011; Miller, Washburn & Glick 2013). In 
particular, it is the traditional mainstay for measuring firm financial performance in 
the corporate governance field (Griffin & Mahon 1997; Berman et al. 1999; Anderson 
& Reeb 2004; Carter et al. 2010; Dalton & Aguinis 2013; Castaner & Kavadis 2013; 
Haynes, Campbell & Hitt 2014; Hill, Upadhyay & Beekun 2015), and more 
specifically in research relating to boards of directors (Dalton et al. 1998; Rhoades, 
Rechner & Sundaramurthy 2000; Kiel & Nicholson 2003; Hillman & Dalziel 2003; 
Boone et al. 2007; Bhagat & Bolton 2008; Geletkanycz & Boyd 2011; Park & 
Westphal 2013; Sur, Lvina & Magnan 2013; Krause & Bruton 2014). 
 
Lastly, the researcher decided to use the accounting measure ROA rather than market-
based measures due to the latter’s substantial weaknesses in the context of this 
research. According to Venanzi (2012), market-based measures tend to aggregate 
relevant information in an inefficient manner for compensation purposes, in which 
‘their forward-looking character may result in compensating for promises and not for 
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actual achievements’ (p. 15). More importantly, these measures are often subject to 
forces beyond firm control. This is indeed the case in Saudi Arabia, because 
fluctuations in oil prices and geopolitical risks make the stock market volatile. The 
most recent and notable example of that volatility is the plummet of the Tadawul 
index (from 11,112 to 5,557 points) following the severe decline in oil prices (from 
USD 115 to USD 28 per Brent barrel) between July 2014 and February 2016 
(Bloomberg 2016). 
 
5.2.3.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables of this study were set up in accordance with the conceptual 
framework (see Chapter 4). The independent variables are comprised of outside 
directors with royalty status, outside directors originating from Najd, outside directors 
with large equity ownership, inside directors with large equity ownership, inside non-
Saudi directors, and SGRDs. These variables are directly and clearly presented in the 
research data sources. To demonstrate, outside directors with royalty status were 
identified in the research data sources as holding the title ‘Prince’24 and having the 
family name ‘Al Saud’. Similarly, outside directors originating from Najd were 
identified in the genealogical resource identified earlier. Outside and inside directors 
with large equity ownership (5% or more of the firm’s stock) were identified using 
annual reports. (This typology of directors with large equity ownership is consistent 
with most prior research (Lussier & Sherman 2014), current corporate governance 
principles (OECD 2014), and the Saudi codes of corporate governance (CMA 2010).) 
Inside non-Saudi directors were identified as having a nationality other than Saudi 
                                                        
24
 It is to be noted that there are no princesses on Saudi boards. 
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Arabian clarified in annual reports. Finally, annual reports specifically identify 
SGRDs as directors representing the Saudi government. 
 
Values of independent variables were calculated using the ratio technique. The ratio 
technique refers to the measurement of data that have all the properties of interval 
data, and the ratio of two values is meaningful (Sekaran & Bougie 2013). The 
strength of this technique lies in its inclusion of the true zero point. The term ‘true 
zero point’ means that ‘a zero data value indicates the absence of the object being 
measured’ (Donnelly 2007, p.22), creating the highest level of quality in data 
measurement. Thus, the independent variables used in this research were calculated as 
their ratio to the total numbers of directors on the firms’ boards. 
 
5.2.3.3 Control Variables 
Mixed evidence about a particular phenomenon may be attributed to the omission of 
relevant variables that affect and interact with that phenomenon. Indeed, Schellenger, 
Wood and Tashakori (1989), De Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005), and Cannella, 
Jones and Withers (2015) suggest that conflicting findings with respect to the effects 
of board structure on firm financial performance could be due to failure to control for 
other related aspects of board and firm characteristics. In the interest of robust 
findings, this research included eight control variables – related covariates introduced 
into the models to control for confounding influences on firm financial performance. 
 
5.2.3.3.2 Independent, Outside and Inside Directors 
As indicated previously, board members were classified into independent, outside and 
inside directors. Agency theorists suggest that independent directors are objective 
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monitors of management actions, strengthening the monitoring mechanisms of the 
board and thereby heightening firm financial performance (Zahra & Pearce 1989; 
Dalton et al. 1998; Withers, Hillman & Cannella 2012). Further, due to their rich 
human and social capital, as well as useful linkages with the firm's external 
environment, resource dependence theory proposes that outside directors assist the 
board in securing access to favourable resources, hence improving the financial 
performance of the firm (Pfeffer 1972; Peng 2004; Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013). 
Also, since they are considered to play a more effective role in shaping the strategic 
direction of the firm than other directors, stewardship theory suggests that boards of 
directors with higher representations of inside directors perform better, also enhancing 
firm financial performance (Pugliese et al. 2009; Boyd, Haynes & Zona 2011; Krause, 
Semadeni & Cannella 2014). Clearly, the classifications of directors are important 
with respect to their effect on firm financial performance. 
 
However, as previously noted, Mueller (2006) and Fan et al. (2011) suggest that such 
classifications have been developed for advanced economies rather than for emerging 
markets such as Saudi Arabia. Since the objective of this study was to investigate 
board structure in the Saudi Arabian context, the researcher argues that employing 
classifications of directors as independent variables would disregard the context of 
this study. To overcome this dilemma, and in line with prior relevant studies 
(Rhoades, Rechner & Sundaramurthy 2000; Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Peng 2004; 
Dulewicz & Herbert 2004; Wu, Levitas & Priem 2005; Westphal & Stern 2006; 
Harris & Raviv 2008; Payne, Benson, & Finegold 2009; Tian, Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan 2011; Krause & Semadeni 2013; Markoczy et al. 2013; Wurthmann 
2014), this research used independent, outside and inside directors as control variables 
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to account for aspects of board characteristics that might influence firm financial 
performance. The measurement of these variables paralleled that of the independent 
variables; the numbers of independent, outside, and inside directors were expressed as 
the ratio of the total numbers of directors on the sample firms’ boards. 
 
5.2.3.3.2 Firm Size 
The size of a firm has always been an influence on firm performance; it represents the 
complexity, capabilities and resources of the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). There is 
a general consensus among management and business scholars that the larger the 
firm, the higher the financial performance (Chizema et al. 2015). In the corporate 
governance field, scholars have long reported that the positive link between firm size 
and firm financial performance is due to the power the board of directors has when 
more resources are under its control (Dalton et al. 1998; Lim 2015). Consistent with 
most prior research (Muth & Donaldson 1998; Coles, McWilliams & Sen 2001; Wu, 
Levitas & Priem 2005; Westphal & Stern 2006; Kroll, Walters & Le 2007; Doidge, 
Karolyi & Stulz 2007; Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011; Markoczy et al. 2013; 
Wurthmann 2014; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014; Chizema et al. 2015; Martin, 
Gözübüyük & Becerra 2015), firm size is controlled for in this study using firm sales. 
 
5.2.3.3.3 Firm Age 
Firm age is generally viewed as an index of survival and growth. Firms that have 
survived through their early years face different issues to younger organisations. 
Aldrich and Auster (1986) explain that ‘the major problem facing younger 
organizations is survival, whereas older organizations face the problem of strategic 
transformations’ (p. 183). Equally, the roles of the board are influenced by the needs 
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of the stage the firm is in (Withers, Hillman & Cannella 2012). The cyclical dynamic 
of the firm is likely to determine which of the board’s roles are most needed. 
Therefore, and in line with previous studies (Gibson 2003; Peng 2004; Wu, Levitas & 
Priem 2005; Boone et al. 2007; Markoczy et al. 2013; Chizema et al. 2015; Wowak, 
Mannor & Wowak 2015), this research used firm age (the number of years since the 
firm’s inception) as a control variable. 
 
5.2.3.3.4 Board Size 
The size of the board is an important part of board structure and is considered an 
influential factor in the effectiveness of the board. Corporate governance scholars 
suggest that larger boards are more likely to be able to perform multiple roles (Payne 
et al. 2009). Numerous and recent empirical studies report that board size influences 
firm financial performance (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Wu, Levitas & Priem 2005; 
Westphal and Stern 2006; Kroll, Walters & Le 2007; Kroll, Walters & Wright 2008; 
Payne et al. 2009; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014; Chizema et al. 2015). Thus, this 
research used board size (total number of directors) as a control variable. 
 
5.2.3.3.5 Board Meetings 
The frequency of board meetings is generally used as a metric of board activity 
(Vafeas 1999; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014). It is seen as relevant to board attributes 
that affect board performance (Forbes & Milliken 1999). However, the nature of the 
relationship between board meeting frequency and firm financial performance is 
complex and unclear. Conger, Finegold and Lawler (1998) and Fichand and 
Shivdasani (2006) report that the frequency of board meetings is an indication of 
board effectiveness. Their findings imply that directors in boards that meet more 
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frequently are more likely to perform their duties in accordance with shareholders' 
interests, thereby enhancing firm financial performance. 
 
An opposing perspective is that more frequent meetings are not related to the quality 
of the exchange of ideas among directors or with management; instead, routine tasks 
absorb much of the meetings, limiting opportunities for directors to exercise 
meaningful control over management (Vafeas 1999). Jensen (1993) further argues 
that boards should be relatively inactive, and that boards are usually forced to 
maintain higher activity levels in the presence of problems. In this manner, board 
meetings serve as a reactive problem-solving device rather than as a proactive 
measure for improved governance. In fact, recent evidence on the relationship 
between board meeting frequency and market value shows that boards that meet more 
frequently have relatively low stability, and as a result have lower firm financial 
performance (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach 2010; Jiraporn et al. 2009; Brick & 
Chidambaran 2010).  
 
Regardless of the nature of the relationship between board meetings and firm 
financial performance, numerous empirical studies find this relationship to be 
significant. Consequently, consistent with most prior research (Dulewicz & Herbert 
2004; Westphal & Stern 2006; Payne et al. 2009; Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach 2013; 
Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014), total number of board annual meetings was used as a 
control variable in this research. 
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5.2.3.3.6 Board Committees 
There is general agreement among corporate governance scholars that the number of 
board committees is related to board effectiveness. Given that some of the most 
important decisions are introduced at committee levels, the function and composition 
of committees, such as auditing and compensation committees, influences firm 
financial performance at a level equivalent to that of the overall board structure 
(Kesner 1988). The impact of committees on firm financial performance is the result 
of influencing firm strategies and reducing agency problems (Klein 1998; Davidson, 
Pilger & Szakmary 1998; Ghafran & O'Sullivan 2013). For instance, Laux and Laux 
(2009) report a positive effect on firm financial performance when a compensation 
committee, rather than the entire board, determines executive compensation. They 
note the same result when the audit committee monitors firm financial reporting, 
rather than when the board as a whole handles it. More recent studies also show the 
significance of board committees on firm financial performance (Zheng & Cullinan 
2010; Hermanson et al. 2012; Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach 2013; Liao & Hsu 2013; 
Yatim & Yusoff 2014). In line with prior and relevant studies (Ferris, Jagannathan & 
Pritchard 2003; Uzun, Szewczyk & Varma 2004; Westphal & Stern 2006; 
Chowdhury & Wang 2009; Brick & Chidambaran 2010; Allegrini & Greco 2013; 
Baccouche, Hadriche & Omri 2014), this research employed total number of board 
committees as a control variable. 
 
Table 5.1 provides a summary of all the variables used in this research. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of the variables used in this research 
Variable  Type of Variable Measure Definition 
 
Firm financial performance 
 
Dependent variable 
 
ROA 
 
Net income divided by total assets 
Outside directors with royalty 
status 
Independent variable Ratio The number of outside directors with royalty status divided by the total 
number of directors 
Outside directors originating 
from Najd 
Independent variable Ratio The number of outside directors originating from Najd divided by the 
total number of directors 
Outside directors with large 
equity ownership 
Independent variable Ratio The number of outside large investor directors divided by the total 
number of directors 
Inside directors with large equity 
ownership 
Independent variable Ratio The number of inside large investor directors divided by the total 
number of directors 
Inside non-Saudi directors Independent variable Ratio The ratio of the total number of inside non-Saudi directors divided by 
the total number of directors 
SGRDs Independent variable Ratio The number of SGRDs divided by the total number of directors 
Independent directors Control variable Ratio The number of independent directors divided by the total numbers of 
directors 
Outside directors Control variable Ratio The number of outside directors divided by the total number of 
directors 
Inside directors Control variable Ratio The number of inside directors divided by the total number of directors 
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Table 5.1 continued     
Variable Type of Variable Measure Definition 
 
Firm size 
 
Control variable 
 
Sales 
 
The firm’s total (gross) sales 
Firm age Control variable Firm age The number of years since the firm’s inception 
Board size Control variable Number of directors The total number of directors on the board  
Board meetings Control variable Number of board 
meetings 
The total number of the board’s annual meetings 
Board committees Control variable Number of board 
committees 
The number of board committees 
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5.2.4 Data Analysis 
This study involved multiple robust statistical analyses, including post-estimation 
tests to ensure efficiency and consistency. All analyses were performed using 
statistical software packages. 
 
5.2.4.1 Analytical Approach 
This research investigated relationships between board structure and firm financial 
performance. The researcher looked for patterns or trends within the data. One 
analytical approach that can serve this objective is the cross-sectional approach. A 
cross-sectional approach involves the analysis of data collected over time – meaning 
repeated observations of the same variables – so that the causal effects of variables on 
changes that take place during that time can be examined (Celsi et al. 2011; Jackson 
2012). However, this approach can suffer from participant attrition and can require a 
long time to collect sufficient data. This concern is not valid for the research reported 
in this thesis, because the data are archival and had already been collected. Since this 
study aimed to report the development of correlational relationships between board 
structure and firm financial performance among 131 firms listed in Tadawul between 
2009 and 2013, this research was cross-sectional in nature. 
 
5.2.4.2 Statistical Analyses 
In line with major and relevant journals including Academy of Management Journal, 
Journal of Management, Strategic Management Journal, Management Science, 
Journal of Management Studies, Strategic Organization, and Organization Science, 
five stages of statistical analysis were used in this study: preliminary analysis, 
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descriptive statistics, correlation matrices, multivariate analysis, and analysis of 
interaction terms. 
 
5.2.4.2.1 Preliminary Analysis 
In empirical studies, preliminary analysis refers to the process of editing, entering and 
transforming the data into an automated data summary form (Mukul & Deepa 2011). 
Krishnaswamy, Sivakumar and Mathirajan (2009) assert that the way preliminary 
analysis is conducted often makes a significant difference to the usefulness of the 
research. The inclusion of this type of analysis reduces entry errors and manual 
override, thereby increasing the accuracy of the data (Celsi et al. 2011). 
 
Data entry accuracy was facilitated using an automated data summary form in 
Microsoft Excel. Precisely, cells were set to accept only numeric entries between zero 
and 100% or to record observations measured by nominal scales were set to accept 
only zero or positive integers. Such procedures exclude certain types of key entry 
errors, and prevent entries of more than the possible ratio or number. 
 
Data entry was carried out through manual extraction of data from the data sources 
(annual reports, Al-Jassir (2001)) and input to Microsoft Excel25 . To ensure the 
accuracy of the data entry, the author reviewed the data three times, and his 
supervisors reviewed a random selection of the data. To independently verify the 
accuracy of the data extraction and entry, an independent editor reviewed the whole 
dataset, which is deposited in an Excel file. The data analysed in this research is 
publicly available. 
                                                        
25
 As all of the data sources are in Portable Document Format (PDF), the researcher had to manually 
extract the data. 
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The data extracted from the data sources into the automated data summary form 
consists of 11,790 items. Despite the large scale of the data, the process was been 
carried out with a high level of precision. Translation from Arabic to English for some 
of the data sources was performed by the author, who is fluent in written and spoken 
English and whose native language is Arabic. 
 
5.2.4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are commonly used in management and business research, 
especially in the corporate governance field (Bergh & Ketchen 2009; Krause & 
Bruton 2014). Their purpose is to provide an initial characterisation of the information 
in a dataset by measuring the central tendency and dispersion of the data, and the 
regularity of the numbers (Mukul & Deepa 2011). In this research, the mean, median, 
standard deviation (SD), minimum (min), maximum (max), skewness and kurtosis 
were generated for all constructs. The production of these statistics helps the 
researcher to form general insights about the collected data, shows patterns in the 
data, and provides the foundation for comparisons between the variables. 
 
5.2.4.2.3 Correlation Matrix 
Following the descriptive statistics, the researcher generated correlation coefficients 
for the dependent, control, and independent variables. Correlation is a statistical 
technique that offers preliminary insights into the relationship between two variables 
(Supino & Borer 2012). Importantly, it treats the dependent and explanatory variables 
symmetrically, without distinction between them (Gujarati 2009). 
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Correlation was used in this research due to its provision of three significant 
indications. Firstly, it provides the direction of the relationship between the variables, 
specifying whether it is positive or negative. Secondly, it shows the nature of the 
relationship between the variables, indicating whether it is linear or not. A correlation 
of -1 or 1 implies a perfect linear relationship, whereas a correlation of 0 implies that 
there is no relationship between the variables. Thirdly, it indicates the strength of the 
relationship between the variables; correlation coefficients of ±0.00 to ±0.29, ±0.35 to 
±0.69, and ±0.70 to ±1.00 indicate none to weak, moderate, and strong relationships 
respectively (Jackson 2012). 
 
Several methods can be used to calculate a correlation coefficient. One of the most 
widely used measures is Pearson’s correlation coefficient, usually known as Pearson’s 
r. Pearson’s r is used for measuring measure association that exists between two 
variables measured on nominal or ratio scale (Cohen et al. 2003; Gravetter & Wallnau 
2013). Pearson’s r was employed in this research due to its suitability and relevance to 
the research data as well as analyses. 
 
5.2.4.2.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The direction and strength of the independent associations between the explanatory 
variables and the dependent variable was measured using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) multiple regression, a common multivariate analysis technique. Multivariate 
analysis explains the impact of multiple explanatory variables on a dependent variable 
(Rubin & Babbie 2011). It allows hypotheses to be tested by ranking the association 
between the variables (Bryman &  Bell 2015). 
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Regression using OLS provides predictions of the values of the dependent variable 
given the values of explanatory variables (Kothari 2004), hence is ideal for this 
investigation of correlational relationships (associations) between board structure and 
firm financial performance. Moreover, OLS modelling controls for serial correlation 
and unobserved heterogeneity (Greene 2011). Thirdly, as is the case with any 
modelling technique, OLS may suffer from problems related to heteroskedasticity, 
normality, autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and endogeneity, which can produce 
biased, inefficient and inconsistent results (Certo & Semadeni 2006). However, as a 
precaution against these analytical shortcomings, this research conducts several post 
estimations tests to control for such possibilities. These tests are thoroughly explained 
later in this chapter. 
 
Lastly, OLS is commonly used in comparable research, especially in recent corporate 
governance empirical studies (Kroll, Walters & Wright 2008; Payne, Benson & 
Finegold 2009; Chizema & Kim 2010; Boulton, Smart & Zutter 2010; Dalziel, Gentry 
& Bowerman 2011; Shin & Seo 2011; Galema, Lensink & Mersland 2012; Karaevli 
& Zajac 2013; Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong & Kor 2014; Pathak, Hoskisson & 
Johnson 2014; Chen 2015; Judge et al. 2015).  
 
5.2.4.2.5 Interaction Terms 
To enable more insights into the variables’ relationships, and in line with previous 
research (Edwards & Lambert 2007; Sekaran & Bougie 2013; Karazsia et al. 2014), 
interaction terms were introduced in the multiple regression models. The interaction 
terms consist of the moderators embedded in the conceptual framework of this 
research (see Chapter 4). Two moderators have been included in the regression; 
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SGRDs jointly with outside directors with royal status, and SGRDs jointly with inside 
non-Saudi directors. Both moderators are hypothesised to have a positive impact on 
the dependent variable (ROA).  
 
5.2.4.2.6 Post-Estimation Tests 
To ensure the models produce unbiased, efficient and consistent outcomes, the 
researcher took several steps to validate their compliance with the four assumptions of 
OLS, as well to limit the risk of endogeneity bias.  
 
With regard to the OLS assumptions, the researcher tested for multicollinearity 
among the explanatory variables (Berry & Feldman 1985) – in other words, whether 
the variables are strongly correlated with one another. Because multicollinearity 
increases the residuals of coefficient estimators, the major effect of multicollinearity 
is on the significance tests and confidence intervals for regression coefficients (Hair et 
al. 2010). In particular, when multicollinearity is high, confidence intervals for 
coefficients tend to be very wide and P values very small. Several methods provide 
information for making an informed judgment about the degree to which 
multicollinearity is present (Wooldridge 2013). 
 
To detect multicollinearity, this research used the method suggested by most 
statisticians and econometric scholars, which is observation of the correlation matrix 
(Hair et al. 2010; Brooks 2014). Jackson (2012) and Field (2013) suggest that 
multicollinearity exists when the correlation between a pair of variables reaches or 
exceeds 0.7. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is also useful; it indicates whether 
there is a strong linear association between two or more explanatory variables 
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(Montgomery, Peck & Vining 2012). Hair et al. (2010) and Wooldridge (2013) state 
that a VIF below 10 indicates no multicollinearity among explanatory variables.  
 
In this research, a multicollinearity problem was identified if a pair of variables 
generated a VIF of 10 or more or a correlation coefficient exceeding 0.7, hence the 
variable with higher VIF was dropped (Brooks 2014). 
 
Another assumption of OLS is that the variables under investigation are normally 
distributed (Singh 2007). To test the normality of the variables, the Shapiro-Wilk 
(SW) test was conducted. The SW test is a statistically vigorous tool used to describe 
the correlation between data and its normal score (Martin & Bridgmo 2012). The test 
examines the null hypothesis in which that residuals are not normally distributed; the 
decision to reject the null hypothesis is made when the tests’ level of significance is 
higher than the P value of 0.05 (Rovai, Baker & Ponton 2013). This means that if the 
normality assumption does not hold, OLS estimates are biased, and vice versa. 
 
To visualise the distribution of the variables, the researcher plotted Kernel Density 
Estimation (KDE). KDE is a well-known general data smoothing technique used in 
statistics to estimate random variable functions, supposing the random variable 
functions are in the same distribution (Simonoff 2011). By generating a smooth, 
continuous surface from the point pattern that represents spatial variation in the 
density of events at each point, KDE supplements the SW test of normal distribution. 
 
Other OLS assumptions are that autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are below 
acceptable limits. Autocorrelation means the errors of prediction are not independent 
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of one another. Wang and Jain (2003) suggest that ‘the presence of autocorrelation 
does not cause a bias in the estimation of the model coefficients, but it reduces the 
efficiency of a model for forecasting’ (p. 74). Application of OLS to autocorrelated 
data could fail to properly estimate the variance in the model (Maddala & Lahiri 
2009), leading to underestimating the true variance and thereby inefficient estimates. 
Heteroskedasticity refers to the non-constant variance in the error terms in the 
regression models. Violation of this assumption means that the variance is not 
constant from the size of the variables, and hence the estimated standard error will be 
biased (Wooldridge 2013). 
 
To deal with violation of the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity assumptions, all 
analyses of OLS regressions involved clustered standard errors, using the Huber-
White (HW) estimator of variance (White 1980). By clustering, the HW estimator 
accounts for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, ensuring more consistent and 
efficient outcomes (Petersen 2009; Wooldridge 2013). Beside its econometric 
strength, the HW estimator has been adopted by many similar studies that apply OLS 
regression (Semadeni et al. 2008; Shin & Seo 2011; Miller, Breton & Lester 2011; 
Basuil & Datta 2015; Dencker & Gruber 2015; Marano & Kostova 2016). 
 
While taking steps to ensure the efficiency, the researcher implemented several 
actions to maintain their consistency across the models. According to Antonakis et al. 
(2014), endogeneity is ‘a major threat to consistency’ (p. 97). Endogeneity refers to 
the situation where an explanatory variable is correlated with the error term. If 
endogeneity occurs, the expected value of the residuals is no longer zero, thereby the 
OLS estimates are not consistent and do not reflect the true population parameters 
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(Wooldridge 2013). Specification errors that trigger endogeneity involve reverse 
causality, omitted key variables, and measurement error (Ketchen, Ketchen & Bergh 
2006; Bascle 2008; Wooldridge 2013; Antonakis et al. 2014). 
 
To ensure the efficiency of the OLS estimates, a comprehensive process was followed 
to manage the risk of endogeneity bias. Firstly, the choice of the dependent variable 
(ROA) was in line with comparable studies (Dalton et al. 1998; Rhoades, Rechner & 
Sundaramurthy 2000; Kiel & Nicholson 2003; Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Anderson & 
Reeb 2004; Boone et al. 2007; Carter et al. 2010; Geletkanycz & Boyd 2011; Park & 
Westphal 2013; Sur, Lvina & Magnan 2013; Krause & Bruton 2014). Hence, the 
possibility of reverse causality is controlled for by the support of previous theoretical 
and empirical arguments that firm financial performance is the dependent variable. As 
a further precaution against reverse causality, the researcher regressed the average of 
the last two years (2012 and 2013) of the dependent variable against the average of 
the first three years (2009, 2010, 2011) of the independent variables. In line with 
(Leenders & Wierenga 2008), reverse causality risk is contained if the variables’ 
directions in this analytical technique and the research main regression did not 
change. 
 
Secondly, following the recommendations of Hamilton and Nickerson (2003), Bascle 
(2008), and Essen et al. (2015) on reducing the risk of omitting key variables, this 
research controlled for endogeneity by utilising control variables. As clarified 
previously, the selected control variables were consistent with those used in similar 
studies, and hence functioned to reduce the probability of factors outside the research 
variables influencing the findings. 
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The final process employed to assess endogeneity bias was inspection of the OLS 
measurement error, which signals whether the independent variables are actually 
exogenous and precisely and reliably measured. To do this, and as recommended by 
leading statisticians such as Bascle (2008), Wooldridge (2013) and Greene (2011), 
and in line with recent comparable research (Hoetker & Mellewigt 2009; Soda & 
Zaheer 2012; Patel & Cooper 2014; Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong & Kor 2014; 
Knockaert, Bjornali & Erikson 2015; Kreutzer, Walter & Cardinal 2015), the 
researcher performed the Hausman procedure which compares the regression with 
instrumental variables to the OLS regression (Hausman 1978). If the null hypothesis 
of explanatory variables are being exogenous is not rejected, concerns of endogeneity 
in OLS outcomes are allayed; otherwise, measurement error is possible, and the 
outcomes of empirical analysis are at risk of bias26. 
 
5.2.4.3 Software Packages 
Stata and SPSS software packages were used to conduct the statistical analyses and 
post estimation tests. These packages are widely used within econometrics, business, 
and social studies (Bryman & Bell 2015; Treiman 2014). Stata was used for 
sophisticated analyses and tests and application of advanced statistical tools. 
Similarly, SPSS assists this research to report statistics and analyses through the 
application of its informative graphs and charts.  
 
 
 
                                                        
26
 A thorough explanation of this procedure is provided in the next chapter. 
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5.3 Summary 
This chapter presents the methodology and design of the research, following on from 
the contextual and theoretical discussions, hypotheses, and conceptual framework 
outlined in the previous chapters. Justifications for the methodology and research 
design are provided to maximise the validity of the research findings. The chapter 
initially clarifies that this research aimed to develop an objective understanding of the 
phenomenon under study and provide critical insights into the understanding of its 
reality. The chapter then explains how the selected quantitative methods and 
secondary data are ideal for the process of investigating the research hypotheses. 
Finally, the rigorous analytical procedures used to generate the research findings are 
specified. 
 
The next chapter presents the detailed results from the statistical analyses and tests. 
The presentation includes visualisations and explanations of descriptive and 
regression analyses, as well as the results of post-estimation tests.  
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Chapter 6 – Results 
 
This research aimed to advance the understanding of the relationship between board 
structure and firm financial performance in the context of the emerging Saudi Arabian 
market. To do so, and as explained in the previous chapters, data were collected to 
empirically test eight hypotheses using various analytical techniques. In this chapter, 
trends, parameters, and statistical associations of the variables of interest are reported. 
The chapter begins with statistical descriptions, followed by a correlation matrix, and 
ultimately a multivariate analysis. The results of post-estimation tests are then 
reported, enabling assessment of the efficiency and consistency of the results. 
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Following the process of editing and entering the data into Stata and SPSS software, 
the researcher calculated descriptive statistics for the dependent, control and 
independent variables. Three records were removed due to outliers in the dependent 
variable (ROA) and missing data relating to origin (Najd or elsewhere) for two 
outside directors. Therefore, the number of observations for all the variables is 652, 
but for ‘outside directors originating from Najd’ is 650. A summary of descriptive 
statistics is presented in Table 6.1, followed by in-depth interpretation. 
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* Numbers in SAR millions.  
Table 6.1: Summary of descriptive statistics 
  Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
          1 ROA 652 4.76% 3.41% 8.71% -30.51% 43.98% 0.54 3.11 
  
 
       2 Firm size* 652 4,095 770 16,135 0 190,000 8.96 92.47 
3 Firm age (years) 652 22.25 22.00 14.49 0 59.00 0.36 -0.54 
4 Board size 652 8 9 2 4 12 -0.13 -0.44 
5 Board committees 652 3 3 1 1 5 0.27 -0.12 
6 Board meetings  652 5 5 2 1 14 1.31 2.38 
7 Outside directors 652 37.6% 40.00% 18.95% 0.00% 80.00% -0.33 -0.80 
8 Independent directors 652 50.80% 44.44% 18.20% 0.00% 100.00% 0.67 -0.08 
9 Inside directors 652 11.5% 11.11% 10.57% 0.00% 50.00% 0.96 0.86 
  
 
       11 Outside directors with royal status 652 3.14% 0.00% 7.51% 0.00% 40.00% 2.57 6.47 
12 Outside directors originating from Najd 650 60.23% 66.67% 26.35% 0.00% 100.00% -0.49 2.46 
13 Outside directors with large ownership 652 3.35% 0.00% 6.59% 0.00% 44.44% 2.85 9.37 
14 Inside directors with large ownership 652 1.32% 0.00% 3.01% 0.00% 24.49% 3.66 16.43 
15 Inside non-Saudi directors 652 0.92% 0.00% 2.00% 0.00% 12.35% 2.57 7.05 
16 SGRDs 652 9.21% 0.00% 14.88% 0.00% 75.00% 1.84 3.31 
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6.1.1 Dependent Variable 
Table 6.1 shows the firms reported an average annual ROA of 4.76% with a variation 
of 8.71% (refer to Figure 6.1). The worst-performing firm recorded an ROA of -
30.51% and the best-performing firm 43.98%. The median ROA was 3.41%, 
signalling that the data is marginally skewed to the right, which is in line with the 
skewness value (see Table 6.1). Finally, the kurtosis value indicates that there are 
some observations with very high or very low ROA. 
 
Figure 6.1: Distribution of ROA 
  
 124 
6.1.2 Control Variables 
6.1.2.1 Firm Size27 
The average annual sales for the Saudi listed firms from 2009 to 2013 was SAR4,095 
million, with SD of SAR16,135 million. As expected, the Saudi Basic Industries 
Corporation (SABIC)28 reported the biggest sales (SAR190,000 million); some firms 
did not report any sales due to the fact that they were newly established. The median 
value of sales is SAR770 million, indicating that the data is substantially skewed to 
the right, is in line with the relatively large skewness and kurtosis values (Table 6.1). 
This suggests that some firms have very high sales and others very low sales. To 
overcome the influence of these large values on findings, firm sales were logged 
(using the natural logarithm) in the remaining analyses.   
  
6.1.2.2 Firm Age 
The mean age of the Saudi listed firms from 2009 to 2013 was about 22 years with an 
SD of roughly 14 years; the oldest firm was Mohammad Al Mojil Group Company at 
59 years29, and the youngest Atheeb Telecom, established and listed in 2009. The 
median age is lower than the mean by two years, indicating that the data is slightly 
skewed to the right, as the skewness value (Table 6.1) confirms. Finally, the kurtosis 
value implies that the data does not suffer from extreme values and the values are 
widely spread around the mean. 
 
  
                                                        
27
 As indicated in Chapter 5, page 105, firm size is represented by the value of firm sales. 
28
 SABIC is the world’s sixth-largest chemical producer in terms of sales value and the largest listed 
firm in the ME in terms of profit, sales, and market capitalisation (KPMG 2010). 
29
 Haji Abdullah Alireza and Company is the oldest existing firm in Saudi Arabia, established in 1845 
(Al-Jazirah 1999), but it is not listed in Tadawul.  
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6.1.2.3 Board Size, Board Committees, and Board Meeting  
From 2009 to 2013, the Saudi listed firms had on average eight directors (SD 2), three 
board committees (SD 1), and five board meetings per annum (SD 2). The highest 
number of directors on these boards is 12, and the lowest is four. The maximum 
number of board committees is five, whereas some firms have just one. The highest 
number of board meetings is 14 meetings a year, while some boards have only one 
meeting per annum. 
 
The median number of directors is nine, indicating the data is slightly skewed to the 
left, which is in line with the skewness value (Table 6.1). On the other hand, the 
median values of the board committees and board annual meetings are three and five 
respectively, suggesting that the data is slightly skewed to the right, as the skewness 
values confirm. Kurtosis values (Table 6.1) signal that the data for these three 
variables are normally distributed.   
 
6.1.2.4 Outside, Independent, and Inside Directors 
On average, the boards of these Tadawul-listed firms were composed of 38% outside 
directors, 51% independent directors, and 12% inside directors (SDs shown in Table 
6.1). While some of the boards have only one or two of these formal directorial 
classifications, some other firms have balanced numbers of outside, independent and 
inside directors. 
 
Table 6.1 shows that the distribution of outside directors is slightly skewed to the left, 
whereas, the distributions of independent and inside directors are marginally skewed 
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to the right. Kurtosis values suggest a low probability of extreme values, and imply 
that the data is normally distributed. 
 
6.1.3 Independent Variables 
6.1.3.1 Outside Directors with Royal Status 
Outside directors with royal status represent on average 3.14% of the total number of 
directors across the Saudi listed firms from 2009 to 2013, with a variation of 7.51% 
(refer to Figure 6.2). While some boards have as many as 40% of such directors (e.g., 
Anaam International Holding Group), most listed firms have no outside directors with 
royal status on their boards. The distribution of outside directors with royal status is 
skewed to the right and the kurtosis value suggesting that the data of this variable is 
slightly sharper than the normal distribution, with values concentrated around the 
mean. This sharp distribution is most likely due to the relatively small scale of this 
variable, accounting for 115 observations. 
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of outside directors with royal status 
 
 
6.1.3.2 Outside Directors Originating from Najd 
The data suggest outside directors originating from Najd dominate the boardrooms in 
in Tadawul-listed firms, accounting for over 60% of the directors from 2009 to 2013 
(refer to Figure 6.3). While these directors dominate some boardrooms, some firms 
have none on their boards. The distribution is slightly skewed to the left (Figure 6.3), 
and the kurtosis value of implies that the data has a flatter distribution than a normal 
distribution with a marginally wider peak. This means that the data does not suffer 
from extreme values. 
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of outside directors originating from Najd 
 
 
6.1.3.3 Outside directors with large equity ownership 
Table 6.1 shows that the average presence of outside directors with large ownership in 
the boards of Tadawul firms from 2009 to 2013 is 3.35%, with a variation of 6.59% 
(refer to Figure 6.4). Among 249 observations, the highest concentration of these 
directors was in the Methanol Chemicals Company, in which they occupied 44.44% 
of the board; in the remaining 403 firm-years there were no outside directors with 
large ownership on boards. The distributions of outside directors with royal status is 
skewed to the right and has a sharp peak with thicker tails (see Table 6.1 and figure 
6.4). While the probability for extreme values is high, it to be expected due to the 
relatively small scale of this variable. 
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of outside directors with large ownership 
 
 
6.1.3.4 Inside directors with large equity ownership 
Inside directors with large ownership represent 1.32% of the total number of directors 
of Tadawul firms between 2009 and 2013, with an SD of 3.01% (refer to Figure 6.5). 
The highest concentration of these directors is in the Jarir Marketing Company, in 
which they account for 24.49% of the board, whereas 453 observations do not have 
inside directors with large ownership. The distribution of inside directors with large 
equity ownership is skewed to the right and is sharper than the normal distribution, 
with values concentrated around the mean (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.5). This sharp 
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distribution is due to the fairly small scale of this variable, accounting for 199 
observations. 
 
Figure 6.5: Distribution of inside directors with large ownership  
 
 
6.1.3.5 Inside Non-Saudi Directors 
The average presence of inside non-Saudi directors in the sample was 0.92%, with an 
SD of 2.00% (refer to Figure 6.6). The majority of firms did not have inside non-
Saudi directors on their boards; the largest presence was in the Astra Industrial Group, 
in which they accounted for 12.35% of the board. The distribution of inside non-Saudi 
directors is skewed to the right (Figure 6.6), and the kurtosis value (Table 6.1) 
suggests that the values are concentrated around the mean with a high probability of 
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extreme values. This is to be expected considering the small scale of this variable, 
representing for around 30% of the total observations of this variable. 
 
Figure 6.6: Distribution of inside non-Saudi directors 
 
 
6.1.3.6 SGRDs 
Just under 10% of Tadawul-listed firms had SGRDs on their boards between 2009 
and 2013 % (refer to Figure 6.7). The highest ratio of SGRDs to all directors was 75% 
in the case of the Saudi Electricity Company. Many listed firms had no such directors 
on their boards. The data are skewed to the right (Figure 6.7), and the kurtosis value 
(Table 6.1) shows that it has a slightly sharp distribution, indicating that there are 
observations with very high or very low SGRDs ratios. 
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Figure 6.7: Distribution of SGRDs 
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6.2 Correlation Matrix 
A correlation matrix was calculated as the first step towards analysing the 
relationships between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. While 
this analysis does not predict or estimate, its significance lies in the revelation of the 
direction, nature, and strength of the relationships between pairs of variables (Jackson 
2012).  
 
The correlation matrix for all the variables was calculated using Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. Note that a correlation of 0.83 between the variables ‘outside directors’ 
and ‘independent directors’ was identified. As stated in the previous chapter, this 
value is intolerable because it signifies a multicollinearity problem. The VIF test for 
‘outside directors’ gave a result of 298.27, confirming the multicollinearity problem. 
To overcome this issue, the research eliminated ‘outside directors’ from the list of 
control variables, and the correlation matrix for the remaining variables is presented 
in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: Correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 ROA 1
2 Firm Size 0.2113* 1
3 Firm Age 0.3589* 0.2269* 1
4 Board Size -0.033 0.1612* -0.1550* 1
5 Board Committees -0.1452* 0.1396* -0.2577* 0.1786* 1
6 Board Meetings 0.0173 0.0898* 0.1991* -0.0128 0.0848* 1
7 Independent Directors -0.1174* -0.1016* 0.1077* -0.0744 0.0511 0.0282 1
8 Inside Directors 0.1710* -0.0579 0.1365* -0.0654 -0.2289* -0.0898* -0.2241* 1
9 Outside Directors with Royal Status 0.0593 0.018 0.0409 -0.0121 -0.0662 0.0382 0 0.0457 1
10 Outside Directors from Najd 0.2006* 0.1384* 0.2506* -0.0688 0.018 0.0844* 0.1157* -0.064 -0.2479* 1
11 Outside Directors with Large Ownership 0.1228* 0.0731 0.0425 0.0572 -0.1111* -0.2018* -0.3205* 0.1036* 0.016 0.0727 1
12 Inside Directors with Large Ownership 0.3002* 0.0668 0.0626 -0.0498 -0.1804* -0.1478* -0.2632* 0.5727* 0.0041 0.0641 0.5555* 1
13 Inside Non-Saudi Directors -0.0173 0.1429* -0.1691* 0.1166* 0.0573 -0.1017* -0.2341* 0.3421* 0.0185 -0.3191* 0.0692 0.2437* 1
14 SGRDs 0.1635* 0.2141* 0.1584* 0.1314* 0.1047* 0.3271* -0.0877* -0.1694* -0.0522 0.2800* -0.2463* -0.2203* -0.1288* 1
 
Note: n = 652. However, due to the transformation of firm size into natural logarithm values, the number of observations for firm age and outside directors 
originating from Najd are 651 and 549 respectively.  
*P ≤ 0.05 for correlations in two-tailed test. 
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As Table 6.2 shows, the control variables of firm size, firm age, and inside directors 
are positively and significantly correlated with ROA. While the number of directors 
and number of board meetings have negative and positive correlations with ROA 
respectively, their correlations are not significant. The remaining control variables of 
number of board committees and independent directors are negatively and 
significantly correlated with ROA. 
 
Further, the correlation matrix reveals that the independent variables of outside 
directors originating from Najd, outside directors with large ownership, inside 
directors with large ownership, and SGRDs are positively and significantly correlated 
with ROA. Outside directors with royal status and inside non-Saudi directors are not 
significantly correlated with ROA, with positive and negative directions respectively. 
 
The correlation matrix also demonstrates that all the explanatory variables are 
independent, as all correlation coefficients are below the problematic level of 0.730. 
The mean VIF test result of 1.51 (refer to Table 6.3), with the largest value for an 
individual variable being 2.56 (far below the threshold of 10 – see section 5.2.4.2.6) 
for inside directors with large ownership, further confirms that the variables are 
independent31.  
                                                        
30
 The largest correlations between the explanatory variables were between inside directors with large 
ownership and independent directors, and between inside directors with large ownership and outside 
directors with large ownership, at 0.573 and 0.555 respectively. 
31
  Note that the means of moderation terms are centred. 
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Table 6.3: VIF test results
Variables VIF Score
Inside Directors with Large Ownership 2.56
Inside Directors 2.11
Outside Directors with Large Ownership 1.96
SGRDs 1.57
Inside Non-Saudi Directors 1.56
Firm Age 1.53
Outside Directors Originating from Najd 1.47
Firm Size 1.46
Independent Directors 1.37
Board Committees 1.24
Board Meeting 1.23
SGRDs X Inside Non-Saudi Directors 1.21
Outside Directors with Royal Status 1.16
Board Size 1.13
SGRDs X Outside Directors with Royal Status 1.11
Mean VIF 1.51
 
 
6.3 Multivariate Analysis 
All the explanatory variables qualified from the correlation matrix were regressed 
against firm financial performance, proxied by ROA. In Table 6.4, three models are 
presented, starting with the base model, then the main model, and finally the full 
model. In the base model, the control variables are regressed against ROA. In the 
main model, the regression includes the base model and the independent variables. In 
the full model, the regression includes the main model and the interaction terms. 
 
The analysis began horizontally, with the response variable analysed against grouped 
control variables, each independent variable and interaction terms. This was followed 
by vertical analysis to examine the predictive power of the models. 
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Table 6.4: The relationship between ROA and board structure using OLS regression a
b SE b SE
Control Variables - Firm Control:
1 Firm Size (log) 0.008*** (0.002) 0.005** (0.002)
2 Firm Age (log) 0.029*** (0.004) 0.028*** (0.003)
Control Variables - Board Control:
3 Board Size 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002)
4 Board Committees -0.006 (0.004) -0.006 (0.004)
5 Board Meeting Attendance -0.002 (0.002) -0.004* (0.002)
6 Independent Directors -0.055** (0.017) -0.036* (0.016)
7 Inside Directors 0.076* (0.036) -0.049 (0.035)
Independent Variables - Board Characteristics:
8 Outside Directors with Royal Status (H1) 0.087* (0.042)
9 Outside Directors Originated from Najd (H2) 0.023* (0.012)
10 Outside Directors with Large Ownership (H3) -0.133** (0.049)
11 Inside Directors with Large Ownership (H4) 1.038*** (0.141)
12 Inside Non-Saudi Directors (H5) -0.114 (0.142)
13 SGRDs (H6) 0.080** (0.025)
Interactions:
14 SGRDs X Outside Directors with Royal Status (H7)
15 SGRDs X Inside Non-Saudi Directors (H8)
Constant -0.063* (0.026) -0.047† (0.025)
N 651 649
Adj R^ 0.173 0.273
F 22.010 19.510
Prob > F 0.000 0.000
a: † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Robus t standard errors are in parentheses.
The base Model The Main Model
Variables
b SE
0.005** (0.002)
0.026*** (0.003)
0.000 (0.002)
-0.005 (0.004)
-0.003† (0.002)
-0.031* (0.016)
-0.051 (0.036)
0.000 (0.037)
0.023* (0.011)
-0.146** (0.047)
1.128*** (0.127)
-0.861* (0.390)
0.038 (0.026)
1.355** (0.456)
2.111* (0.853)
-0.045† (0.024)
649
0.301
20.490
0.000
The Full Model
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6.3.1 The Relationship between Control Variables and ROA 
The results of the OLS regression show that some control variables have a significant 
independent linear relationship with ROA, some do not, and others have mixed 
outcomes. Across the models, firm size and firm age predict ROA positively and 
significantly (Table 6.4). Independent directors also significantly predict ROA, but in 
a negative direction. Board size and board committees have positive and negative 
relationships with ROA respectively, but neither is statistically significant. 
 
Board meetings and inside directors have negative relationships with ROA, with 
variations in their statistical significance across the models. In the full model, 
however, the former is statistically insignificant (with a p value of 0.083), and the 
latter is even less significant. 
 
6.3.2 The Relationship Between Independent Variables and ROA  
6.3.2.1 Outside Directors with Royal Status 
While the regression reveals a positive linear association between outside directors 
with royal status and ROA, the statistical significance of this relationship is not 
sustained across the models. In the main model, outside directors with royal status 
predict ROA with a strong significance (b= 0.087, p< .05), in which an increase of 1 
percentage point in the regressor predicts an increase in the regressand of 0.087%, 
with a variation of 0.042%. In the full model however, outside directors with royal 
status is not statistically significantly associated with ROA. This loss of significance 
is arguably due to its involvement in an interaction term with SGRDs. 
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This analyses supports Hypothesis 1: Outside directors with royal status are 
positively associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. However, this 
prediction is not sustainable when the related moderation term is included in the 
model. The scatter plot in Figure 6.8 illustrates the relationship between the two 
variables. 
 
Figure 6.8: Scatter plot of outside directors with royal status and ROA 
 
 
6.3.2.2 Outside Directors Originating from Najd 
The regression analysis tested whether the proportion of outside directors originating 
from Najd predicts ROA. Across the involved models, the variable ‘outside directors 
of Najd descent’ significantly influenced ROA in a positive direction (b= 0.023, p< 
.05). To further specify, the results suggest that an increase of one percentage point in 
the independent variable predicts an increase in the dependent variable of 0.023% 
with a variation of 0.012% and 0.011% in the main model and full model, 
 140 
respectively. Therefore, this result supports Hypothesis 2: Outside directors 
originating from Najd are positively associated with firm financial performance in 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
The scatter plot (Figure 6.9) illustrates the impact of outside directors with royal 
status on ROA. 
  
Figure 6.9: Scatter plot of outside directors originating from Najd and ROA 
 
 
6.3.2.3 Outside Directors with Large Equity Ownership 
The OLS regression detected a linear relationship between outside directors with large 
ownership and ROA. Across the related models, outside directors with large 
ownership significantly predict ROA in a negative direction (b= -0.133 and b= -0.146, 
p< .01). The results imply that an increase of one percentage point in the predictor 
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variable will decrease the dependent variable by 0.013% with SD of 0.049%, and by 
0.146% with SD of 0.047%, in the main and full models respectively. 
 
Thus, these results support Hypothesis 3: Outside directors with large equity 
ownership are negatively associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
. The scatter plot (Figure 6.10) illustrates the relationship between the two variables. 
 
Figure 6.10: Scatter plot of outside directors with large ownership and ROA 
 
 
6.3.2.4 Inside Directors with Large Equity Ownership 
Positive linear dependence of ROA on inside directors with large ownership was 
statistically significant in the two models (b= 1.038 and b= 1.128, p< .001). The 
results predict that an increase of one percentage point in the manipulated variable 
will increase the outcome variable by 1.038% with a variation of 0.141%, and by 
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1.128% with a variation of 0.127%, in the main and full models, respectively. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 4:  Inside directors with large equity ownership are positively 
associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia is supported.  
 
The scatter plot (Figure 6.11) illustrates the relationship between the two variables. 
 
Figure 6.11: Scatter plot of inside directors with large ownership and ROA 
 
 
6.3.2.5 Inside Non-Saudi Directors 
While the results of the regression show a negative impact of inside non-Saudi 
directors on ROA, the statistical significance of this relationship is not sustained 
across the models. In the main model, inside non-Saudi directors appear to estimate 
ROA but without statistical significance. In the full model however, the significance 
level, reaching a p value of 0.05, and an increase of one percentage point in the 
regressor predicts a decrease in the regressand by 0.861%, with a variation of 0.390%. 
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This surge of significance is arguably due to its involvement in an interaction term 
with SGRDs.  
 
Therefore, Hypothesis 5: Inside non-Saudi directors are positively associated with 
firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia is not supported. 
The analyses do not support this hypothesis, and conclude that inside non-Saudi 
directors do not predict ROA. Yet, the variable inside non-Saudi directors is 
significantly associated with ROA in a negative direction when the related interaction 
term is also included in the model. The scatter plot (Figure 6.12) illustrates the 
relationship between inside non-Saudi directors and ROA. 
 
Figure 6.12: Scatter plot of inside non-Saudi directors and ROA 
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6.3.2.6 SGRDs 
Although the OLS regression shows that SGRDs are positively associated with ROA, 
the statistical significance of this relationship varies across the models. In the main 
model, the relationship between SGRDs and ROA is significant (b= 0.080, p< .01); an 
increase of one percentage point in the independent variable will increase the 
dependent variable by 0.080%, with an SD of 0.025%. In the full model however, this 
relationship is not significant. This loss of significance is arguably due to its 
involvement in two interaction terms with outside directors with royal status and with 
inside non-Saudi directors. 
 
Thus, Hypothesis 6: SGRDs are positively associated with firm financial performance 
in Saudi Arabia is supported. SGRDs positively and significantly predict ROA, but 
not when the interaction terms are included. The scatter plot (Figure 6.13) illustrates 
the relationship between the two variables. 
 
Figure 6.13: Scatter plot of SGRDs and ROA 
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6.3.3 The Relationship Between Moderation Terms and ROA 
6.3.3.1 SGRDs Jointly with Outside Directors with Royal Status 
A regression was performed to find whether SGRDs jointly with outside directors 
with royal status are significantly associated with ROA. The results show that the 
interaction term is both positively and significantly associated with ROA (b= 1.355, 
p< .001). Specifically, the results imply that an increase of one percentage point in the 
moderator will increase the regressand by 1.355%, with a variation of 0.456%.  
 
Hence, the results support Hypothesis 7: SGRDs jointly with outside directors with 
royal status are positively associated with firm financial performance in Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
The scatter plots (Figures 6.14.1 and 6.14.2) illustrate this relationship. 
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Figure 6.14.1: Scatter plot of low ratio of SGRDs jointly with outside directors 
with royal status and ROA 
 
 
Figure 6.14.2: Scatter plot of high ratio of SGRDs jointly with outside directors 
with royal status and ROA 
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6.3.3.2 SGRDs Jointly with Inside Non-Saudi Directors 
An OLS regression involving SGRDs jointly with inside non-Saudi directors 
significantly predicts ROA in a positive direction (b= 2.111, p< .05). The results 
demonstrate that an increase of one unit in the moderator will increase the dependent 
variable by 2.111%, with a variation of 0.853%. Therefore, Hypothesis 8: SGRDs 
jointly with inside non-Saudi directors are positively associated with firm financial 
performance in Saudi Arabia is supported. 
While the reported results support this hypothesis, scatter plots (Figures 6.15.1 and 
6.15.2) illustrate that this support is conditional, in that lower ratio of SGRDs jointly 
with inside non-Saudi directors positively and significantly estimate ROA. 
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Figure 6.15.1: Scatter plot of low ratio of SGRDs X inside non-Saudi directors 
and ROA 
 
Figure 6.15.2: Scatter plot of high ratio of SGRDs X inside non-Saudi directors 
and ROA 
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6.3.4 The Predictive Power of Models 
Across the three models (refer to Table 6.4), the results show that all indicators of 
model fit appear significantly strong and improved during the build-up of the OLS 
regression. To further specify, in the base model, with 651 observations, the control 
variables explain 17.30% of the variation in ROA, with a statistical significance of 
less than 0.1% In the main model, with 649 observations, the model fit improved 
further; the control and independent variables explain 27.30% of the variation in 
ROA, with a p value of less than 0.1%. Finally in the full model, the explanatory 
variables and interaction terms explain 30.10% of the variation in ROA, with a p 
value of less than 0.1%. Accordingly, the results of OLS regression establish that the 
explanatory variables and interaction terms predict ROA with statistical significance.  
 
6.4 Post-Estimation Tests 
The researcher conducted several procedures to test the degree to which the OLS 
models produced unbiased, efficient and consistent predictions. HW robust standard 
errors were used to assess autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems (refer to 
Table 6.4), and two additional post estimation tests were performed. A normality test 
was conducted to check whether the residuals of the models were normally 
distributed. Then, a rigorous process to assess the risk of endogeneity bias was 
implemented. 
 
6.4.1 Normality Test 
Following the OLS regression, the SW test was employed to measure the distribution 
of the residuals with respect to the expected values and constant variance. Across the 
three models, SW tests report p values of less than 0.1%, below the significance level 
of 0.05. Hence, the research rejects the null hypothesis of non-normality, indicating 
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that the residuals of the three models are normally distributed. In other words, the 
normality assumption does hold, and the OLS estimates are robust and efficient. 
 
To check for possible influence of the sample size on the SW test, the researcher 
plotted KDE. The visualisation of KDE shows that the distribution of the residuals are 
relatively smooth with continuous surface from the point pattern that represents 
spatial variation in the density of the residuals in the three models. Particularly in the 
full model (see Figure 6.16), the KDE density of 0.0142, which is close to that of the 
normal distribution, confirms the results of the SW test32. 
 
Figure 6.16: KDE for the full model 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
32
 Appendix 2 presents the KDE for the base and main models, which show very similar outcomes to 
the full model. 
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6.4.2 Endogeneity Bias 
This research followed a comprehensive process to assess endogeneity bias. As 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the risk of reverse causality is contained by the 
support of an enormous number of theoretical and empirical studies that used ROA as 
the dependent variable. Moreover, and as an extra precaution against such potential 
risk, the researcher regressed the average of the last two years (2012 and 2013) of the 
dependent variable against the average of the first three years (2009, 2010, 2011) of 
the independent variables (see Table 6.5).  
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Table 6.5: Reverse causality bias analysis for the relati
Control Variables - Firm Control:
1 Firm Size (log)
2 Firm Age (log)
Control Variables - Board Control:
3 Board Size
4 Board Committees
5 Board Meeting Attendance
6 Independent Directors
7 Inside Directors
Independent Variables - Board Characteristics:
8 Outside Directors with Royal Status (H1)
9 Outside Directors Originating from Najd (H2)
10 Outside Directors with Large Ownership (H3) 
11 Inside Directors with Large Ownership (H4)
12 Inside Non-Saudi Directors (H5)
13 SGRDs (H6)
Interactions:
14 SGRDs X Outside Directors with Royal Status (H7)
15 SGRDs X Inside Non-Saudi Directors (H8)
Constant
N
Adj R^
F
Prob > F
Variables
onship between ROA an
b SE
0.005** (0.002)
0.028*** (0.003)
0.000 (0.002)
-0.006 (0.004)
-0.004* (0.002)
-0.036* (0.016)
-0.049 (0.035)
0.087* (0.042)
0.023* (0.012)
-0.133** (0.049)
1.038*** (0.141)
-0.114 (0.142)
0.080** (0.025)
-0.047† (0.025)
649
0.273
19.510
0.000
The Main Model
d board structure using OLS regression
b SE b SE b SE
0.004† (0.002) 0.005** (0.002) 0.004† (0.002)
0.024*** (0.004) 0.026*** (0.003) 0.021*** (0.004)
0.004* (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.004* (0.002)
-0.012** (0.005) -0.005 (0.004) -0.011* (0.004)
-0.009*** (0.002) -0.003† (0.002) -0.007*** (0.002)
-0.047* (0.020) -0.031* (0.016) -0.035† (0.019)
-0.065 (0.043) -0.051 (0.036) -0.058 (0.042)
0.083* (0.037) 0.000 (0.037) 0.002 (0.039)
0.037** (0.014) 0.023* (0.011) 0.037** (0.013)
-0.281*** (0.069) -0.146** (0.047) -0.321*** (0.067)
1.108*** (0.154) 1.128*** (0.127) 1.325*** (0.154)
-0.222 (0.174) -0.861* (0.390) -1.645*** (0.414)
0.096*** (0.022) 0.038 (0.026) 0.049* (0.023)
1.355** (0.456) 1.386*** (0.267)
2.111* (0.853) 3.805*** (0.932)
-0.012 (0.029) -0.045† (0.024) -0.017 (0.028)
131 649 131
0.284 0.301 0.330
20.871 20.490 22.390
0.000 0.000 0.000
The Main Model 2 The Full Model 2The Full Model
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The results of the analysis presented in Table 6.5 show that the signs of the directions 
did not change between models, with very similar significances of the coefficients to 
those in Table 6.4. Hence, reverse causality risk is intuitively and statistically 
contained. Similarly, the selected control variables function to minimise the 
possibility of having omitted key variables that could influence the findings. 
 
The researcher also assessed endogeneity bias by inspecting the OLS measurement 
error, to check whether the explanatory variables were exogenous and precisely and 
reliably measured. To do so, the research performed the Hausman procedure, as 
described in the following paragraphs. 
 
The researcher suspected that the independent variable ‘outside directors originating 
from Najd’ was likely to be endogenous with other variables that were not included in 
the full model. This suspicion was confirmed by the fact that outside directors of Najd 
descent account for over 60% of the board of directors in the selected sample, and the 
variable significantly predicts the dependent variable. Using ‘economic intuition’ 
(Baum 2006, p. 185; Bascle 2008, p. 291; Wooldridge 2013, p. 614), the researcher 
selected two relevant Instrumental Variables (IVs): ownership concentration of 
outside directors with large ownership33 and directorial interlocks34  for use in the 
Hausman procedure.  
 
                                                        
33
 In line with CMA guidance, ownership of 5% or more of the firm’s total stocks is considered a large 
ownership. 
34
 Both the IVs were obtained from the firms’ annual reports for the same period. Ownership 
concentration of outside directors with large ownership and directorial interlocks were measured as the 
numbers of outside directors with large ownership divided by the total firm stocks, and the total 
number of interlocked directors divided by the total numbers of directors, respectively. 
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Intuitively, this choice of the IVs is reasonable because individuals from Najd are the 
largest stockholders in Tadawul after the Saudi government (refer to Table 2.1, page 
24) and because outside directors originating from Najd dominate the boardrooms of 
these firms (refer to Table 6.1, page 125). Statistically, the inclusion of two IVs 
appears appropriate given ‘the bias induced by having so many instruments would 
yield highly suspect results’ (Hoetker & Mellewigt 2009, p. 1035). More importantly, 
ownership concentration of outside directors with large ownership and directorial 
interlocks are significant predictors of outside directors originating from Najd, with p 
values of 0.05 and 0.001 respectively, using the specification of OLS regression (see 
Appendix 3 for the full results). 
 
Following the positive outcomes of the previous steps, the researcher carried out the 
Hausman procedure. In the first stage, the IVs were used to compute the estimated 
values of the suspect predictor by regressing the variable ‘outside directors originating 
from Najd’ on all exogenous variables and the two IVs. In the second stage, those 
computed values were used to estimate a regression model of the dependent variables. 
In other words, after retrieving residuals from the first stage, the researcher re-
estimated ROA, including the residuals from the first regression as additional 
regressors in the second stage. 
 
Ultimately, via the command estat endogenous in Stata, the Hausman test revealed 
that the null hypotheses of explanatory variables being exogenous cannot be rejected 
(p value = 0.83), implying that omitted variables or endogeneity issues are not unduly 
biasing the research findings. 
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6.5 Summary 
The statistical results in this chapter provide evidence to support most of the 
hypotheses put forward in Chapter 4. Descriptive statistics, a correlation matrix, and 
the results of OLS regression analyses are presented, outlining the parameters of the 
variables and their associations with ROA for the 131 firms continuously listed on 
Saudi Arabia’s Tadawul from 2009 to 2013. In summary, the regression outcomes 
show that outside directors originating from Najd, outside directors with large 
ownership, inside directors with large ownership, SGRDs jointly with outside 
directors with royal status, and SGRDs jointly with inside non-Saudi directors predict 
ROA with statistical significance. While outside directors with royal status, inside 
non-Saudi directors, and SGRDs also predict ROA, the statistical significance of these 
relationships is tied to certain settings.  
 
Post-estimation tests established that the reported OLS results are unbiased and valid. 
The reported analyses do not suffer from multicollinearity, autocorrelation or 
heteroskedasticity problems. The tests also confirmed that the data are normally 
distributed and free from endogeneity risk. 
 
The next chapter contains a discussion of the findings of this research and their 
theoretical implications. 
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Chapter 7 – Discussion 
 
This research was an empirical investigation of the effect of board structure on firm 
financial performance in the context of the emerging Saudi Arabian market. Eight 
hypotheses about the nature of this relationship were empirically tested in the 
previous chapters. To articulate a solid understanding of this relationship, the results 
of the reported findings must be discussed. Therefore, this chapter presents a thorough 
discussion of the main findings reported in the previous chapter, explains the 
theoretical implications of the hypotheses, and highlights the contributions of this 
study to an improved understanding of the targeted phenomenon.  
 
7.1 Hypotheses 
As noted in the earlier chapters, this study followed a novel path in its investigation of 
the impact of board structure on firm financial performance in emerging markets, 
specifically in Saudi Arabia. The research went beyond conventional (and Western-
centric) governance theories by proposing a different approach to recognising board 
members who influence firm financial performance in an emerging market context. 
Relying on a formal classification of independent, outside and inside directors when 
examining the financial performance of firms in countries with emerging markets is 
unreasonable, since these countries have weak formal institutions and rely mostly on 
strong informal institutional systems (Peng 2004; Xu & Meyer 2013). Gergen (2001) 
suggests that patterns of meaning are rooted in their context, and that the significance 
of where the practice of corporate governance happens must be appreciated. 
Similarly, Whetten (1989) explains that ‘observations are embedded and must be 
understood within a context’ (p. 492). Hence, adjusting theories developed in 
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advanced markets to take account of the contextual uniqueness of emerging markets 
is vital (Whetten 2009; Kearney 2012). Accordingly, this research addressed a well-
known gap in the governance literature (Wright et al. 2005; Cornelissen & Durand 
2014) and makes significant theoretical contributions by aligning agency, class 
hegemony, resource dependence, and stewardship theories with social, administrative, 
and political considerations unique to the emerging Saudi Arabian market. It also 
contributes through its proposal and testing of eight hypotheses about the main 
players in Tadawul firms’ boards and their influence on firm financial performance. 
Before proceeding to a detailed discussion of these hypotheses, Table 7.1 provides a 
summary of the relevant empirical findings reported in the previous chapter. 
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Table 7.1: Summary of hypotheses testing 
Test Results
Hypothesis 1 Outside directors with royal status are positively associated with firm 
financial performance in Saudi Arabia. Supported
Hypothesis 2 Outside directors originated from Najd are positively associated with 
firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. Supported
Hypothesis 3 Outside directors with large equity ownership are negatively associated 
with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. Supported
Hypothesis 4 Inside directors with large equity ownership are positively associated 
with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. Supported
Hypothesis 5 Inside non-Saudi directors are positively associated with firm financial 
performance in Saudi Arabia. Rejected
Hypothesis 6 SGRDs are positively associated with firm financial performance in 
Saudi Arabia. Supported
Hypothesis 7 SGRDs jointly with outside directors with royal status are positively 
associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. Supported
Hypothesis 8 SGRDs jointly with inside non-Saudi directors are positively associated 
with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. Conditionally Supported
Hypotheses
 
 
7.1.1 Hypothesis 1: Outside directors with royal status are positively associated 
with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia 
As shown in the previous chapter, H1 was statistically confirmed, indicating that a 
higher proportion of outside directors with royal status increases financial 
performance among Tadawul’s firms. However, the results also suggest that the 
notion that outside directors with royal status alone provide better financial 
performance for their firms is not sustainable when SGRDs are also present in the 
boardroom35. Hence, the research concludes that firm financial performance among 
Saudi listed companies is enhanced by outside directors with royal status through 
their provision of beneficial and yet structurally sensitive contributions. 
                                                        
35
 The moderation term of outside directors with royal status and SGRDs is discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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The results further support the argument that the Saudi royal family’s political power 
undoubtedly underpins their involvement in local business (Hertog 2007; Mazaheri 
2013). In an absolute monarchical system, outside directors with royal status can 
capitalise on their political and social status, making them very influential in the 
business community. Moreover, considering the existence of strong informal 
institutions in the Saudi business environment (Bray & Darlow 2013), the results of 
this research imply that political power and social privileges are utilised by outside 
directors with royal status to exert influence across the spectrum of the Saudi 
economy, which translates into greater resource provision to their firms. 
 
While some scholars have expressed concerns that outside directors with royal status 
could negatively impact firm financial performance because of their alleged 
monopolistic tendencies in doing business and through preventing non-royals from 
gaining economic influence (Al-Rasheed 2010; Wilson 2012), the results of this 
research instead indicate that they provide boards with continuity and stability. More 
importantly, and considering the weakly enforced formal Saudi institutions, they can 
influence the legislators to create favourable laws for their firms and block reforms 
that might negatively affect their business interests. In fact, the influence of outside 
directors with royal status over Saudi legislators could explain the finding that outside 
directors with royal status alone have less effect on firm financial performance than 
when SGRDs are also present in the board, signifying that an alliance between the 
two overshadow the unilateral role of outside directors with royal status. 
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7.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Outside directors originating from Najd are positively 
associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia 
Hypothesis 2 was proven correct in this study. The results indicate that a greater 
presence of outside directors originating from Najd on boards is a significant 
contributor to firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
This result confirms the findings of Al-Juhany (2002) and Niblock and Malik (2007) 
that the social structure of Saudi Arabia is a significant element of local business, in 
that individuals from Najd are high in the social hierarchy and use that privileged 
social status to good effect in their business activities. They account for around 25% 
of the Saudi population (Ibrahim 2006; Yamani 2008; Katz 2012; Alsaif 2013), but 
(as shown in Table 2.1) four of the ten largest shareholders in the Tadawul originate 
from Najd, and over 60% of the boardrooms in Tadawul firms include outside 
directors originating from Najd. These findings reveal their business dominance; more 
importantly, they suggest that these directors translate their business dominance into 
positive contributions for their firms. 
 
By capitalising on the context of the Saudi market, where firms tend to be guided by 
informal institutions like influential families to overcome the lack of legal 
endorsement and poor quality of state governance, outside directors of Najd descent 
materialise their social and business influence – their acknowledged reputation and 
strong connections – into a mechanism of resource provision.  
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7.1.3 Hypothesis 3: Outside directors with large ownership are negatively 
associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia 
The empirical evidence presented in the previous chapter shows that hypothesis 3 is 
correct. Outside directors with large ownership provide negative contributions to the 
boardroom, causing firms to produce poor financial performance. 
 
The finding of this study that large concentration of ownership outside management 
decreases corporate performance in emerging markets is consonant with those of most 
previous researchers (Cespedes, González, & Molina 2010; Globerman, Peng & 
Shapiro 2011; Chen & Yu 2012). Other authors (Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi 2000; 
Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003; Black, Carvalho & Gorga 2012) suggest that outside 
directors with large ownership have an obvious incentive, given their large stake in a 
company's equity, to monitor and assist management in order to promote firm 
performance, the results presented in this thesis indicate that the costs arising from the 
presence of these directors in the boardrooms exceed their benefits in the context of 
the Saudi emerging market. These costs are probably generated from the placement in 
boardrooms of unqualified family members or friends who are unable to perform the 
required roles. 
In Saudi Arabia, the controlling shareholders appointing new board members is a 
well-documented managerial practice, and these appointments are largely influenced 
by personal or social factors rather than competency (Oukil & Khalifah 2012). The 
finding implies that board appointments benefit the inner circle of the outside 
blockholders at the cost of the firm. More importantly, considering that around 50% 
of the Saudi market is controlled by large investors (Solomon 2011), and reflecting on 
Saudi Arabia’s poor legal protections for investors (Niblock 2013), the financial harm 
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resulting from outside directors with large ownership can be attributed to their 
insistence on the firm dealing with particular other firms, those in which these 
directors have significant shareholdings or other links, at above-market prices when 
purchasing or at below-market prices when selling. This assertion is in line with a 
statement from the head of the CSCC, Abdulrahman Al-Zamil (Alsharq 2013), that 
such practices are the biggest threat to Saudi firms, and one of the main reasons for 
firm failure. In the Saudi context, the combination of weak institutions and outside 
directors with large ownership seems to promote conflicting interests between these 
directors and the rest of the directors and minority shareholders. Through pursuing 
personal objective, and through oppressing minority investors, outside directors with 
large ownership reduce firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
7.1.4 Hypothesis 4: Inside directors with large ownership are positively 
associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia 
This study revealed strong empirical evidence for hypothesis 4. The results imply that 
inside directors with large ownership have beneficial effects on board deliberation, 
which in turn enhances firm financial performance. 
 
The results of this research are consistent with prior empirical studies of the 
relationship between the ownership concentration of inside directors and firm 
performance in emerging markets (Heugens, Essen & Oosterhout 2009; 
Ivashkovskaya & Stepanova 2011; Kim & Ouimet 2014). Although other reports 
suggest an inverse relationship (Hassan et al. 2008; Mandac & Gumus 2010; Luo & 
Jackson 2012), these reports focus primarily on risks generated from potential 
managerial entrenchment within the current management, ignoring the ownership 
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structure of inside director. Given the high levels of information asymmetry, which 
characterises most emerging economies, including Saudi Arabia (Claessens & 
Yurtoglu 2013), the results of this research imply that managerial entrenchment 
caused by higher ownership of inside director is not seen as a concern; instead, more 
ownership by inside directors increases firm financial performance because it aligns 
the incentives for executives on the board and shareholders. This alignment of 
interests is more pronounced in the Saudi market, considering that executive power 
among Tadawul firms often lies in the hands of the founding families (Fontaine & 
Ahmad 2013). This fact suggests that inside directors with large equity ownership 
manage based on long-term strategies rather than short-term financial profits. They 
view their companies as assets to transfer to the family’s next generation rather than 
to be consumed during their own lifetimes. In this manner, inside directors with large 
ownership will work for the firm’s stability and survival and refrain from 
individualistic behaviours that harm other shareholders’ interests, thereby enabling 
performance to flourish. 
Additionally, the results suggest that combining ownership and management is a 
practical and beneficial governance mechanism given the Saudi environment. In 
particular, since enforcement of business contracts is more challenging and expensive 
in Saudi Arabia than elsewhere, inside directors with large ownership compensate for 
poor corporate governance mechanisms and reduce the traditional PA conflicts. Such 
directors increase information sharing and improve monitoring of fellow executives, 
thereby improving firm financial performance. 
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7.1.5 Hypothesis 5: Inside non-Saudi directors are positively associated with 
firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia 
This research’s findings regarding the effect of inside non-Saudi directors on firm 
financial performance are inconsistent. Independently, the analytical parameters show 
a negative direct of this relationship, with varying empirical support from weak to 
strong. However, when inside non-Saudi directors is modelled jointly with SGRDs, 
the results indicate a positive moderating influence on firm performance36. Due to this 
inconsistency, hypothesis 5 is not accepted. The results indicate that inside non-Saudi 
directors (in the absence of SGRDs) hinder board deliberation and thereby exert a 
negative influence on firm financial performance. 
 
Previous research has focused on the influence of foreign directors on firm 
performance in emerging markets without specifically distinguishing between the 
accepted classifications of board membership (inside, outside, and independent); it is 
scarce, and its findings are conflicting (Certo & Semadeni 2006; Nielsen 2010; Mi 
Choi, Sul & Min 2012). The findings reported in this thesis contradict hypothesis 5 
and the results of studies that reported positive associations between inside foreign 
directors and firm financial performance (Rajagopalan & Zhang 2008; Stahl, 
Bjorkman & Morris 2012), but are in line with studies that reported a negative 
association (Ramaswamy & Li 2001; Stenger 2012). 
 
While the researcher hypothesised that the benefits of the human capital of steward 
inside non-Saudi directors would overcome the costs associated with the lack of 
skilled Saudi inside directors and the limitation on their deliberation inhibited by the 
                                                        
36
 The moderation term will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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controlling shareholders (Ezzine 2012), the results reveal that this is not so, and 
moreover indicate that their costs exceed their presumed benefits, ultimately being 
associated with poorer firm financial performance. This implies that the suggestion of 
the dominant forces in the Saudi boardrooms, mainly controlling shareholders, restrict 
the utilisation of highly experienced and educated inside non-Saudi directors to 
managing day-to-day firm operations, rather than involving them in formulating firm 
strategies. It is possible that cultural differences between them and the rest of the 
board members explain their negative impact on firm financial performance. The high 
level of power distance in the Saudi culture (Hofstede 2001) means the Saudi 
leadership of firms is not fully committed or lacks motivation to adopt ideas or 
opinions from ‘outsiders’, who are trusted in managing firm operations but not 
necessarily in determining the firm’s long-term directions. Poor-quality interaction 
between inside non-Saudi directors and the rest of the board undoubtedly hinders 
communication within the board, and this must result in conflicts rather than 
knowledge diffusion and organisational progress.  
 
7.1.6 Hypothesis 6: SGRDs are positively associated with firm financial 
performance in Saudi Arabia 
The statistical results of this study illustrated that SGRDs have a positive impact on 
the financial performance of firms listed on Tadawul. Although the statistical 
significance of this relationship weakened in the full model, this was expected, 
because this model included SGRDs in two moderation terms37. Therefore, hypothesis 
6 was accepted. The finding implies that SGRDs make positive contributions to the 
                                                        
37
 The moderation terms will be discussed following this sub-section. 
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boardroom, helping firms to achieve higher financial performance than those lacking 
SGRDs on their boards. 
 
The findings of this study are consistent with those of the majority of previous 
empirical research conducted in emerging markets contexts – that benefits gained 
from government representatives in the boardroom outshine the costs associated with 
these directors (Peng 2004; Omran, Bolbol & Fatheldin 2008; Inoue, Lazzarini & 
Musacchio 2013). The findings are also more persuasive than those of some previous 
inconclusive studies (Okhmatovskiy 2010) and opposed to others (Yiu, Bruton & Lu 
2005; Al-Farooque et al. 2007) that found firms in emerging markets suffer 
financially from the political interference of government representative directors, their 
focus on social and macro-economic objectives rather than firm profitability, and their 
lack of incentives commonly found in private firms. 
Despite these concerns, the results indicate that SGRDs play a crucial role in Saudi 
boardrooms and represent a valuable governance mechanism for Saudi firms, 
agreeing with the tenets of agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Coffee 1993). 
The results suggest that SGRDs are effective monitors and protect the interests of 
minority shareholders, hence fulfilling the role they are supposed to perform. Indeed, 
since the Saudi government is the only institutional investor in Tadawul, holding 
more than half its stocks, and strongly influences the appointment of leadership in the 
major listed firms (Al-Kahtani 2014), the improvement in firms’ financial 
performance is a reflection of SGRDs’ work in promoting good governance practices. 
Further, the findings support Al-Majed’s (2012) statement that investors feel safer 
investing in firms with SGRDs on their boards because their investment will be 
protected by the government if hardship arrives. In conjunction with the results of this 
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research, firms with SGRDs in boardrooms are anticipated to engage in long-term 
investment rather than seeking short-term profits and exit in moments of market 
disturbance. With such a strategy, SGRDs provide firms with legitimacy and 
reputation, which has positive consequences for their capabilities to attract and 
acquire valuable resources. 
 
7.1.7 Hypothesis 7: SGRDs jointly with outside directors with royal status are 
positively associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia 
As the findings of this research revealed, SGRDs and outside directors with royal 
status jointly predict firm financial performance in a positive relationship. The fact 
that the findings also showed SGRDs and outside directors with royal status 
independently lose their prediction power for the moderation term when pooled in the 
same model indicates the significance of the moderating effect. Thus, hypothesis 7 
was accepted. The result implies that alliances between SGRDs and outside directors 
with royal status occur and substantially improve in board functioning, with outcomes 
that positively impact firm financial performance. 
 
The results of this study conform to the broad outcomes of research to date indicating 
the influence of the Saudi royals and government bureaucrats in the Saudi business 
world (Wilson 2008: 2012; Reed, 2009; Al-Rasheed 2010). The findings suggest that 
combining these two types of directors in the boardroom profits the firm through the 
utilisation of their resource mechanisms. In an absolute monarchy with weakly 
enforced formal institutions, Saudi-listed firms with SGRDs and outside directors 
with royal status on their boards meld the legitimacy provided by the former and the 
political influence of the latter to strengthen their bargaining power to access vital 
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resources. Outside directors with royal status utilise SGRDs as a coordinating channel 
of legitimacy and information. Using their official status, SGRDs can formalise the 
political influence of outside directors with royal status and enable them to use their 
high social and commercial esteem to lobby for access to fund and projects, including 
state subsidies and government-funded projects. Indeed, considering the state’s 
economic contribution accounted for over 60% of Saudi GDP in 2014 (CDSI 2015), 
government-funded projects are more likely to be allocated to the Saudi firms with 
this board cluster. Further, outside directors with royal status use their social 
privileges to influence the economic decisions of the institutions that SGRDs 
represent, yielding favourable conditions for their firms. Hence, such alliances are a 
significant governance mechanism, allowing politically and administratively 
connected corporates to gain a major advantage over other firms within Saudi 
monarchical and bureaucratic institutional settings. 
 
7.1.8 Hypothesis 8: SGRDs jointly with inside non-Saudi directors are 
positively associated with firm financial performance in Saudi Arabia 
Results presented in the previous chapter show that SGRDs and inside non-Saudi 
directors jointly impact firm financial performance positively. However, scatter plots 
(Figures 6.15.1 and 6.15.2) illustrate that this impact is conditional, in that lower 
representation of SGRDs jointly with higher representation of inside non-Saudi 
directors positively and significantly estimate ROA. The fact that the findings also 
showed SGRDs and inside non-Saudi directors independently lose their prediction 
power for the former and strengthen the negative impact of the latter for the 
moderation term when pooled in the same model further indicates the significance of 
the moderating effect. Thus, hypothesis 8 is conditionally accepted. The results 
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indicate that having a low proportion of SGRDs and a higher proportion of inside 
non-Saudi directors is beneficial for firm financial performance. 
 
While this particular stream of research has been largely neglected, the results of this 
study are in agreement with a small number of reports that the involvement of foreign 
management and government officials in running and overseeing board activities in 
emerging markets improves firms’ productivity and performance (Rajagopalan & 
Zhang 2008; Stahl, Bjorkman & Morris 2012), including Saudi Arabia (Nicholson & 
Kiel 2007; GCC BDI 2013). The interaction term’s positive effect on firm financial 
performance supplements the study’s previously reported findings. Specifically, the 
results support the contention that inside non-Saudi directors’ negative effect on firm 
financial performance is due to functioning and communication conflicts between 
them and directors with large ownership that prevent the utilisation of their business 
experience (acquired in developed economy contexts). Therefore, the value derived 
from the human capital of inside non-Saudi directors is acknowledged, but restrained. 
Indeed, various academic and industry reports show that the lack of human capital is 
the reason why foreigners replace local executives and increase firm productivity and 
competitiveness in Saudi Arabia (Ali 2008; GCC BDI 2013). Moreover, the findings 
support the view that SGRDs are active and effective players in boardrooms, adding 
value and quality to corporate governance practices in Tadawul firms. Yet, SGRDs’ 
partnership with foreign executive directors seems productive only when the presence 
of the first does not overcome the latter. Otherwise, this partnership appears to be 
vulnerable to counterproductive activities and communication problems that 
compromise firm financial performance.  
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Nevertheless, Al-Kahtani’s (2014) argument, which suggests that the improvement of 
corporate governance practices among Tawadul firms is largely attributed to the 
presence of SGRDs on boards, stands. A joint multiplicative effect means that lower 
(rather than equal or higher) representation of SGRDs than of inside non-Saudi 
directors provides institutional support that protects inside non-Saudi directors from 
the dominance of the controlling shareholders present in the board. With this 
conditional support, the rich human capital of inside non-Saudi directors can be 
utilised, allowing them to function effectively and be involved in designing strategic 
plans, ultimately reflecting positively on firm financial performance. 
 
7.2 Research Aims and Outcomes 
The six aims of this research project were achieved. The researcher conducted a 
comprehensive investigation of the impact of board structure on firm financial 
performance in the context of the emerging Saudi Arabian market through empirical 
examination grounded by integration of theory and context. 
 
To elaborate, the research achieved its first aim by providing an extensive overview 
of the Saudi emerging market context, explaining the historical, political, social 
background as well as the economic situation in Saudi Arabia. In addition, the thesis 
offered a detailed presentation of the Saudi corporate governance codes, with a 
particular focus on issues related to board structure. 
 
The researcher accomplished the second aim by conducting a literature review of the 
corporate governance discipline that generated insights into board structure and firm 
financial performance. To thoroughly capture the required aspects of the phenomenon 
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under study, a multi-theoretical perspective using agency theory, class hegemony 
theory, resource dependence theory and stewardship theory was applied. Because this 
research was situated within an emerging market, further theoretical considerations 
related to emerging markets that affect board structure and firm financial performance 
were included to supplement the theoretical foundation of this research. 
 
The research succeeded in reaching its third aim by developing hypotheses that, 
through testing, would enhance understanding of the targeted phenomenon. Through 
bundling theory and context, eight empirical hypotheses were developed. In achieving 
the fourth aim, the researcher tested these hypotheses in replicable and comparable 
models. In addition, the researcher produced a conceptual framework that integrated 
board structures in the Saudi market context with concepts in the development of 
board structure identified by theory. 
 
The fifth aim was achieved by mapping out the methodology and research design. 
Justifications for the methodology and design were provided to underscore the 
validity and reliability of the research findings. The thesis explains how the selected 
quantitative methods and data are ideal for the process of testing the research 
hypotheses. Similarly, the rigorous analytical procedures used to derive the findings 
were specified.  
 
Most importantly, the thesis presents statistical results that constitute empirical 
evidence about the accuracy of the hypotheses. The results show that outside directors 
originating from Najd, outside directors with large ownership, inside directors with 
large ownership, SGRDs jointly with outside directors with royal status, and SGRDs 
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jointly with inside non-Saudi directors are significantly associated with ROA. Outside 
directors with royal status, inside non-Saudi directors, and SGRDs are also 
significantly associated with ROA, but only under certain conditions. Post-estimation 
measures established that the analysis was unbiased and reliable – lacking 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity problem – and that the models 
are normally distributed and free from endogeneity. 
 
Ultimately, the sixth aim of this thesis was accomplished through filling a gap in the 
corporate governance literature on board structure in the context of emerging markets.  
The findings of this research project revealed that the applicability of theory 
developed in advanced economies varies depending on the market context, informed 
largely by the institutional theory. In particular, the findings demonstrated that 
contextual settings in an important emerging market such as Saudi Arabia have a 
major impact on board structure, board deliberations, and on firm financial 
performance. Higher performance of listed companies in Saudi Arabia is associated 
with directors being connected to influential political, social, and administrative 
institutions. In the absence of connections to these institutions in boardrooms, firms 
are likely to experience conflict of interest and counterproductive communication, 
which harm firm financial performance. The findings overall suggest that when 
markets are imperfect and developing, as in Saudi Arabia, theory developed in 
advanced markets is not necessarily applicable.  
 
Note that the following chapter contains recommendations designed to improve 
corporate governance practices in Saudi Arabia and other countries with emerging 
markets (fulfilling the second part of the final aim of this research). 
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7.3 Synthesised Discussion of the Hypotheses 
This section offers a concise discussion of the collective meaning of the results of the 
hypothesis testing. 
 
The Saudi market is relatively new; by 1965, Saudi Arabia had only 14 loosely 
regulated public companies. Regulation was strengthened in 1984, when the Saudi 
government formed SAMA to supervise, regulate and develop the commercial and 
financial markets. In 2003, growing financial market complexity and the number of 
listed firms increasing to over 100 prompted the Saudi government to establish the 
CMA as a specialised administrative agency to oversee the Tadawul. However, the 
Tadawul still lacked governance codes that outlined the principles and responsibilities 
of Saudi public firms. The boards of most Saudi public firms lacked transparency and 
independence, and teemed with conflicts of interest (Al-Hussain 2009). In response to 
the Tadawul crisis of 2006 and to gain the confidence of investors, the CMA issued 
Saudi corporate governance codes at the end of 2006, and a revised version in 2009. 
 
As explained previously, the Saudi corporate governance code is based on the Anglo-
American model, in which the directorship classifications of insiders, outsiders and 
independents are seen as the spine of board structure and play a significant role in 
enhancing firm financial performance. However, while Saudi firms formally 
recognise and implement these classifications, these classifications appear ineffectual. 
The fact that directors are overwhelmingly recognized by their formal classifications 
in emerging markets goes against the conventional wisdom given the significant 
contextual implications of these countries. Unsurprisingly, their ineffectiveness in the 
Saudi context contradicts well-established theory and practice adopted by many 
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advanced markets. This contradictory finding however is not about the validity but 
rather the applicability of these classifications in the context of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, 
the significant implications of context with relation to board structure in the Saudi 
market appear to unveil the key players who effectively participate and influence 
board deliberations. The institutional settings in Saudi Arabia, including the rule of 
law, the quality of formal institutions, and enforcement of contracts are weaker than 
in advanced markets. Precisely, the Saudi political, social, and market structures 
exhibit the uniqueness of this context in which making the influence of the Saudi 
informal institutions effective in comparison to the formal institutions in advanced 
markets. The significant influence of informal institutional arrangements means the 
formal directorship classifications are of no importance in Saudi Arabia. 
 
This research aimed to identify the types of directors who are effective in performing 
control, resource and strategy roles and consequently powerfully influence firm 
financial performance in Saudi Arabia. The effectiveness of these directors is derived 
largely from their political, social and administrative influence, and is supplemented 
by the structure of the Saudi market. The research identified that the combination of 
Saudi government representatives with non-Saudi executives and non-management 
Saudi royals on boards to be the most beneficial for financial performance of firms 
listed in Tadawul. In addition, executives holding a large stake of firm equity and 
individuals originating from the region of Najd were identified as effective forces on 
Saudi boards. The research also determined that the presence of non-management 
Saudi royals and Saudi government representatives on boards of directors has a 
positive impact on firm financial performance. Conversely, the research showed that 
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non-executives holding a large stake of the firm equity and non-Saudi executives on 
boards have a negative impact on corporate financial outcomes. 
 
In the author’s opinion, Saudi boardrooms roughly reflect the longstanding nature of 
Saudi politics and society, as well as the oligopolistic structure of the Saudi market. 
Recent reforms intended to transform Saudi Arabia into an institution-based or 
modern country have largely failed; the financial system is still fundamentally based 
on kinship, privilege and personal relationships. Genuine commitment to 
implementation by the people in power remains absent. Nevertheless, the author is 
convinced that boards of directors can utilise (or exploit) the weaknesses of the Saudi 
market by perceiving them as unique opportunities. Indeed, directors and business in 
general should not rigidly view business opportunities via the lens of Western-
developed standards, but be flexible and compromise to use other influential non-
businesslike elements of the Saudi context. The author argues that the greater the 
adjustment to the Saudi context, the more contribution directors can make to their 
firms. For instance, and as shown previously, having influential political or social 
figures on their boards is financially beneficial for corporates operating in Saudi 
Arabia. However, the degree to which their contributions are transparent and the way 
boards are being run is a source of concern. A firm with highly influential directors 
can undoubtedly get an edge over others in the market, but by the same token it 
should exercise great caution when dealing with them.  
 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter presents a comprehensive discussion of the hypotheses in relation to the 
literature and the context of the study. The discussion reveals that the significance of 
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governance theories developed in advanced economies, namely agency, class 
hegemony, resource dependence and stewardship theories, vary depending on the 
market contextual settings and informed largely by the institutional theory.  
 
Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the contextual settings of the Saudi emerging 
market have a major impact on board structure, its deliberations, and on firm 
profitability. Certain political, social and administrative elements unique to the Saudi 
context strongly influence firm financial performance when embedded within board 
structure. Higher performance of listed companies in Saudi Arabia is associated with 
directors being connected to influential political, social and administrative 
institutions. In the absence of these institutions in their boardrooms, firms can 
experience certain conflicts (particularly if directors with large equity ownership 
dominate the board), which are likely to harm firm financial performance. 
Nonetheless, the alignment of the interests of large equity ownership and management 
can overcome these conflicts. Finally, when markets are imperfect and developing – 
as in Saudi Arabia, where the contextual settings of the market are divergent and 
highly influential – theory developed in advanced markets is not necessarily 
applicable.  
 
In the final and concluding chapter, the theoretical and practical implications of the 
findings are provided. The chapter also outlines the limitations that this study faced, 
and concludes by offering recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes this empirical investigation of board structure and firm 
financial performance in the context of the emerging Saudi Arabian market. It 
presents the theoretical and practical implications of the findings presented in the 
preceding chapter, discusses the study’s limitations, and concludes with 
recommendations for future research.    
 
8.1 Theoretical Implications  
The discussion in the previous chapter covered the findings of empirical analysis 
designed to test eight hypotheses put forward in chapter 4. As clarified previously, 
these hypotheses were underpinned by a multi-theoretical approach (class hegemony, 
agency, resource dependence, and stewardship theories) bundled with contextual 
considerations (predominantly based on institutional theory) influential in emerging 
markets to gain comprehensive insights into the relationship between board structure 
and firm financial performance in the Saudi Arabian market. This approach was 
applied following prominent scholars’ (Huse et al. 2011; Schiehll, Ahmadjian & 
Filatotchev 2014) recommendations that integration between relevant theory and 
context would lead to constructive theoretical contributions to the phenomenon of 
board structure and firm financial performance in emerging markets. The main 
theoretical implications and the contribution to the literature of this study are 
presented in Table 8.1, then thoroughly elucidated. 
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Table 8.1: Theoretical implications of the research outcomes 
Underpinning Theory Formalisation Base Board Strucutre Board Role Hypothesis Empirical Support Implications of Contextual Influence
Political figures Resource H1 and H7 Supported Public administration legitimacy
Socially privileged figures Resource H2 Supported –
Independence Non-executives with large ownership Control H3 Not supported Principal-Principal (PP) conflicts
Incentive-alignment 
argument Executives with large ownership Control H4 Supported –
Independence Government representatives Control H6 and H8 Supported –
Social capital Non-executives with large ownership Resource H3 Not supported Principal-Principal (PP) conflicts
Human capital Foreign executives Resource H5 and H8 Conditionally supported Principal-Agent (PA) conflicts
Stewardship Theory
Organizational commitment 
and identification Foreign executives Strategy H5 and H8 Conditionally supported Principal-Agent (PA) conflicts
Agency Theory
Social status
Resource Dependence 
Theory
Class Hegemony Theory
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8.1.1 Class Hegemony Theory 
In support of class hegemony theory (Useem 1984; Domhoff 2006; Markoczy et al. 
2013; Wurthmann 2014), the research found that the Saudi political elites use their 
reputations and social status to provide their firms with access to vital resources and 
reduce risk, which then reflect positively on firm financial performance. While the 
theory was developed in advanced market settings, the theory is prominent and 
influential in emerging markets, and in particular in Saudi Arabia given the practical 
role of outside directors with royal status in enhancing firm financial performance. 
Although the country is firmly ruled by the Saudi royal family, the findings can 
theoretically be extended to other developing countries with a royal family and/or a 
single-party or dominant-party government with members who are very active in 
business and economic life; they use their high political influence to lobby for access 
to crucial resources for the companies on whose boards they sit. More significantly, 
given that these political figures dominate state politics situated within weak 
institutional settings, they are likely to use government officials present in the 
boardroom to provide legitimacy when lobbying for preferential treatment with regard 
to government regulations, information, funding and projects. 
 
This research also is in line with the theory through its finding that socially privileged 
outside directors employ their social status to occupy dominant positions in 
boardrooms, creating strong connectivity among them. They use their status as a co-
optative mechanism to obtain vital resources, conduct inter-organisational 
networking, and increase the firms’ legitimacy. This theory is relevant and important 
in the context of emerging markets, given the significant role of outside directors 
from the socially privileged region of Najd in improving the financial performance of 
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Saudi corporates. Undoubtedly, the market contextual settings are pivotal in revealing 
the powerful presence of class hegemony theory, especially in emerging markets. In 
countries where social status is extremely influential (due to region of origin, religion, 
ethnicity, race and so on), individuals with such privilege who are involved in the 
local economy and on boards of directors are very likely to use their social status as a 
mechanism of resource provision. This generates positive financial performance when 
tangible and/or intangible resources are allocated to these socially well-connected 
companies. 
 
8.1.2 Agency Theory 
The results reported in this thesis about the negative impact of non-executives or 
outside directors with large ownership on firm financial performance contradict the 
Anglo–American agency theory (Jensen & Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989; Daily, 
Dalton & Cannella 2003; Withers et al. 2012), which implies that these directors are 
effective in playing the control role in emerging markets. The weak regulatory 
institutions in Saudi Arabia and many other developing countries mean such board 
members tend to expropriate the other directors and minority shareholders, damaging 
firm financial performance. Other negative implications triggered by PP conflicts are 
likely to occur between board members, negating the potentially valuable monitoring 
activities being performed by non-executive directors with large ownership. Having 
been developed in advanced economies, agency theory is generally applied by 
management and strategy researchers under the assumption that the institutional 
conditions found in developed markets are also present in emerging markets. The 
findings of this study clearly illustrate that this is not the case, and thus corporate 
activities can differ significantly depending on the context. 
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Nevertheless, the findings of this research support the argument of incentive 
alignment proposed by agency theorists; that is, that greater ownership by executives 
in the board or inside directors improves firm financial performance because it aligns 
the interests of insider directors and other shareholders, leading to an effective 
strategy in monitoring fellow executives, thereby reducing PA conflicts. While other 
Anglo–American variations of agency theory view concentrated ownership as a 
possible source of PA conflicts (Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988), the research 
presented herein suggests that concentrated ownership in the hand of executive 
directors is not a root cause of PA conflicts in the emerging Saudi economy. 
Conceptually, this can be extended to other comparable economies, in which 
ownership concentration by executive directors in fragile institutional settings could 
be the most viable and robust corporate governance mechanism with regard to 
management control and contract enforcement, thus being a remedy for PA conflicts. 
 
In addition, this study is supportive of the theoretical arguments of agency theory in 
which government representative directors enhance the control mechanisms of the 
board. The value of these directors is embedded within their posited independence, 
that in turn is significant not only in emerging countries, which suffer from poor 
quality of governance and institutions, but in developed countries, especially in the 
event of market failure. Given the states’ general tendency to commit to long-term 
investments, their independent representatives in the board are keen to provide 
credible mechanisms for transmitting information to the market, shareholders and 
investors. By retaining investment for a long duration and by holding usually large 
equity, these directors are crucial in mitigating risks associated with management 
entrenchment or minority shareholder expropriation. Therefore, the argument that 
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government representative directors lack efficiency and that this negatively impacts 
their performance in boardrooms appears less relevant, considering their effective role 
in monitoring management responsible for day-to-day operations. This signifies the 
importance of government representative directors in the Saudi context and perhaps in 
other emerging markets as a mean of improving firm financial performance through 
strengthening internal governance and reducing agency problems.  
 
8.1.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
The findings of this research do not support the notion proposed by the Anglo–
American resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978; Dalton et al. 1998; 
Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009; Johnson et al. 2013) that non-executive directors 
with large ownership play an effective resource provision role through their rich 
social capital, contributing positively to firm financial performance. This research 
found that this notion might be valid in advanced markets but is inapplicable in the 
Saudi market and likely so in other emerging markets. Due to the absence of a 
transparent, legally enforceable and impartial rule of law, outside directors with large 
ownership are likely to use the weak governance environments of emerging markets 
to exploit firm resources for their private benefit at the cost of the rest of the 
shareholders. In other words, and as is the case with agency theory, PP conflicts 
restrain resource provision by these directors, and consequently damage firm 
resources and capabilities, causing profits to plummet. Moreover, and as explained 
above, social capital in emerging markets is largely tied to political and social 
influence rather than pure market forces. In other words, directors in emerging 
markets are largely recognised and organised by social class rather than corporations.  
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Furthermore, although the research challenges the underpinning theory which holds 
that firm financial performance is enhanced by the rich human capital of foreign 
executives, it emphasises again the significance of context, in that costs which arise 
from contextual implications in an emerging market can overshadow the theoretical 
predicted benefits of these directors. While differences in culture and managerial style 
between foreign executives (largely from Western and developed countries) and local 
directors (from Eastern and developing countries) may enrich the board’s strategic 
approaches and perspectives, these differences have problematic implications. Indeed, 
the advantage of having a foreign executive in the boardroom differ between a 
company in an advanced market, which has high-quality governance standards and 
strong formal institutions, and a company in an emerging market, such as Saudi 
Arabia, which has lower-quality governance standards and weaker formal institutions. 
Appointing a foreign executive director, especially one from an economy with strong 
formal institutions, seems counterproductive to firms in emerging markets, where the 
overall level of governance and institutions is weak. 
 
That being said, the findings indicate that the likelihood that the human capital of 
foreign executives is unutilised and/or causes costly spillovers is more pronounced in 
governance conflicts with other players in the board, mostly the dominant and 
controlling shareholders, than communications conflicts and cultural differences with 
local directors. Thus, the premise that the value of foreign executive directors is 
derived from their human capital is relevant to the context of Saudi Arabia and 
perhaps to other emerging markets. Yet, its applicability depends on the availability 
of certain contextual conditions and the dismantling or weakening of others. Indeed, 
the presence of state administrative directors as enhancing mechanisms of corporate 
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governance practices would mitigate risks that are associated with the oppressive 
governance practices of directors with large ownership. Under these conditions, firms 
would be able to maximise the utilisation of foreign executives’ human capital 
beyond operational and day-to-day duties.  
 
8.1.4 Stewardship Theory 
The findings presented herein conditionally support the theoretical argument put 
forward by stewardship theorists (Donaldson & Davis 1991; Davis, Schoorman & 
Donaldson 1997; Boyd et al. 2011; Krause, Semadeni & Cannella 2014), in which 
executives in the boardroom foster the firm’s strategies and improve financial 
performance. This conditionality is derived from the significance of context and its 
impact on the applicability of Western-developed theory to an emerging markets 
context. 
 
To elaborate, relying solely on executive directors to play the strategy role effectively 
is not feasible in the Saudi market due to contextual constraints. Board–executive 
relationships in Saudi Arabia, and perhaps in other comparable markets, appear to be 
mostly about operations, with hardly any executive involvement in articulating 
strategies. This exclusion of executives from such an important and relevant 
managerial role is thought to be attributable to limitations imposed or conflicts caused 
by boards, including unfavourable and sceptical perceptions, rather than executive 
competence to perform such a role. This is plausible in Saudi Arabia, and possibly in 
other emerging markets, given the previous clarification that Saudi boards generally 
perceive executives as merely reporters and servants (refer chapter 4, page 78). With 
this in mind, non-executive directors think favourably about their peers and 
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sceptically about executive directors, creating a negative working environment among 
board members, and leading to destructive board deliberations. Therefore, the premise 
of stewardship theory does not hold in the Saudi market. 
 
However, the theory can find a foothold in that Saudi executive directors effectively 
participate in board activities and perform the strategy role when endorsing 
governance mechanisms are present in the boardroom – namely, state representatives. 
As they do in their role in enabling the utilisation of the human capital of foreign 
executives, state representatives appear to hold the key to providing an environment 
of trust and support to executives to contribute and be part of board policymaking 
mechanisms. By reducing problems associated with demographic heterogeneity, and 
interpersonal conflicts with non-executive directors, government representatives, as 
promoters of good governance, are seen to a certain degree as influencers who 
strengthen the organisational commitment and identification of executives. Hence, 
executives are identified as stewards with pro-organisational behaviour and motivated 
to play their role in articulating firm strategies. In this condition, stewardship theory is 
relevant and valid in the Saudi market and potentially in other emerging market 
contexts. 
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8.2 Practical Implications 
The practical implications of this research flow from its detailed and empirically 
derived understanding of board structure and its effectiveness in relation to firm 
financial performance in the Saudi Arabian market. 
 
The first practical implication of this study is that it serves to increase the awareness 
of the significance of board structure as a fundamental mechanism of corporate 
governance practices that affect firm profitability in emerging economies, and 
specifically in Saudi Arabia. Such a mechanism is underlined and influenced by the 
institutional settings of those economies. Indeed, since emerging markets generally 
lack effective formal institutions, it is imperative to utilise the informal and yet 
effective arrangements of social, political and administrative institutions that are 
unique to each emerging market. Hence, a contextually embedded configuration of 
board members in emerging markets that goes beyond the conventional classifications 
of independent, outside, and inside directors would undoubtedly influence board 
deliberations and thereby financial outcomes for firms and investors. Similarly, 
international organisations like the IMF that offer consultancy and recommendations 
to regulators and investors should consider this contextual uniqueness when 
considering corporate governance practices in emerging markets. Such consideration 
would lead to more accurate and informative assessments, and therefore more 
relevant and practical policy recommendations. 
 
Secondly, the research shows that firms and shareholders are better off when certain 
politically and socially influential players are present in Saudi boards of directors. 
Specifically, firm profit is relatively high when boards contain outside directors with 
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royal status and outside directors originating from Najd, because these players are 
more able than others to facilitate access to resources and mitigate market risk. Firms 
with more of these players in the board are more likely to have resilient supply 
networks in the marketplace. 
 
Thirdly, the research found that concentrated ownership together with the rule of law 
in the Saudi business environment influence the deliberation of board members. 
Directors with large ownership actively engaged in management duties should be 
financially favourable stewards, forming a mutually beneficial relationship with the 
firm and the rest of its shareholders. In contrast, blockholders holding directorships 
without executive positions would most likely clash with minority shareholders and 
take advantage of firm resources at the cost of firm profitability. Until the Saudi 
contextual settings with relation to minority shareholder protection and the rule of law 
are improved, it is recommended that investors with large ownership sitting on boards 
should be directly involved in managing the firm, otherwise their influence and 
intervention should be curbed. 
 
The fourth practical implication of this thesis is that while Saudi firms could benefit 
from the rich human capital of non-Saudi executives, as suggested by previous studies 
(Ali 2008; Sadi & Al-Buraey 2009), this is not necessarily the case when these 
individuals become members of boards of directors. The lack of effectiveness and 
hence impact of these board members is arguably not due to contradiction with their 
presumed valuable human capital and commitment, but rather because of poor 
communication derived from differences between them and Saudi directors in 
managerial style, which limit their ability to function effectively. Once trust and 
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collaboration between inside non-Saudi directors and other board members is 
established or restored, their participation on the board would most likely strengthen 
the firm’s future directions, enabling them to formulate and pursue long-team 
strategies rather than short-sighted initiatives. 
 
Fifth, it is evident that the presence of SGRDs in Tadawul firms drives organisations 
to perform better financially, presumably as a result of better governance practices. 
This finding supports Al-Majed’s (2012) and Al-Kahtani’s (2014) suggestions that 
SGRDs are effective monitors and promoters of good corporate governance. Tadawul 
has had a volatile past; its future can be safeguarded by ensuring that a high 
proportion of boardrooms contain Saudi government representatives, providing a 
crucial stabilising mechanism. It is likely that firms without such links miss out on 
government backing and are more vulnerable to market volatility.  
 
Sixth, this study shows that SGRDs moderate the relationship between inside non-
Saudi directors and firm financial performance, suggesting that SGRDs’ provision of 
good governance enables non-Saudi executives to play their strategic role effectively 
and overcome divergences and conflicts with the rest of the board. While this 
functional conditionality facing inside non-Saudi directors should not exist, it is a 
practical solution given the cultural and structural realities of the Saudi market. 
Similarly, this study has revealed that SGRDs moderate the relationship between 
outside directors with royal status and firm financial performance, suggesting that 
SGRDs’ provision of ties to government enables royal board members to legitimise 
their privileged access to lucrative government contracts. Given the political reality 
that royals have enormous influence across the spectrum in Saudi Arabia, having both 
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these categories of directorship is a significant practical strategy for Tadawul firms to 
adopt. 
 
Lastly, the research makes the general point that in emerging markets, tailoring board 
structure to reflect the social, political and economic status quo has substantial 
benefits for publicly listed firms. Because the sociopolitical and economic settings in 
emerging markets are largely informally institutionalised, relying on them when doing 
business is not necessarily sustainable. In fact, this could lead to severe social, and 
political, and market problems in the long term. Hence, governments in countries with 
emerging markets should engage in comprehensive reforms that make market 
transparency a priority. Transparent and effectively implemented regulations promote 
stable, robust and long-lasting markets; they are key elements of sound economic 
governance based on accountability, fairness and citizen engagement. Lessons should 
be learnt from markets that have moved from emerging to advanced status in recent 
decades such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan (IMF 2008). Further, to achieve 
sustainable growth, companies should conduct internal reforms rather than relying on 
regulators to drive change, particularly with respect to the issues of board 
independence and the roles of inside directors. As explained in the previous chapters, 
a structure for a board of directors that optimises the contextual settings to overcome 
weak formal institutions is not equivalent to a robust, transparent, independently 
functioning organisational system. If a choice has to be made, it ideally should be 
about moving towards institution-based rather than contextualised model. Yet, firms 
seeking to benefit from the business current boom in emerging markets would be 
better off by practically adjusting to the realities of emerging markets. 
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8.3 Limitations 
As with any research, this study had some limitations. These limitations and their 
implications for the research results are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
First, as the objective of this study was to look at the targeted phenomenon from a 
holistic perspective, an empirical examination was conducted which involved all the 
listed firms in the Tadawul, combining all firms from all sectors of the market in one 
pool. This approach may have ignored important differences between market sectors 
– differences related to the business models and characteristics of each sector, which 
could have implications for optimal board composition. A sector-specific 
investigation might give different outcomes than the ones this thesis has reported. 
 
Second, the short time period of the sample (five years) might be a cause for concern; 
many firms operate over decades, and market conditions can change dramatically 
over such timescales (as the 2006 Tadawul crisis shows). Unfortunately, due to the 
lack of historical data to which the results of this research can be compared, no 
determination can be made as to whether these results are representative of Saudi 
firms over the long term, or whether the theory that guided this study is applicable 
over longer time scales. In this regard, it is important to clarify that the researcher 
gathered all available secondary data about Tadawul firms; all such data were 
analysed. 
 
Third, while data collected about the entire Saudi market was analysed in this 
research, the total number of 131 firms represented is small in comparison with other 
emerging stock markets (such as Taiwan with 882 firms, South Africa with 381 firms, 
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and Brazil with 362 firms (WFE 2015). Hence, it is possible that analysis of a sample 
from an emerging market with a greater number of firms would produce different 
outcomes. 
 
Fourth, this research employed quantitative, archival-based methods to examine the 
impact of board composition on firm financial performance. The use of qualitative 
methods such as interviews, questionnaires and direct observations to produce 
primary data might have generated different and/or different insights than those 
reported in the thesis. 
 
Fifth, this paper used the accounting-based measure of ROA to capture firm financial 
performance. While ROA is widely used in comparative studies in the governance 
field, employing other measures that account for liquidity, solvency and profitability 
might better capture firm financial performance. 
 
Sixth, restriction of the research to one country could limit the generalisability of the 
findings. Just as research developed within an advanced market context may not be 
applicable to emerging markets, as argued herein, the finding of this study could be 
specific to the Saudi context. For example, the findings in relation to outside directors 
from a privileged region is not applicable to countries where regionalism has little or 
no political or economic influence. However, regional status can be replaced with 
factors such as ethnic or religious status in other emerging market contexts. Hence, 
with careful consideration of the contexts of other emerging countries, the results 
reported in this thesis are plausibly representative of countries that share some or all 
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of the characteristics of Saudi Arabia (including absolute monarchical or party rule, 
and/or a highly influential social class). 
 
8.4 Suggestions for Future Research  
Given the fact that very little research has been conducted in the field of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia, and that this work is the first to empirically investigate 
the effect of board composition on the financial performance of Tadawul firms, it is 
clear that there are many potentially fruitful areas of research in the Saudi context.  
 
As mentioned in the limitations section above, sector-specific studies could 
investigate the implications of the characteristics of each sector for corporate 
governance. Given the evidence this study generated about the significance of 
directors with large ownerships and SGRDs, future research could target board 
deliberations and their impact on firm operation and strategy. In addition, the effect 
on firm performance of foreign institutional investors, who were allowed to enter the 
Tadawul at the end of 2015, is an obvious topic for future research.  
 
This research revealed evidence suggesting that inside directors (whether local or 
foreign), had a negative influence on firm performance. Future research could seek to 
determine whether their lack of effectiveness is due to cultural or methodological 
differences, incompetence, or being rendered incapable of performing their duties due 
to limitations imposed by other directors. 
 
Future researchers are encouraged to use a variety of both accounting-based and 
market–based measurements, along with different analytical modellings than those 
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implemented in this study, such as structural equation modelling and panel data using 
random and/or fixed effects models. Diverse, sophisticated and robust analyses would 
undoubtedly enhance understanding of corporate governance practices in emerging 
markets and their impact on firm operations, and could uncovered new and important 
patterns.  
 
This researcher urges that future studies investigate the phenomenon of board 
composition – and corporate governance in general – in emerging markets using a 
more comprehensive research agenda than has been the case in much previous work. 
Bundling conventional theories with contextual considerations – as used in this 
research –offers more informative insights when evaluating the implications of board 
composition and corporate governance in emerging markets. In addition, while the 
limited knowledge of the relationship between board structure and firm financial 
performance is at least partially ‘due to the fact that it is quite difficult for researchers 
to access and observe how board of directors work’ (Payne et al. 2009, p. 705), 
dedicated qualitative and observational research could yield more insights on how 
boards really function and how they affect firm performance. 
 
Finally, to test the generalisability of the research’s findings, it is important for future 
studies to explore the relationships described in this thesis in other emerging 
economies. Comparative studies could be conducted in similar contexts, like the GCC 
nations or other Arab countries, or in countries with social and political conditions 
similar to those in Saudi Arabia. The results could be compared with those produced 
in advanced markets, potentially leading to the establishment of a new and 
increasingly important field of research. 
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8.5 Summary 
This chapter concludes this empirical investigation of the phenomenon of board 
structure and firm financial performance in the context of the emerging Saudi Arabian 
market. The theoretical implications and contribution to literature of the research are 
presented, as well as the implications of the findings for practice, the limitations of 
the study and how they might affect the results, and directions for future research.    
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Corporate Governance Codes and Principles in Saudi Arabia 
CAPITAL MARKET AUTHORITY 
 
 
 
 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATIONS IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI 
ARABIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority Pursuant to Resolution No. 
1/212/2006 dated 21/10/1427AH (corresponding to 12/11/2006) based on the Capital 
Market Law issued by Royal Decree No. M/30 dated 2/6/1424AH 
 
Amended by Resolution of the Board 
 
of the Capital Market Authority Number 1-10-2010 Dated 30/3/1431H 
corresponding to 16/3/2010G 
 
 
 
 
English Translation of the Official Arabic Text 
 
Arabic is the official language of the Capital Market Authority 
 
 
The current version of these Rules, as may be amended, can be found at on the CMA 
website: www.cma.org.sa 
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PART 1 
 
 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
 
 
Article 1: Preamble 
 
a) These Regulations include the rules and standards that regulate the 
management of joint stock companies listed in the Exchange to ensure their 
compliance with the best governance practices that would ensure the 
protection of shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of stakeholders.  
 
b) These Regulations constitute the guiding principles for all companies listed in 
the Exchange unless any other regulations, rules or resolutions of the Board of 
the Authority provide for the binding effect of some of the provisions herein 
contained.  
 
c) As an exception of paragraph (b) of this article, a company must disclose in 
the Board of Directors` report, the provisions that have been implemented and 
the provisions that have not been implemented as well as the reasons for not 
implementing them.  
 
Article 2: Definitions 
 
a) Expression and terms in these regulations have the meanings they bear in the 
Capital Market Law and in the glossary of defined terms used in the 
regulations and the rules of the Capital Market Authority unless otherwise 
stated in these regulations.  
 
b) For the purpose of implementing these regulations, the following expressions 
and terms shall have the meaning they bear as follows unless the contrary 
intention appears:  
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Independent Member: A member of the Board of Directors who enjoys complete 
independence. By way of example, the following shall constitute an infringement of 
such independence: 
 
1. he/she holds a five per cent or more of the issued shares of the company or 
any of its group.  
2. Being a representative of a legal person that holds a five per cent or more of 
the issued shares of the company or any of its group.  
3. he/she, during the preceding two years, has been a senior executive of the 
company or of any other company within that company’s group.  
4. he/she is a first-degree relative of any board member of the company or of 
any other company within that company’s group.  
5. he/she is first-degree relative of any of senior executives of the company or 
of any other company within that company’s group.  
6. he/she is a board member of any company within the group of the company 
which he is nominated to be a member of its board.  
7. If he/she, during the preceding two years, has been an employee with an 
affiliate of the company or an affiliate of any company of its group, such as 
external auditors or main suppliers; or if he/she, during the preceding two 
years, had a controlling interest in any such party.  
 
Non-executive director: A member of the Board of Directors who does not have a 
full-time management position at the company, or who does not receive monthly or 
yearly salary. 
 
First-degree relatives: father, mother, spouse and children. 
 
Stakeholders: Any person who has an interest in the company, such as shareholders, 
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, community. 
 
Accumulative Voting: a method of voting for electing directors, which gives each 
shareholder a voting rights equivalent to the number of shares he/she holds. He/she 
has the right to use them all for one nominee or to divide them between his/her 
selected nominees without any duplication of these votes. This method increases the 
chances of the minority shareholders to appoint their representatives in the board 
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through the right to accumulate votes for one nominee. 
 
Minority Shareholders: Those shareholders who represent a class of shareholders 
that does not control the company and hence they are unable to influence the 
company. 
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PART 2 
 
RIGHTS OF SHAREHOLDERS AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
Article 3: General Rights of Shareholders 
 
A Shareholder shall be entitled to all rights attached to the share, in particular, the 
right to a share of the distributable profits, the right to a share of the company’s assets 
upon liquidation; the right to attend the General Assembly and participate in 
deliberations and vote on relevant decisions; the right of disposition with respect to 
shares; the right to supervise the Board of Directors activities, and file responsibility 
claims against board members; the right to inquire and have access to information 
without prejudice to the company’s interests and in a manner that does not contradict 
the Capital Market Law and the Implementing Rules. 
 
 
Article 4: Facilitation of Shareholders Exercise of Rights and Access to 
Information 
 
a) The company in its Articles of Association and by-laws shall specify the 
procedures and precautions that are necessary for the shareholders’ exercise of 
all their lawful rights.  
 
b) All information which enable shareholders to properly exercise their rights 
shall be made available and such information shall be comprehensive and 
accurate; it must be provided and updated regularly and within the prescribed 
times; the company shall use the most effective means in communicating with 
shareholders. No discrepancy shall be exercised with respect to shareholders in 
relation to providing information.  
 
 
Article 5: Shareholders Rights related to the General Assembly 
 
a) A General Assembly shall convene once a year at least within the six months 
following the end of the company’s financial year.  
 
b) The General Assembly shall convene upon a request of the Board of Directors. 
The Board of Directors shall invite a General Assembly to convene pursuant to 
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a request of the auditor or a number of shareholders whose shareholdings 
represent at least 5% of the equity share capital.  
 
c) Date, place, and agenda of the General Assembly shall be specified and 
announced by a notice, at least 20 days prior to the date the meeting;  
invitation for the meeting shall be published in the Exchange’ website, the 
company’s website and in two newspapers of voluminous distribution in the 
Kingdom. Modern high tech means shall be used in communicating with 
shareholders. 
 
d) Shareholders shall be allowed the opportunity to effectively participate and 
vote in the General Assembly; they shall be informed about the rules 
governing the meetings and the voting procedure.  
 
e) Arrangements shall be made for facilitating the participation of the greatest 
number of shareholders in the General Assembly, including inter alia 
determination of the appropriate place and time.  
 
f) In preparing the General Assembly’s agenda, the Board of Directors shall take 
into consideration matters shareholders require to be listed in that agenda; 
shareholders holding not less than 5% of the company’s shares are entitled to 
add one or more items to the agenda. upon its preparation.  
 
g) Shareholders shall be entitled to discuss matters listed in the agenda of the 
General Assembly and raise relevant questions to the board members and to 
the external auditor. The Board of Directors or the external auditor shall 
answer the questions raised by shareholders in a manner that does not 
prejudice the company’s interest.  
 
h) Matters presented to the General Assembly shall be accompanied by sufficient 
information to enable shareholders to make decisions.  
 
i) Shareholders shall be enabled to peruse the minutes of the General Assembly; 
the company shall provide the Authority with a copy of those minutes within 
10 days of the convening date of any such meeting.  
 
j) The Exchange shall be immediately informed of the results of the General 
Assembly.  
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Article 6: Voting Rights 
 
a) Voting is deemed to be a fundamental right of a shareholder, which shall not, in 
any way, be denied. The company must avoid taking any action which might 
hamper the use of the voting right; a shareholder must be afforded all possible 
assistance as may facilitate the exercise of such right. 
 
b) In voting in the General Assembly for the nomination to the board members, 
the accumulative voting method shall be applied.  
 
c) A shareholder may, in writing, appoint any other shareholder who is not a 
board member and who is not an employee of the company to attend the 
General Assembly on his behalf.  
 
d) Investors who are judicial persons and who act on behalf of others - e.g. 
investment funds- shall disclose in their annual reports their voting policies, 
actual voting, and ways of dealing with any material conflict of interests that 
may affect the practice of the fundamental rights in relation to their 
investments.  
 
 
Article 7: Dividends Rights of Shareholders 
 
a) The Board of Directors shall lay down a clear policy regarding dividends, in a 
manner that may realize the interests of shareholders and those of the 
company; shareholders shall be informed of that policy during the General 
Assembly and reference thereto shall be made in the report of the Board of 
Directors.  
 
b) The General Assembly shall approve the dividends and the date of 
distribution. These dividends, whether they be in cash or bonus shares shall be 
given, as of right, to the shareholders who are listed in the records kept at the 
Securities Depository Center as they appear at the end of trading session on 
the day on which the General Assembly is convened.  
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PART 3 
 
DISCLOSURE AND TRANSPARENCY 
Article 8: Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure 
 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and supervisory 
rules related to disclosure, pursuant to law. 
 
 
Article 9: Disclosure in the Board of Directors’ Report 
 
In addition to what is required in the Listing Rules in connection with the content 
of the report of the Board of Directors, which is appended to the annual financial 
statements of the company, such report shall include the following: 
 
a) The implemented provisions of these Regulations as well as the 
provisions which have not been implemented, and the justifications for 
not implementing them.  
 
b) Names of any joint stock company or companies in which the company 
Board of Directors member acts as a member of its Board of directors.  
 
c) Formation of the Board of Directors and classification of its members as 
follows: executive board member, non-executive board member, or 
independent board member.  
 
d) A brief description of the jurisdictions and duties of the Board's main 
committees such as the Audit Committee, the Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee; indicating their names, names of their 
chairmen, names of their members, and the aggregate of their respective 
meetings.  
 
e) Details of compensation and remuneration paid to each of the following:  
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1. The Chairman and members of the Board of Directors.  
2. The Top Five executives who have received the highest compensation and 
remuneration from the company. The CEO and the chief finance officer 
shall be included if they are not within the top five. 
For the purpose of this paragraph, “compensation and remuneration” 
means salaries, allowances, profits and any of the same; annual and 
periodic bonuses related to performance; long or short- term incentive 
schemes; and any other rights in rem.  
 
f) Any punishment or penalty or preventive restriction imposed on the company 
by the Authority or any other supervisory or regulatory or judiciary body. 
 
g) Results of the annual audit of the effectiveness of the internal control 
procedures of the company.  
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PART 4 
 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
Article 10: Main Functions of the Board of Directors 
 
Among the main functions of the Board is the following: 
 
a) Approving the strategic plans and main objectives of the company and 
supervising their implementation; this includes:  
 
1. Laying down a comprehensive strategy for the company, the main 
work plans and the policy related to risk management, reviewing and 
updating of such policy.  
2. Determining the most appropriate capital structure of the company, its 
strategies and financial objectives and approving its annual budgets.  
3. Supervising the main capital expenses of the company and 
acquisition/disposal of assets.  
4. Deciding the performance objectives to be achieved and supervising 
the implementation thereof and the overall performance of the 
company.  
5. Reviewing and approving the organizational and functional structures 
of the company on a periodical basis.  
 
b) Lay down rules for internal control systems and supervising them; this 
includes:  
 
1. Developing a written policy that would regulates conflict of interest 
and remedy any possible cases of conflict by members of the Board of 
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Directors, executive management and shareholders. This includes 
misuse of the company’s assets and facilities and the arbitrary 
disposition resulting from dealings with the related parties.  
2. Ensuring the integrity of the financial and accounting procedures 
including procedures related to the preparation of the financial reports.  
3. Ensuring the implementation of control procedures appropriate for risk 
management by forecasting the risks that the company could 
encounter and disclosing them with transparency.  
4. Reviewing annually the effectiveness of the internal control systems.  
 
c) Drafting a Corporate Governance Code for the company that does not 
contradict the provisions of this regulation, supervising and monitoring in general 
the effectiveness of the code and amending it whenever necessary.  
 
d) Laying down specific and explicit policies, standards and procedures, for the 
membership of the Board of Directors and implementing them after they have 
been approved by the General Assembly.  
 
e) Outlining a written policy that regulate the relationship with stakeholders with 
a view to protecting their respective rights; in particular, such policy must 
cover the following:  
 
1. Mechanisms for indemnifying the stakeholders in case of contravening 
their rights under the law and their respective contracts.  
2. Mechanisms for settlement of complaints or disputes that might arise 
between the company and the stakeholders.  
3. Suitable mechanisms for maintaining good relationships with customers 
and suppliers and protecting the confidentiality of information related to 
them.  
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4. A code of conduct for the company’s executives and employees 
compatible with the proper professional and ethical standards, and regulate 
their relationship with the stakeholders. The Board of Directors lays down 
procedures for supervising this code and ensuring compliance there with.  
5. The Company’s social contributions.  
 
f) Deciding policies and procedures to ensure the company’s compliance with 
the laws and regulations and the company’s obligation to disclose material 
information to shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders.  
 
Article 11: Responsibilities of the Board 
 
a) Without prejudice to the competences of the General Assembly, the 
company’s Board of Directors shall assume all the necessary powers for the 
company’s management. The ultimate responsibility for the company rests 
with the Board even if it sets up committees or delegates some of its powers to 
a third party. The Board of Directors shall avoid issuing general or indefinite 
power of attorney.  
 
b) The responsibilities of the Board of Directors must be clearly stated in the 
company’s Articles of Association.  
 
c) The Board of Directors must carry out its duties in a responsible manner, in 
good faith and with due diligence. Its decisions should be based on sufficient 
information from the executive management, or from any other reliable 
source.  
 
d) A member of the Board of Directors represents all shareholders; he undertakes 
to carry out whatever may be in the general interest of the company, but not 
the interests of the group he represents or that which voted in favor of his 
appointment to the Board of Directors.  
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e) The Board of Directors shall determine the powers to be delegated to the 
executive management and the procedures for taking any action and the 
validity of such delegation. It shall also determine matters reserved for 
decision by the Board of Directors. The executive management shall submit to 
the Board of Directors periodic reports on the exercise of the delegated 
powers.  
 
f) The Board of Directors shall ensure that a procedure is laid down for orienting 
the new board members of the company’s business and, in particular, the 
financial and legal aspects, in addition to their training, where necessary.  
 
 
g) The Board of Directors shall ensure that sufficient information about the 
company is made available to all members of the Board of Directors, 
generally, and, in particular, to the non-executive members, to enable them to 
discharge their duties and responsibilities in an effective manner.  
 
h) The Board of Directors shall not be entitled to enter into loans which spans more 
than three years, and shall not sell or mortgage real estate of the company, or 
drop the company's debts, unless it is authorized to do so by the company’s 
Articles of Association. In the case where the company’s Articles of 
Association includes no provisions to this respect, the Board should not act 
without the approval of the General Assembly, unless such acts fall within the 
normal scope of the company’s business. 
 
Article 12: Formation of the Board 
 
Formation of the Board of Directors shall be subject to the following: 
 
a) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the number of the 
Board of Directors members, provided that such number shall not be less than 
three and not more than eleven.  
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b) The General Assembly shall appoint the members of the Board of Directors 
for the duration provided for in the Articles of Association of the company, 
provided that such duration shall not exceed three years. Unless otherwise 
provided for in the Articles of Association of the company, members of the 
Board may be reappointed.  
 
c) The majority of the members of the Board of Directors shall be non-executive 
members.  
 
d) It is prohibited to conjoin the position of the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors with any other executive position in the company, such as the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) or the managing director or the general manager.  
 
e) The independent members of the Board of Directors shall not be less than two 
members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater.  
 
f) The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the manner in which 
membership of the Board of Directors terminates. At all times, the General 
Assembly may dismiss all or any of the members of the Board of Directors 
even though the Articles of Association provide otherwise. 
g) On termination of membership of a board member in any of the ways of 
termination, the company shall promptly notify the Authority and the 
Exchange and shall specify the reasons for such termination.  
 
h) A member of the Board of Directors shall not act as a member of the Board of 
Directors of more than five joint stock companies at the same time.  
 
i) Judicial person who is entitled under the company’s Articles of Association to 
appoint representatives in the Board of Directors, is not entitled to nomination 
vote of other members of the Board of Directors.  
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Article 13: Committees of the Board 
 
a) A suitable number of committees shall be set up in accordance with the 
company’s requirements and circumstances, in order to enable the Board of 
Directors to perform its duties in an effective manner.  
 
b) The formation of committees subordinate to the Board of Directors shall be 
according to general procedures laid down by the Board, indicating the duties, 
the duration and the powers of each committee, and the manner in which the 
Board monitors its activities. The committee shall notify the Board of its 
activities, findings or decisions with complete transparency. The Board shall 
periodically pursue the activities of such committees so as to ensure that the 
activities entrusted to those committees are duly performed. The Board shall 
approve the by-laws of all committees of the Board, including, inter alia, the 
Audit Committee, Nomination and Remuneration Committee.  
c) A sufficient number of the non-executive members of the Board of Directors 
shall be appointed in committees that are concerned with activities that might 
involve a conflict of interest, such as ensuring the integrity of the financial and 
non-financial reports, reviewing the deals concluded by related parties, 
nomination to membership of the Board, appointment of executive directors, 
and determination of remuneration.  
 
 
Article 14: Audit Committee 
 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named the “Audit 
Committee”. Its members shall not be less than three, including a specialist in 
financial and accounting matters. Executive board members are not eligible for 
Audit Committee membership.  
 
b) The General Assembly of shareholders shall, upon a recommendation of the 
Board of Directors, issue rules for appointing the members of the Audit 
Committee and define the term of their office and the procedure to be followed 
by the Committee.  
 244 
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Audit Committee include the following:  
 
1. To supervise the company’s internal audit department to ensure its 
effectiveness in executing the activities and duties specified by the 
Board of Directors.  
2. To review the internal audit reports and pursue the implementation of 
the corrective measures in respect of the comments included in them.  
3. To recommend to the Board of Directors the appointment, dismissal 
and the Remuneration of external auditors; upon any such 
recommendation, regard must be made to their independence.  
4. To supervise the activities of the external auditors and approve any 
activity beyond the scope of the audit work assigned to them during 
the performance of their duties. 
5. To review together with the external auditor the audit plan and make 
any comments thereon.  
7. To review the external auditor’s comments on the financial statements 
and follow up the actions taken about them.  
8. To review the interim and annual financial statements prior to 
presentation to the Board of Directors; and to give opinion and 
recommendations with respect thereto.  
9. To review the accounting policies in force and advise the Board of 
Directors of any recommendation regarding them.  
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Article 15: Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
 
a) The Board of Directors shall set up a committee to be named “Nomination and 
Remuneration Committee”.  
 
b) The General Assembly shall, upon a recommendation of the Board of 
Directors, issue rules for the appointment of the members of the Nomination 
and Remuneration Committee, their remunerations, and terms of office and the 
procedure to be followed by such committee.  
 
c) The duties and responsibilities of the Nomination and Remuneration 
Committee include the following:  
 
1. Recommend to the Board of Directors appointments to membership of the 
Board in accordance with the approved policies and standards; the 
Committee shall ensure that no person who has been previously convicted 
of any offense affecting honor or honesty is nominated for such 
membership.  
2. Annual review of the requirement of suitable skills for membership of the 
Board of Directors and the preparation of a description of the required 
capabilities and qualifications for such membership, including, inter alia, 
the time that a Board member should reserve for the activities of the Board.  
3. Review the structure of the Board of Directors and recommend changes.  
4. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board of Directors 
and recommend remedies that are compatible with the company’s interest.  
5. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the independent members 
and the absence of any conflict of interest in case a Board member also 
acts as a member of the Board of Directors of another company.  
6. Determine the points of strength and weakness in the Board of Directors 
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and recommend remedies that are compatible with the company’s interest.  
7. Ensure on an annual basis the independence of the independent members 
and the absence of any conflict of interest in case a Board member also 
acts as a member of the Board of Directors of another company.  
 
Article 16: Meetings of the Board 
 
a) The Board members shall allot ample time for performing their responsibilities, 
including the preparation for the meetings of the Board and the permanent and 
ad hoc committees, and shall endeavor to attend such meetings. 
 
b) The Board shall convene its ordinary meetings regularly upon a request by the 
Chairman. The Chairman shall call the Board for an unforeseen meeting upon a 
written request by two of its members.  
 
c) When preparing a specified agenda to be presented to the Board, the Chairman 
should consult the other members of the Board and the CEO. The agenda and 
other documentation should be sent to the members in a sufficient time prior to 
the meeting so that they may be able to consider such matters and prepare 
themselves for the meeting. Once convened, the Board shall approve the 
agenda; should any member of the Board raise any objection to this agenda, the 
details of such objection shall be entered in the minutes of the meeting.  
 
d) The Board shall document its meetings and prepare records of the deliberations 
and the voting, and arrange for these records to be kept in chapters for ease of 
reference.  
 
Article 17:  Remuneration and Indemnification of Board Members 
 
The Articles of Association of the company shall set forth the manner of remunerating 
the Board members; such remuneration may take the form of a lump sum amount, 
attendance allowance, rights in rem or a certain percentage of the profits. Any two or 
more of these privileges may be conjoined. 
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Article 18. Conflict of Interest within the Board 
 
a) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization from the General 
Assembly, to be renewed each year, have any interest (whether directly or 
indirectly) in the company’s business and contracts. The activities to be 
performed through general bidding shall constitute an exception where a 
Board member is the best bidder. A Board member shall notify the Board of 
Directors of any personal interest he/she may have in the business and 
contracts that are completed for the company’s account. Such notification shall 
be entered in the minutes of the meeting. A Board member who is an 
interested party shall not be entitled to vote on the resolution to be adopted in 
this regard neither in the General Assembly nor in the Board of Directors. The 
Chairman of the Board of Directors shall notify the General Assembly, when 
convened, of the activities and contracts in respect of which a Board member 
may have a personal interest and shall attach to such notification a special 
report prepared by the company’s auditor.  
 
b) A Board member shall not, without a prior authorization of the General 
Assembly, to be renewed annually, participate in any activity which may 
likely compete with the activities of the company, or trade in any branch of the 
activities carried out by the company.  
 
c) The company shall not grant cash loan whatsoever to any of its Board 
members or render guarantee in respect of any loan entered into by a Board 
member with third parties, excluding banks and other fiduciary companies. 
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PART 5 
 
CLOSING PROVISIONS 
 
 
 
Article 19: Publication and Entry into Force 
 
These regulations shall be effective upon the date of their publication. 
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Appendix 2: KDE Plots for the Base and Main Models 
 
 
 250 
Appendix 3: Analysis of the Suspect Endogenous Variable and Instrumental 
Variables a 
 
Instrumental Variables The OLS Model 
Ownership Concentration of Outside 
Directors with Large Ownership 0.177**  (0.066) 
Directorial interlocks  0.144*** (0.042) 
Constant 0.519*** (0.025) 
 
N 560 
 Adj R^ 0.025 
 F 9.310 
 Prob > F 0.000   
a: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
